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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE MACROECONOMICS OF INCOME INEQUALITY
Serdar Ozkan
Supervisor: Dirk Krueger
Economic inequality has been an important feature of the developed economies since
the 1970s. Thus understanding the determinants and consequences of economic in-
equality is central to macroeconomics. This thesis consists of three chapters, each of
which focuses on a different aspect of inequality.
First, we investigate the differences in wage inequality between the United States
and continental European countries (CEU). Wage inequality has been significantly
higher in the US compared to the CEU since the 1970s. Moreover, this inequality
gap has further widened during this period as the US has experienced a large increase
in wage inequality, whereas the CEU has seen only modest changes. We study the
role of redistributive institutions, particularly progressive income tax policies, for
understanding these facts in a human capital accumulation setting.
Second, we focus on statistical modeling of labor income risk over the life cycle.
In particular, we investigate whether workers at different ages face the same variance
of income risk and how the persistence of earnings changes over the life cycle. Using
the PSID data, we estimate a novel specification for idiosyncratic income risk that
allows for both the persistence and variance of earnings shocks vary by age. We
find, contrary to the previous literature, that persistence is only moderate for young
workers (around 0.70) and variance of persistence shocks follows a pronounced U-
shaped pattern over the life cycle. We also study consumption-savings implications
of these non-flat profiles.
vi
Third, we study differences in health care usage between low- and high-income
households. Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) we
find that early in life the rich spend more on health care, whereas midway through
life until old age medical spending of the poor exceeds that of the rich. In addition
the distribution of medical expenditures of the poor is more widely spread to the
tails. To account for these facts we develop and estimate a life-cycle model of two
distinct types of health capital: preventive and physical. Preventive health capital
determines the distribution of health shocks, whereas physical health capital governs
survival probabilities. We use the model to evaluate the effects of the recent health
care reform in the economy. Our results suggest that policies encouraging the use of
health care by the poor early in life have significant welfare gains, even when fully
accounting for the increase in taxes required to pay for them.
vii
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Chapter 1
Taxation of Human Capital and
Wage Inequality: A Cross-Country
Analysis
This chapter is first presented in Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009) and is co-
authered with Fatih Guvenen and Burhanettin Kuruscu.
Abstract
Wage inequality has been significantly higher in the United States than in continental
European countries (CEU) since the 1970s. Moreover, this inequality gap has further
widened during this period as the US has experienced a large increase in wage inequal-
ity. This paper studies the role of labor income tax policies for understanding these
facts. We begin by documenting two new empirical facts that link these inequality
differences to tax policies. First, we show that countries with more progressive labor
income tax schedules have significantly lower before-tax wage inequality at different
points in time. Second, progressivity is also negatively correlated with the rise in
wage inequality during this period. We then construct a life cycle model in which
individuals decide each period whether to go to school, work, or be unemployed. In-
dividuals can accumulate skills either in school or while working. Wage inequality
arises from differences across individuals in their ability to learn new skills as well
as from idiosyncratic shocks. Progressive taxation compresses the (after-tax) wage
structure, thereby distorting the incentives to accumulate human capital, in turn re-
ducing the cross-sectional dispersion of (before-tax) wages. We find that these policies
can account for half of the difference between the US and the CEU in overall wage
inequality and 76% of the difference in inequality at the upper end (log 90-50 differen-
tial). When this economy experiences skill-biased technological change, progressivity
also dampens the rise in wage dispersion over time. The model explains 41% of the
difference in the total rise in inequality and 58% of the difference at the upper end.
1
1.1 Introduction
Why is wage inequality significantly higher in the United States (and the United King-
dom) than in continental European countries (CEU)? And why has this inequality gap
between the US and the CEU widened substantially since the 1970s (see Table 1.1)?
More broadly, what are the determinants of wage dispersion in modern economies?
How do these determinants interact with technological progress and government poli-
cies? The goal of this paper is to shed light on these questions by studying the
impact of labor market (tax) policies on the determination of wage inequality, using
cross-country data.
We begin by documenting two new empirical relationships between wage inequal-
ity and tax policy. First, we show that countries with more progressive labor income
tax schedules have significantly lower wage inequality at different points in time. The
measure of wages we use is “gross before-tax wages”1 and can therefore be thought
of as a proxy for the marginal product of workers. From this perspective, progres-
sivity is associated with a more compressed productivity distribution across workers.
Second, we show that countries with more progressive income taxes have also experi-
enced a smaller rise in wage inequality over time, and this relationship is especially
strong above the median of the wage distribution. This latter finding is intriguing
because the substantial part of the rise in wage inequality since 1980 has taken place
precisely here—above the median of the distribution (see Table 1.2). Overall, these
findings reveal a close relationship between progressivity and wage inequality, which
motivates the focus of this paper. However, on their own, these correlations fall short
of providing a quantitative assessment of the importance of the tax structure—e.g.,
1More precisely, wages are measured before taxes and the employee’s social security contributions
and also include bonuses and overtime pay when applicable. Therefore, they represent a fairly good
measure of the total monetary compensation of a worker.
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Table 1.1: Log Wage Differential Between the 90th and 10th Percentiles
1978-1982 2001-2005 Change
average average
Denmark 0.76 0.97 0.20
Finland 0.91 0.89 -0.01
France 1.18 1.08 -0.10
Germany 1.06 1.15 0.09
Netherlands 0.94 1.06 0.12
Sweden 0.71 0.83 0.12
CEU 0.93 1.00 0.07
UK 1.09 1.27 0.18
US 1.34 1.57 0.23
what fraction of cross-country differences in wage inequality can be attributed to tax
policies? For this purpose, we build a model.
Specifically, we construct a life cycle model that features some key determinants of
wages—most notably, human capital accumulation and idiosyncratic shocks. Here is
an overview of the framework. Individuals enter the economy with an initial stock of
human capital and are able to accumulate more human capital over the life cycle using
a Ben-Porath (1967) style technology (which essentially combines learning ability,
time, and existing human capital for production). Individuals can choose to either
invest in human capital on the job up to a certain fraction of their time or enroll in
school where they can invest full time. We assume that skills are general and labor
markets are competitive. As a result, the cost of on-the-job investment will be borne
by the workers, and firms will adjust the wage rate downward by the fraction of time
invested on the job. Therefore, the cost of human capital investment is the forgone
earnings while individuals are learning new skills.
We introduce two main features into this framework. First, we assume that in-
dividuals differ in their learning ability. As a result, individuals differ systematically
in the amount of investment they undertake and, consequently, in the growth rate of
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Table 1.2: Decomposing the Change in Log 90-10 Wage Differential
Total Change Percentage due to
in Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10
CEU 0.07 91% 9%
US 0.23 70% 30%
their wages over the life cycle. Thus, a key source of wage inequality in this model
is the systematic fanning out of the wage profiles.2 Second, we allow for endoge-
nous labor supply choice, which amplifies the effect of progressivity, a point that we
return to shortly. Finally, for a comprehensive quantitative assessment, we also al-
low idiosyncratic shocks to workers’ labor efficiency, and also model differences in
the unemployment insurance and pension systems, which vary greatly across these
countries.
The model described here provides a central role for policies that compress the
wage structure—such as progressive income taxes—because such policies hamper the
incentives for human capital investment. This is because a progressive system reduces
after-tax wages at the higher end of the wage distribution compared to the lower end.
As a result, it reduces the marginal benefit of investment (the higher wages in the
future) relative to the marginal cost (the current forgone earnings), thereby depressing
investment. A key observation is that this distortion varies systematically with the
ability level—and, specifically, it worsens with higher ability—which then compresses
the before-tax wage distribution. These effects of progressivity are compounded by
endogenous labor supply and differences in average income tax rates: the higher taxes
in the CEU reduce labor supply—and, consequently, the benefit of human capital
investment—further compressing the wage distribution.
The main quantitative exercise we conduct is the following. We consider the eight
2Recent evidence from panel data on individual wages provides support for individual-specific
growth rates in wage earnings (cf. Baker (1997), Guvenen (2007, 2009), Huggett, Ventura, and
Yaron (2007)).
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countries listed in Table 1.1, for which we have complete data for all variables of
interest. We assume that all countries have the same innate ability distribution but
allow each country to differ in the observable dimensions of their labor market struc-
ture, such as in labor income (and consumption) tax schedules, and in unemployment
insurance and retirement benefits systems. We then calibrate the model-specific pa-
rameters to the US data and keep these parameters fixed across countries. The policy
differences we consider explain about half of the observed gap in the log 90-10 wage
differential between the US and the CEU in the 2000s, and 76% of the wage inequality
above the median (log 90-50 differential). When the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
is increased to 0.5 from its baseline value of 0.3, the model is able to explain 60% of
the log 90-10 differential and virtually all (97% to be exact) of the log 90-50 differ-
ential observed in the data. The model explains only about 30% of the difference in
the lower tail inequality between the US and the CEU, which is not very surprising,
since the human capital mechanism is likely to be more important for higher ability
individuals and, therefore, above the median of the distribution. In contrast to the
CEU, however, the United Kingdom turns out to be an outlier in the sense that the
model is least successful in explaining the features of its wage distribution.
We also provide a decomposition that isolates the roles of (i) the progressivity of
income taxes, (ii) average income tax rates, (iii) consumption taxes, and (iv) pension
and unemployment insurance systems. We find that progressivity is by far the most
important component, accounting for about 68% of the model’s explanatory power.
As for the remaining three components, each has a similar contribution to the dif-
ferences in the log 90-10 differential (∼ 10% each), but consumption taxes are most
important for the upper end (20%) and benefits institutions are most important for
the lower end (18%) wage inequality.
A contribution of the present paper that could be of independent interest is the
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derivation of country-specific effective labor income tax schedules. These schedules
are obtained by putting together tax data from different OECD sources and using
a flexible functional form that provides a good fit for this relatively diverse set of
countries. These tax schedules allow us to measure the progressivity of the (effective)
tax structure at different points in the income distribution. This is an essential
ingredient in our analysis and could also be useful for studying other questions in the
future.
The second question we ask is whether the widening of the inequality gap between
the US and the CEU since the late 1970s could also be explained by the same human
capital channels discussed earlier. One challenge we face in trying to answer this
question is that the tax schedules just described are only available for the years after
2001 (because the detailed information from OECD sources for taxes is only available
after that date), whereas the tax structure has changed over time for several of the
countries in our sample. Despite this caveat, we cautiously explore how much of the
change in the US-CEU inequality gap can be explained with fixed tax schedules.
As shown in Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009), the model described above with the
Ben-Porath technology does not have a well-defined notion of returns to skill, which
essentially means that changes in the price of human capital (e.g., resulting from skill-
biased technical change, SBTC) have no effect on investment behavior. To circumvent
this problem, in Section 1.6, we extend the human capital production technology to
a two-factor structure along the lines proposed in that paper.3 Assuming that all
countries have experienced the same degree of SBTC from 1980 to 2003 and using
3Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) have quantitatively studied a simplified version of this model—
one that abstracts from idiosyncratic shocks and endogenous labor supply as well as from all the
institutional details studied here—and applied it to the U.S. data. They concluded that even that
stark version provides a fairly successful account of several trends observed in the U.S. data since the
1970s. Here, we build on this research by explicitly modeling labor market institutions and allowing
for idiosyncratic shocks and endogenous labor supply to understand the role of tax policy for wage
inequality.
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fixed tax schedules over time, the model explains about 41% of the observed gap in
the rise in total wage inequality (log 90-10) between the US and the CEU, and about
58% of the difference in the log 90-50 differentials, during this time period. Finally,
for two countries in our sample—the US and Germany—we are also able to derive tax
schedules for 1983, which reveal significantly more flattening of tax schedules in the
US compared to Germany from 1983 to 2003. When these changes in progressivity
and SBTC are jointly taken into account, the (recalibrated) model generates a much
larger rise in inequality in the US than in Germany and, in fact, overestimates the
actual widening of the inequality gap between these countries by 16%. Overall, these
results illustrate how government policies can strongly influence the response of an
economy to technological change by distorting individuals’ incentives to undertake
human capital investment, which keeps inequality low but at the cost of lower aggre-
gate output. To highlight this point, we briefly discuss the implications of the model
for some macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, hours, unemployment rates, and so
on.
Finally, in section 1.7, we provide some direct empirical evidence on the human
capital mechanism that is central to our model. For this purpose, we use data from
the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) to construct an empirical measure of
human capital at the individual-level for seven of the eight countries in our sample.
First, we investigate whether higher wage dispersion in a given country is indeed ac-
companied with larger human capital dispersion, as predicted by our model. Second,
we compare the human capital dispersion implied by our model to that found in the
data across countries. Third, and as mentioned above, our model predicts that coun-
tries with a more progressive tax system will also have a more compressed human
capital distribution, which we test in the data. We find strong empirical support for
all three predictions.
7
Related Literature. Some previous papers have also examined the US-CEU dif-
ferences in wage inequality, although using techniques that are quite different from
the present paper; see, e.g., Blau and Kahn (1996), Kahn (2000), and Gottschalk
and Joyce (1998). These papers mainly use regression analyses and conclude that
unionization, centralized bargaining, and minimum wage laws are important for un-
derstanding European wage inequality data. An important point to note, however, is
that these studies do not consider the role of progressive taxation in their regression
analyses. Because countries with more rigid institutions also have more progressive
tax systems (see Appendix A.1), this omission could attribute the effect of progres-
sivity to these other institutions. A notable exception in this literature is Acemoglu
(2003), who constructs a fully specified model in which wage compressing institutions
in the CEU affect the incentives of firms such that they adopt technologies that are
less skill biased than in the US. Thus, in his model inequality rises less in Europe
because the rise in skill demand is slower in that region. His paper highlights a novel
channel, which can be complementary to the mechanism studied in this paper.
In terms of methodology, this paper is also related to the recent macroeconomics
literature that has written fully specified models to address US-CEU differences in
labor market outcomes. Prominent examples include Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998),
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007), who
focus on unemployment rates, and Prescott (2004), Ohanian, Raffo, and Rogerson
(2006), and Rogerson (2008), who study labor hours differences. Several of these pa-
pers rely on representative agent models and are, therefore, silent on wage inequality;
and those that do allow for individual-level heterogeneity do not address differences
in wage inequality.4 In terms of modeling choices, the closest framework to ours is
4A notable exception is Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2007), who do study the implications
of their framework for wage inequality but conclude that it does not generate much wage disper-
sion or differences in wage inequality across countries, despite having successful implications for
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Kitao, Ljungqvist, and Sargent (2008), who study a rich life cycle framework with
human capital accumulation and job search, and model the benefits system. Their
goal is to explain the different unemployment patterns over the life cycle in the US
and Europe.
Finally, a number of recent papers share some common modeling elements with
ours but address different questions. Important examples include Altig and Carlstrom
(1999), Krebs (2003), Caucutt, Imrohoroglu, and Kumar (2006), and Huggett, Ven-
tura, and Yaron (2007). Altig and Carlstrom (1999) study the quantitative impact
of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on income inequality arising solely from behavioral
responses associated with labor-supply and saving decisions and find that distor-
tions arising from marginal tax rate changes have sizable effects on income inequality.
Krebs (2003) studies the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on human capital investment
and shows that reducing income risk can increase growth, in contrast to the stan-
dard incomplete markets literature, which typically reaches the opposite conclusion.
Caucutt, Imrohoroglu, and Kumar (2006) develop an endogenous growth model with
heterogeneity in income. They show that a reduction in the progressivity of tax rates
can have positive growth effects even in situations where changes in flat rate taxes have
no effect. Another important contribution is Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2007),
who study the distributional implications of the Ben-Porath model and estimate the
sources of lifetime inequality using US earnings data. Finally, the interaction of hu-
man capital investment and progressive taxes is also present in Heckman, Lochner,
and Taber (1998), Erosa and Koreshkova (2007), and Manovskii (2002). Erosa and
Koreshkova (2007) investigate the effects of replacing the current U.S. progressive
income tax system with a proportional one in a dynastic model. They find a large
positive effect on steady state output, which comes at the expense of higher inequality.
unemployment rates and the labor share.
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Manovskii (2002) finds that progressive taxes increase human capital investment and
occupational mobility in the absence of complete insurance markets, which increases
output but reduces before-tax inequality. Although our paper has many useful points
of contact with this body of work, to our knowledge, the combination of human cap-
ital accumulation, ability heterogeneity, progressive taxation, and endogenous labor
supply is new to this paper, as is the attempt to explain cross-country inequality facts
in such a framework.
The next section starts with a stylized model to explain the various channels
through which tax policy affects wage inequality. It then explains how the country-
specific tax schedules are estimated and uses the estimates to document some empir-
ical links between taxes and inequality. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 describe the main model
and the parametrization. Section 1.5 presents the cross-sectional quantitative results
and sensitivity analyses. Section 1.6 extends this model to examine the evolution of
inequality over time. In Section 1.7, we provide some direct empirical evidence on the
mechanism that is at work in our model. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 US versus CEU: Differences in Empirical Trends
In this section, we document two new empirical relations between wage inequality
and the progressivity of the tax policy. To this end, we begin with a stylized version
of the more general model studied in Section 1.3 that illustrates the key mechanisms
at work and will allow us to define different measures of progressivity subsequently
used in documenting the empirical facts. We then discuss how the tax schedules are
derived for each country and present the empirical findings in Section 1.2.3.
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1.2.1 Model 0: Intuition in a Stylized Framework
Consider an individual who derives utility from consumption and leisure and has
access to borrowing and saving at a constant interest rate, r. Let β be the subjective
time discount factor and assume β(1 + r) = 1. Each period individuals have one unit
of time endowment that they allocate between leisure and work (n ∈ [0, 1]). While
working, individuals can accumulate new human capital, Q, according to a Ben-
Porath style technology. Specifically, Q = Aj (hin)α, where h denotes the individual’s
current human capital stock, i denotes the fraction of working time (n) spent learning
new skills, and Aj is the learning ability of individual type j. We assume that skills
are general and labor markets are competitive. As a result, the cost of human capital
investment is completely borne by workers, and firms adjust the hourly wage rate
downward by the fraction of time invested on the job (equation (1.2)). Finally, labor
earnings are taxed at a rate given by the average tax function τ¯n(y), and the marginal
tax rate function is denoted by τ(y). The problem of a type j individual can be written
as
max
cs,as+1,is
S∑
s=1
βs−1u(cs, 1− ns)
s.t. cs + as+1 = (1− τ¯n(ys))ys + (1 + r)as
hs+1 = hs + A
j (hsisns)
α (1.1)
ys = PHhs(1− is)ns (1.2)
Using the fact that Qjs = A
j (hsisns)
α, the opportunity “cost of investment” (i.e.,
hsisns) can be written as Cj(Q
j
s) = (Q
j
s/A
j)
(1/α)
, which will play a key role in the
optimality conditions that follow. Now, it is useful to distinguish between two cases.
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Inelastic Labor Supply. First, suppose that labor supply is inelastic. The
optimality condition for human capital investment is (assuming an interior solution)
(1− τ(ys))C ′j(Qjs) ={β(1− τ(ys+1)) + β2 (1− τ(ys+2)) + ...+ βS−s (1− τ(yS))}.
(1.3)
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of investment and the right-hand side is
the marginal benefit, which is given by the present discounted value of net wages
in all future dates earned by the extra unit of human capital. Notice that both the
marginal cost and benefit of investment take into account the marginal tax rate faced
by the individual. To understand the effect of taxes, first consider the case where
taxes are flat rate, i.e., τ ′(y) ≡ 0. In this case, all terms involving taxes cancel out
and the first order condition reduces to
C ′j(Q
j
s) ={β + β2 + ...+ βS−s}.
Thus, flat-rate taxes have no effect on human capital investment. This is a well-
understood insight that goes back to at least Heckman (1976) and Boskin (1977).5
Now consider progressive taxes, i.e., τ ′(y) > 0. We rearrange equation (1.3) to
get:
C ′j(Q
j
s) ={β
1− τ(ys+1)
1− τ(ys)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Progressivity Discount
+ β2
1− τ(ys+2)
1− τ(ys) + ...+ β
S−s 1− τ(yS)
1− τ(ys)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Progressivity Discount
}. (1.4)
As long as the individual’s earnings grow over the life cycle and the tax structure
is progressive, all tax ratios on the right-hand side will be smaller than one, which
5With pecuniary costs of investment, flat taxes can affect human capital investment, as shown by
King and Rebelo (1990) and Rebelo (1991). Similarly, Lucas (1990) shows that flat taxes can have
a negative impact on human capital investment when labor supply is elastic.
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will depress the marginal benefit of investment and in turn dampen human capital
accumulation. Thus, each of these tax ratios captures the progressivity discount that
effectively reduces the value of higher wage earnings in the future when compared to
the lower forgone wage earnings today. To draw an analogy to the taxation literature
(c.f. Prescott (2004), Ohanian, Raffo, and Rogerson (2006), etc.), it is useful to focus
on a closely related measure—what we refer to as the progressivity wedge—which is
essentially one minus the progressivity discount:
PW (ys, ys+k) ≡ 1− 1− τ(ys+k)
1− τ(ys) =
τ(ys+k)− τ(ys)
1− τ(ys) . (1.5)
These wedges provide a key measure of the distortion created by progressive taxes.
A progressivity wedge of zero corresponds to flat taxes, and the distortion grows
with the wedge. To understand the effect of progressive taxes on wage inequality,
first note that the distortion created by progressivity differs systematically across
ability levels. At the low end, individuals with very low ability whose optimal plan
involves no human capital investment in the absence of taxes would experience no
wage growth over the life cycle and, therefore, no distortion from progressive taxation.
At the top end, individuals with high ability whose optimal plan implies low wage
earnings early in life and very high earnings later face very large wedges, which depress
their investment. Thus, progressivity reduces the cross-sectional dispersion of human
capital and, consequently, the wage inequality in an economy, even with inelastic
labor supply.6
6It is easy to see that in a model with retirement (as in the next section), a redistributive pension
system will have an effect that would work very similarly to progressive income taxation. The same
is true for the unemployment insurance system, which dampens the incentives to invest, although
this is likely to be more important at the lower end of the income distribution. We incorporate both
into the full model later.
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Endogenous Labor Supply. Second, consider now the the case with elastic labor
supply. The first order condition can be shown to be as follows:
C ′j(Q
j
s) ={β
1− τ(ys+1)
1− τ(ys) ns+1 + β
21− τ(ys+2)
1− τ(ys) ns+2 + ...+ β
S−s1− τ(yS)
1− τ(ys)nS}, (1.6)
where now the marginal benefit accounts for the utilization rate of human capital,
which depends on the labor supply choice (for derivation, see Appendix A.2.1). Now,
once again, consider the effect of flat rate taxes. The intratemporal optimality con-
dition implies that labor supply depends negatively on the tax rate and positively
on the level of human capital. A higher tax rate depresses labor supply choice (as
long as the income effect is not too large), which then reduces the marginal benefit
of human capital investment, which reduces the optimal level of human capital. But
labor supply in turn depends on the level of human capital, which further depresses
labor supply, the level of human capital and so on. Therefore, with endogenous labor
supply, even a flat-rate tax has an effect on human capital investment, which can also
be large because of the amplification described here.7
Because average labor hours differ significantly across countries and over time (c.f.,
Prescott (2004), Ohanian, Raffo, and Rogerson (2006)), it is also useful to consider
a second measure of wedge that takes into account each country’s utilization rate of
its human capital (relative to the average country in the sample) in addition to its
tax structure. Formally, for country i, what we now call the progressivity wedge*, is
defined as
PW ∗i (ys, ys+k) = 1−
1− τ(ys+k)
1− τ(ys)
(
ni
nALL
)
, (1.7)
7Similarly, policies that restrict labor supply (such as the 35-hour workweek law implemented
in France during much of the 2000s) will also depress human capital accumulation and compress
the wage distribution. This illustrates a situation where unions (who lobbied for the restrictions
imposed in France) can affect even inequality at the upper end.
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where ni is the hours per person in country i and, similarly, nALL is the average of
hours across all countries in the sample.8
In summary, the stylized model studied here implies that countries with more
progressive tax systems will have a lower wage inequality. As will become clear later,
these countries will also experience smaller rises in wage inequality in response to
SBTC.
1.2.2 Deriving Country-Specific Tax Schedules
For each country, we follow the same procedure described here. First, the OECD tax
database provides a calculator that estimates the total labor income tax for all income
levels between half of average wage earnings (hereafter, AW ) to two times AW. ( The
calculation takes into account several types of taxes (central government, local and
state, social security contributions made by the employee, and so on), as well as many
types of deductions and cash benefits (dependent exemptions, deductions for taxes
paid, social assistance, housing assistance, in-work benefits, etc.).9 Using this tool,
we calculate the average labor income tax rate, τ¯(y), for 50%, 75%, 100%, 125%,
150%, 175%, and 200% of AW. However, tax rates beyond 200% of AW are also
relevant when individuals solve their dynamic program. Fortunately, another piece of
information is available from the OECD: specifically, we also have the top marginal
tax rate and the top bracket corresponding to it for each country. As described in
more detail in Appendix A.3.1, we use this information to generate average tax rates
at income levels beyond two times AW. Then, we fit the following smooth function
8Notice that because of the rescaling by nALL, if a country has sufficiently high labor hours
and low progressivity, this wedge measure can become negative (e.g., the US). Therefore, this new
measure is defined relative to a given sample of countries, but is still informative about the relative
return to human capital within a group of countries, which is the focus of this paper.
9Non-wage income taxes (e.g., dividend income, property income, capital gains, interest earnings)
and non-cash benefits (free school meals or free health care) are not included in this calculation.
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Figure 1.1: Estimated Average Tax Rate Functions, Selected OECD Countries, 2003
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to the available data points:10
τ¯(y/AW ) = a0 + a1(y/AW ) + a2(y/AW )
φ. (1.8)
The parameters of the estimated average tax functions for all countries are re-
ported in Appendix A (Table A.2), along with the R2 values. Although the assumed
10We have also experimented with several other functional forms, including a popular specification
proposed by Guoveia and Strauss (1994), commonly used in the quantitative public finance literature
(cf. Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull (2003), Conesa and Krueger (2006), and the references
therein). However, we found that the functional form used here to provides the best fit across the
board for these relatively diverse set of countries, as seen from the high R2 values in Table A.2.
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Figure 1.2: Progressivity Wedges At Different Income Levels: 1 − 1−τ(k×0.5)
1−τ(0.5) for k =
2, 3, .., 6.
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functional form allows for various possibilities, all fitted tax schedules turn out to be
increasing and concave. The lowest R2 is 0.984 and the mean is 0.991, indicating a
fairly good fit. In Figure 1.1 we plot the estimated functions for three countries: one
of the two least progressive (United States), the most progressive (Finland), and one
with intermediate progressivity (Germany).
Figure 1.2 plots the progressivity wedges for the eight countries in our sample.
Specifically, each line plots PW (0.5, 0.5k) for k = 1, 2, ..., 6, which are essentially the
wedges faced by an individual who starts life at half the average earnings in that
country and looks toward an eventual wage level that is up to six times his initial
wage. As seen in the figure, countries are ranked in terms of their progressivity,
consistent with one could conjecture: the US and the UK have the least progressive
tax system, whereas Scandinavian countries have the most progressive one, with larger
continental European countries scattered between these two extremes. The differences
also appear quantitatively large (although a more precise evaluation needs to await
the full-blown model in Section 1.3): for example, the marginal benefit of investment
17
for a young worker who invests today when her wage is 0.5 × AW and aims to earn
2 × AW in the future is 13% lower than a flat-tax system in the US and the UK,
compared to 27% lower in Denmark and Finland. These differences grow with the
ambition level of the individual, dampening human capital investment, especially at
the top of the distribution.
1.2.3 Taxes and Inequality: Cross-Country Empirical Facts
As explained earlier, the average labor income tax schedule in 2003 has been estimated
for each of the eight countries listed in Table 1.1. Using these schedules, we normalize
AW in each country to 1 and focus on the progressivity wedge between half the
average earnings and 2.5 times the average earnings: PW (0.5, 2.5). Similarly, when
we calculate PW ∗ for a given country, we use the average hours per person in that
country between 2001 and 2005 for ni in equation (1.7), and the average of the same
variable across all countries for nALL.
The wage inequality data come from the OECD’s Labour Force Survey database
and are derived from the gross (i.e., before-tax) wages of full-time, full-year (or equiv-
alent) workers.11 This is the appropriate measure for the purposes of this paper, as
it more closely corresponds to the marginal product of each worker (and, hence, her
wage) in the model. The fact that the inequality data pertain to before-tax wages
is important to keep in mind; if the data were after-tax wages, the correlation be-
tween the progressivity of taxes and inequality would be mechanical and, thus, not
11The definition of gross wages is given in footnote 1. An exception to this definition is France,
for which wage earnings are net of employee social security contributions. Also, in contrast to the
other countries in the sample, France excludes “agricultural and general government workers and
household service workers” from its samples when reporting wage data. Despite these caveats, we
are including France in our sample because it is not clear how much these differences affect the final
wage inequality numbers. To get an idea, we have compared the wage inequality figures from our
main data to another source for France, also provided in the OECD Labour Force Survey (reported
as the GAE0 variable), which includes all workers and reports gross wages but is only available
from 2002 to 2005. At least during this period, the two data sources agree extremely well, which is
reassuring.
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Figure 1.3: Progressivity Wedge and the Log 90-10 Wage Dispersion in 2003
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Note: A wedge of zero corresponds to flat taxation (no distortion), and progressivity
increases along the horizontal axis. The wedge measure used corresponds to PW(0.5,2.5)
as defined in the text.
surprising at all.
Figure 1.3 plots the relationship between the log 90-10 wage differential and pro-
gressivity wedge in the 2000s. Countries with a smaller wedge—meaning a less pro-
gressive tax system and, therefore, smaller distortion in human capital investment—
have a higher wage inequality. The relationship is also quite strong with a correlation
of 0.83. Repeating the same calculation using the progressivity wedge∗ yields a cor-
relation of 0.75.12 Both relationships are consistent with the human capital model
with progressive taxes presented earlier. Moreover, this strong relationship is robust
to using wedges calculated from different parts of the wage distribution. This is seen
in Table 1.3, which reports the correlation between the log 90-10 wage differential
12In a recent working paper, Duncan and Peter (2008) also construct income tax schedules for
a broad set of countries and empirically investigate the relation between progressivity and income
inequality. Although their measures of progressivity and income is different from ours along impor-
tant dimensions, they document a strong negative relationship between progressivity and income
inequality, consistent with our findings here.
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Table 1.3: Cross-Correlation of PW (k,m) and Log 90-10 Wage Differential
1980
k
↓
m→ 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
0.5 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88
1.0 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86
1.5 0.86 0.84 0.79
2.0 0.76 0.65
2003
0.5 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.85
1.0 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.89
1.5 0.87 0.88 0.88
2.0 0.87 0.82
and PW (k,m) as k and m are varied over a wide range.13
We next turn to the change in inequality over time. Figure 1.4 plots the progres-
sivity wedge* versus the change in the log 90-50 (left panel) and the log 50-10 (right
panel) wage differentials. Countries with a more progressive tax system in the 2000s
have experienced a smaller rise in wage inequality since the 1980s. The relationship
is especially strong at the top of the wage distribution and weaker at the bottom:
the correlation between progressivity and the change in the 90-50 differential is very
strong (−0.86), whereas the correlation with the 50-10 differential is much weaker
(only −0.36); see Figure 1.4). This result is consistent with the idea that the distor-
tion created by progressivity is likely to be felt especially strongly at the upper end
where human capital accumulation is an important source of wage inequality, but less
so at the lower end, where other factors, such as unionization, minimum wage laws,
and so on, could be more important.
Finally, Table 1.4 gives a more complete picture of the differences between the two
13The same table also reports the correlation for each country in 1980, even though the wedges are
still the ones obtained using the 2003 tax schedules. Surprisingly, even in this case, the correlation is
as strong as before. One possible explanation is that the relative ranking of inequality across these
countries might not have changed much since 1980. Indeed, the correlation between the log 90-10
wage differential in 2003 and 1980 is 0.87.
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Figure 1.4: Progressivity Wedge* and Change in Log 90-50 (Left) and 50-10 (Right)
Differentials: 1980 to 2003
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Note: The wedge measure for country i is PW ∗i (0.5, 2.5) as defined in equation (1.7).
Progressivity increases along the horizontal axis.
definitions of wedges. The top panel reports the correlation of each wedge measure
with log wage differentials, which reveals that the adjustment for utilization rates
through labor hours makes little difference in the correlations in 2003 but has a
somewhat larger effect (reduction) in the correlations in 1980. However, with either
measure, progressivity is negatively correlated with inequality even when one focuses
on different parts of the distribution. This picture changes when we turn to the
change in inequality over time (bottom panel). Now the simple wedge measure has a
rather low correlation with log wage differentials (the strongest is with log 90-50 and
that is −0.39). However, adjusting for hours per person increases these correlations
significantly to −0.63 for the log 90-10 differential, and to −0.86 for the log 90-
50 differential (which is plotted in the left panel of Figure 1.4). We conclude that
the relationship between the wedge measures and cross-sectional inequality is quite
robust, whereas the change in inequality over time is more sensitive to the adjustment
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Table 1.4: Correlation Between Progressivity Measures and Wage Dispersion
Measure of Wedge:
PW (0.5, 2.5) PW ∗(0.5, 2.5)
Log wage differentials Year: 2003
90-10 −.83 −.75
90-50 −.84 −.73
50-10 −.73 −.67
Year: 1980
90-10 −.87 −.51
90-50 −.74 −.38
50-10 −.88 −.57
Change from 1980 to 2003
90-10 −.11 −.63
90-50 −.39 −.86
50-10 .14 −.36
by hours per person. Since our full model includes a labor supply choice, this latter
measure will become the more relevant one, as we shall see in the next section.
1.3 Model 1: For Cross-Sectional Analysis
The model we use for the cross-sectional analysis is a richer version of the basic
framework presented in Section 1.2.1. Each individual has one unit of time in each
period, which she can allocate to three different uses: work, leisure, and human capital
investment. Preferences over consumption, c, and leisure time, 1 − n, are given by
this common separable form:
u(c, n) = log(c) + ψ
(1− n)1−ϕ
1− ϕ . (1.9)
If an individual chooses to work, as before, she can allocate a fraction (i) of
her working hours (n) to human capital investment. However, more realistically,
we now assume that i ∈ [0, χ], where χ < 1. An upper bound less than 100% on
on-the-job investment can arise, for example, because the firm incurs fixed costs for
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employing each worker (administrative burden, cost of office space, etc.) or as a result
of minimum wage laws. Individuals can invest full-time by attending school (i = 1)
and enjoy leisure for the rest of the time. Thus, the choice set is i ∈ [0, χ] ∪ {1},
which is non-convex when χ < 1. Finally, human capital depreciates every period at
rate δ < 1. Except for the differences described here, the human capital accumulation
process is the same as the stylized model described in Section 1.2.1.
As before, human capital is produced according to a Ben-Porath technology:
Q = Aj (hin)α. A key parameter in this specification is Aj, which determines the
productivity of learning. The heterogeneity in Aj implies that individuals will differ
systematically in the amount of human capital they accumulate and, consequently,
in the growth rate of their wages over the life cycle. This systematic fanning out of
wage profiles is the major source of wage inequality in this model. Also, as can be
seen from the optimality conditions (for example, (1.6)), the price of human capital
has no effect in this model other being a scaling factor. Thus, for simplicity we set
PH = 1 in the rest of the cross-sectional analysis.
An individual may choose to be unemployed at age s, ns = 0, in which case she
receives unemployment benefit payments as specified later. Individuals retire at age
R and receive constant pension payments every year until they die at age T. The
benefits system is described in more detail later on.
Idiosyncratic Shocks and Earnings. Individuals receive idiosyncratic shocks to
the efficiency of the market labor supply. Specifically, when an individual devotes (1−
is)ns hours producing for his employer, his effective labor supply becomes ns(1− is),
where the  shocks are generated by a stationary Markov transition matrix Π(′ | )
that is identical across agents and over the life cycle. The observed total wage income
of an individual is yjs ≡ hjs(1− ijs)njs, and the hourly wage rate is simply wjs = yjs/njs.
23
1.3.1 Government: Taxes and Transfers
Unemployment and Pension Benefits. The unemployment benefit system is
modeled so as to capture the salient features of each country’s actual system in a rel-
atively parsimonious manner. For computational reasons, we make some simplifying
assumptions to the actual systems implemented by each country. Specifically, if a
worker becomes unemployed at age s, the initial level of the unemployment payment
she receives is an increasing function of her years of work before becoming unem-
ployed, denoted by m, and also (typically) decreases with the duration of the unem-
ployment spell. Furthermore, in most countries the replacement rate falls with the
level of pre-unemployment income, which is also partly captured here. Let Φ(y∗,m, s)
denote the unemployment benefit function of an s-year-old individual with m years
of employment before becoming unemployed. Although, in reality, unemployment
payments depend on the pre-unemployment earnings, ys−1, making this dependence
explicit will add an additional state variable into an already demanding non-convex
computational problem. Thus, we simplify the problem by assuming that Φ instead
depends on y*, which is the income the individual would have earned in the current
state at age s if he did not have the option of receiving unemployment insurance. For
the precise mathematical problem that yields y∗, see Appendix A.2.2.
After retirement workers receive constant pension payments each period. The
pension of a worker with ability level j depends on the average lifetime earnings of
workers with the same ability level (denoted by yj) as well as on the number of years
the worker has been employed up to the retirement age (denoted by mR) subject to a
maximum years of contribution, m. The pension function is denoted as Ω(yj,mR).14
14In reality, pension payments depend on the workers’ own earnings history, but modeling this
explicitly also adds an extra state variable, which this simplified structure avoids.
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The Tax System and the Government Budget. The government imposes a
flat-rate consumption tax, τ¯c, as well as a potentially progressive labor income tax,
τ¯n(y).
15 The collected revenues are used for two main purposes: (i) to finance the
benefits system, and (ii) to finance government expenditure, G, that does not yield
any direct utility to consumers (because of either to corruption or waste). The residual
budget surplus or deficit, Tr, is distributed in a lump-sum fashion to all households
regardless of employment status.
1.3.2 Individuals’ Dynamic Program
Individuals are able to trade a full set of one-period Arrow securities. A security
that promises to deliver one unit of consumption good in state ′ in the next period
costs q(′|) in state  today. Let In be an indicator that is equal to 0 if the agent
is unemployed and 1 otherwise (if a worker or student). The dynamic program of a
typical individual is given by
V (h, a,m; , s) = max
c,n,i,a′(′)
[u(c, n) + βE (V (h′, a′(′),m′; ′, s+ 1)|)](1.10)
s.t.
(1 + τ¯c)c+
∑
q(′ | )a′(′) = (1− τ¯n(y))y + a+ Tr, (1.11)
y = In × h(1− i)n+ (1− In)× Φ(y∗,m, s), (1.12)
h′ = (1− δ)h+ A(hin)α, (1.13)
m′ = m+ In × 1{i < 1}, (1.14)
i ∈ [0, χ] ∪ {1},
15Because capital is mobile internationally, it is harder to justify using country-specific tax rates on
capital income, unlike for labor and consumption, which are almost always taxed at destination (or
the country of residence of the worker). In particular, the mobility of capital implies the equalization
of after-tax rates across countries of comparable assets. For these reasons, we abstract from capital
income taxes.
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where we suppress ability type for clarity. Notice from equation (1.13) that individuals
cannot accumulate human capital while unemployed (n = 0). Of course, an individual
may return to school after losing her job, in which case she is considered a student and
not unemployed. Finally, equation (1.14) makes clear that m′ increases only when
agents work and not when they are enrolled in school (i.e., i = 1).
After retirement, individuals receive a pension and there is no human capital in-
vestment. Since there is no uncertainty during retirement, a riskless bond is sufficient
for smoothing consumption. Therefore, the problem of a retired agent at age s > R
can be written as
WR(a, yj,mR; s) = max
c,a′
[
u(c, n¯) + βWR(a′, yj,mR; s+ 1)
]
(1.15)
s.t (1 + τ¯c)c+ qa
′ = (1− τ¯n(ys))ys + a+ Tr
ys = Ω(y
j,mR).
Definition 1. A stationary competitive equilibrium for this economy is a set of equi-
librium decision rules, c(x), n(x), Q(x), i(x), and a′(′, x); value functions, V (x) and
WR(x), for working and retirement periods, respectively, where x = (h, a,m; , s, j)
(notice the inclusion of j into this vector); a pricing function for Arrow securities,
q(′|), and a measure Λ(x) such that
1. Given the labor income tax function, τ¯(y), consumption tax, τ¯c, transfers, Tr,
and government policy functions, Φ and Ω, individuals’ decision rules and value
functions solve problems in (1.10) to (1.14) and in (1.15).
2. Asset markets clear:
´
x(:,=˜)
a′(′, x)dΛ(x) = 0 for all combinations of (˜,′).16
3. Λ(x) is generated by individuals’ optimal choices.
16The notation x(:,  = ˜) indicates that the integral is taken over the entire domain of variables
in state vector x, except for , which is set equal to ˜. Others below are defined analogously.
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4. The government budget balances:
ˆ
x(:,s<R)
τ¯n(y(x))y(x)dΛ(x) +
ˆ
x
τ¯cc(x)dΛ(x) = G+ Tr
+
ˆ
x(:,s<R)
Φ(y∗(x),m, s)I(n(x) = 0)dΛ(x) +
T∑
s=R
ˆ
x(:,s=R−1)
Ω(yj,mR(x))dΛ(x).
The first term in the government’s budget is the total tax revenue from labor
income collected from all agents who are working and younger than retirement age.
Similarly, the second term is the total tax revenue from the consumption tax, but it
is collected from all agents including the retirees. On the right-hand side, the pension
payments only depend on a worker’s ability through yj and the number of years she
worked until retirement (mR(x)), which in turn depends on the full state vector x at
age R− 1. Therefore, we integrate the pension payments over the full state vector x
conditioning on age R− 1 and then sum the same amount over all ages greater than
R− 1 to find total pension payments.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we begin by discussing the parameter choices for the model. Our
basic calibration strategy is to take the United States as a benchmark and pin down
a number of parameter values by matching certain targets in the US data.17 We
then assume that other countries share the same parameter values with the US along
unobservable dimensions (such as the distribution of learning ability), but differ in
the dimensions of their labor market policies that are feasible to model and calibrate
17Taking the US as the benchmark is motivated by the fact that its economy is subject to much
less of the labor market rigidities present in the CEU—such as unionization and other distorting
institutions. Because these institutions are not modeled in this paper, the US provides a better
laboratory for determining the unobservable parameters than other countries where these distortions
could be more important for wage determination.
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(specifically, consumption and labor income tax schedules, the retirement pension
system, and the unemployment insurance system). We then examine the differences
in economic outcomes—specifically in wage dispersion, output, and labor supply—
that are generated by these policy differences alone.
1.4.1 Calibration
A model period corresponds to one year of calendar time. Individuals enter the
economy at age 20 and retire at 65 (S = 45). Retirement lasts for 20 years and
everybody dies at age 85. The net interest rate, r, is set equal to 2%, and the
subjective time discount rate is set to β = 1/ (1 + r).18 The curvature of the human
capital accumulation function, α, is set equal to 0.80, broadly consistent with the
existing empirical evidence, and the maximum investment allowed on the job, χ, is set
to 0.50 (see Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) for further justification of these parameter
choices).
Utility Function. The utility function given in (1.9) has two parameters to cali-
brate: the curvature of leisure, ϕ, and the utility weight attached to leisure, ψ. These
parameters are jointly chosen to pin down the average hours worked in the economy,
as well as the average Frisch labor supply elasticity. We assume that each individual
has 100 hours of discretionary time per week (about 14 hours a day), and taking 40
hours per week as the average labor supply for employed workers in the US implies
n = 0.4. With power utility, the theoretical Frisch elasticity of labor is equal to 1−n
n
1
ϕ
.
Because of heterogeneity across individuals, labor supply varies in the population, so
there is a distribution of Frisch elasticities. We simply target the Frisch elasticity
implied by the average labor hours, n. The empirical target we choose is 0.3, which is
18This interest rate should be thought of as the “after-tax” rate, since we do not model taxes on
savings explicitly.
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Table 1.5: Baseline Parametrization
Parameter Description Value
ϕ Curvature of utility of leisure 5.0 (Frisch = 0.3 )
ψ Weight on utility of leisure 0.20
α Curvature of human capital function 0.80
S Years spent in the labor market 45
T Retirement duration (years) 20
r Interest rate 0.02
β Time discount factor 1/(1 + r)
χ Maximum investment time on the job 0.50
δ Depreciation rate of skills (annual) 1.5%
E
[
hj0
]
Average initial human capital (scaling) 4.95
Parameters calibrated to match data targets
E [Aj] Average ability 0.190
σ
(
hj0
)
/E
[
hj0
]
Coeff. of variation of initial human capital 0.076
σ [Aj] /E [Aj] Coeff. of variation of ability 0.408
γ Dispersion of Markov shock 0.23
p Transition probability for Markov shock 0.90
consistent with the estimates surveyed by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999),
which range from zero to 0.5. Although it is common to use higher elasticity values in
representative agent macro studies (e.g., Prescott (2004) among many others), values
of 0.5 or lower are more common in quantitative models with heterogeneous agents (cf.
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008), Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2009)).
As will become clear later, a higher Frisch elasticity improves the performance of our
model, so in our baseline case we choose the relatively conservative value of 0.3.19 In
the sensitivity analysis, we will experiment with both a higher Frisch elasticity of 0.5
and a case without hours choice (i.e., a 0-1 choice).
Distributions: Learning Ability, Initial Human Capital, and Shocks. Agents
have two individual-specific attributes at the time they enter the economy: learning
ability and initial human capital endowment. We assume that these two variables are
19With our baseline calibration, the Frisch elasticities in the population range from 0.25 to 0.39.
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jointly uniformly distributed in the population and are perfectly correlated with each
other.20Although the assumption of perfect correlation is made partly for simplicity,
a strong positive correlation is plausible and can be motivated as follows. The present
model is interpreted as applying to human capital accumulation after age 20 and by
that age high-ability individuals will have invested more than those with low ability,
leading to heterogeneity in human capital stocks at that age, which would then be
very highly correlated with learning ability. Indeed, Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron
(2007) estimate the parameters of the standard Ben-Porath model from individual-
level wage data, and find learning ability and human capital at age 20 to be strongly
positively correlated (corr: 0.792). Making the slightly stronger assumption of perfect
correlation allows us to collapse the two-dimensional heterogeneity in Aj and hj0 into
one, speeding up computation significantly.
Therefore, this jointly uniform distribution of (Aj, hj0) yields four parameters to
be calibrated. E
[
hj0
]
is a scaling parameter and is simply set to a computationally
convenient value, leaving three parameters: (i) the cross-sectional standard deviation
of initial human capital, σ
(
hj0
)
, (ii) the mean learning ability, E [Aj], and (iii) the
dispersion of ability, σ (Aj) . The idiosyncratic shock process, , is assumed to follow a
first-order Markov process, with two possible values, {1− γ, 1 + γ}, and a symmetric
transition matrix: Π =
 p 1− p
1− p p
 .
This structure yields two more parameters, γ and p, to be calibrated—for a total
of five parameters. Finally, because there is measurement error in individual-level
20We prefer the uniform distribution over a Gaussian distribution because it has a bounded sup-
port, so initial human capital and ability can be easily ensured to be non-negative. Another choice
would be a lognormal distribution, but most empirical measures of ability find it more closely ap-
proximated by a symmetric distribution, unlike a lognormal one. It will turn out, however, that the
wage distribution generated by the model will be closer to lognormal with a longer right tail (more
consistent with the data), as a result of the convexity arising from the human capital production
function.
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wage data, we add a zero mean iid disturbance to the wages generated by the model
(which has no effect on individuals’ optimal choices).
Data Targets. Our calibration strategy is to require that the wages generated by
the model be consistent with micro-econometric evidence on the dynamics of wages
found in panel data on US households. Specifically, these empirical studies begin by
writing a stochastic process for log wages (or earnings) of the following general form:
log w˜js =
[
aj + bjs
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
systematic comp.
+ zjs + ε
j
s︸ ︷︷ ︸
stochastic comp.
(1.16)
zjs = ρz
j
s−1 + η
j
s,
where w˜js is the “wage residual” obtained by regressing raw wages on a polynomial in
age; the terms in brackets, [aj + bjs], capture the individual-specific systematic (or
life cycle) component of wages that result from differential human capital investments
undertaken by individuals with different ability levels, and zjs is an AR(1) process with
innovation ηjs. Finally, ε
j
s is an iid shock that could capture classical measurement
error that is pervasive in micro data and/or purely transitory movements in wages.
For concreteness, in the discussion that follows, we refer to the first two terms in
brackets as the “systematic component” and to the latter two terms as the “stochastic
component” of wages.
We begin with εs and assume that it corresponds to the measurement error in the
wage data. This is consistent with the finding in Guvenen and Smith (2009) that the
majority of transitory variation in wages is due to measurement error. Based on the
results of the validation studies from the US wage data,21 we take the variance of the
measurement error to be 10% of the true cross-sectional variance of wages in each
21For an excellent survey of the available validation studies and other evidence on measurement
error in wage and earnings data, see Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz (2001).
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country, which yields σ2ε = 0.034 for the United States. We then choose the following
five moments from the US data to pin down the five parameters identified earlier:
1. the mean log wage growth over the life cycle (informative about E(Aj)),
2. the cross-sectional dispersion of wage growth rates, σ(bj) (informative about
σ(Aj)),
3. the cross-sectional variance of the stochastic component (informative about γ),
4. the average of the first three autocorrelation coefficients of the stochastic com-
ponent of wages (informative about p), and
5. the log 90-10 wage differential in the population (which, together with the pre-
vious moments, is informative about σ(hj0)).
The target value for the mean log wage growth over the life cycle (i.e., the cumulative
growth between ages 20 and 55) is 45%. This number is roughly the middle point
of the figures found in studies that estimate life cycle wage and income profiles from
panel data sets such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID); see, for exam-
ple, Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2006), and Guvenen
(2007). The second data moment is the cross-sectional standard deviation of wage
growth rates, σ(bj). The estimates of this parameter are quite consistent across dif-
ferent papers, regardless of whether one uses wages or earnings (which is not always
the case for some other parameters of the income process).22 We take our empirical
target to be 2%, which represents an average of these available estimates.
The next two moments are included to ensure that the model is consistent with
some key statistical properties of the stochastic component of wages in the data. These
22Using male hourly earnings data, Haider (2001) estimates a value of 2.07%, and using annual
earnings data he estimates it to be 2.02%. Baker (1997) (Table 4, rows 6 and 8) uses an annual
earnings measure and estimates values of 1.76% and 1.97% in the two most closely related specifica-
tions to the present paper, whereas Guvenen (2009) finds a value of 1.94%, again using male annual
earnings data. Finally, Guvenen and Smith (2009) estimate a process for household annual earnings
and obtain a value of 1.87%.
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moments are (i) the unconditional variance of the stochastic component, (zs + εs),
as well as (ii) the average of its first three autocorrelation coefficients. The empirical
counterparts for these moments are taken from Haider (2001), which is the only study
that estimates a process for hourly wages and allows for heterogeneous profiles. The
figure for the unconditional variance can be calculated to be 0.109 and the average
of autocorrelations is calculated to be 0.33, using the estimates in Table 1 of his
paper.23,24
Our fifth, and final, moment is the log 90-10 wage differential in 2003. Adding
this moment ensures that the calibrated model is consistent with the overall wage
inequality in the US in that year, which is the benchmark against which we measure
all other countries. The empirical target value is 1.57 (from the OECD’s Labour
Force Survey data). Table 1.6 displays the empirical values of the five moments as
well as their counterparts generated by the calibrated model. As can be seen here,
all moments are matched fairly well; some are matched exactly.25 One point to note
is that even though the average of the first three autocorrelation coefficients is pretty
low (0.33), recall that the stochastic component includes measurement error as well,
which is iid. The Markov shocks to human capital, which approximate the AR(1)
process in the data, have a first order annual autocorrelation of 0.80 (implied by
23Over the sample period, Haider estimates the average innovation variance to be 0.074, an AR
coefficient of 0.761, and an MA coefficient of −0.42. Using these parameters, the unconditional
variance is 0.109.
24We match the average of the first three autocorrelation coefficients because Haider (2001) es-
timates an ARMA(1,1) process, whereas in our model we employ a slightly more parsimonious
structure (AR(1)+ iid shock). This latter formulation is a common choice in calibrated macroe-
conomic models because it requires one fewer state variable while still capturing the dynamics of
wages quite well. Nevertheless, because of this difference, it is not possible to exactly match each
autocorrelation coefficient in the ARMA(1,1) specification and, so, we match the average of the first
three. In the calibrated model, the first three autocorrelations are 0.48, 0.33, and 0.20 compared to
0.42, 0.32, and 0.24 in the data.
25Because the moments chosen are typically non-linear functions of the underlying parameters we
calibrate, having five moments and five parameters does not guarantee that all moments will be
matched exactly. Considering this, the close correspondence is an encouraging sign that the model
is flexible enough to generate wage dynamics similar to that observed in the data.
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Table 1.6: Empirical Moments Used for Calibrating Model Parameters
Moment Data Model
Mean log wage growth from age 20 to 55 0.45 0.46
Cross-sectional standard deviation of wage growth rates 2.00% 2.00%
Cross-sectional variance of stochastic component 0.109 0.107
Average of first three autocorrelation coeff. of stochastic component 0.33 0.34
Log 90-10 ratio in 2003 1.57 1.58
p = 0.90 shown in Table 1.5).
Unemployment and Pension System. A great deal of variation can be found
across countries in the parameters that control the generosity, the duration, and the
insurance component of the benefits system. For example, among the countries in
our sample, individuals in Denmark and the Netherlands receive the largest pension
payments after retirement with the present value of retirement wealth for the average
individual exceeding half a million US dollars (as of 2007). The US and the UK,
however, have the lowest pension entitlements—less than six times the average annual
earnings in each respective country (and less than half the wealth in Denmark and
the Netherlands). We provide the exact formulas for each country and discuss the
specifics in more detail in Appendix A.4. Finally, the calibration of G (the surplus
wasted by the government) is challenging because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable
estimates of its magnitude. In the baseline case, we assumeG = 0. So, the government
rebates back all the surplus to households in a lump-sum fashion (Tr). We relax this
assumption in Section 1.5.3 and find that it has very little effect on the results
Consumption Taxes. The average tax rate on consumption is taken from Mc-
Daniel (2007), who provides estimates for 15 OECD countries for the period 1950
to 2003 by calculating the total tax revenue raised from different types of consump-
tion expenditures and dividing this number by the total amount of corresponding
expenditure. McDaniel (2007) does not provide an estimate for Denmark, so we set
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Figure 1.5: Life Cycle Profile of Labor Hours
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this country’s consumption tax equal to that of Finland, which has a comparable
value-added tax rate.
1.4.2 Life Cycle Profiles of Wages, Earnings, and Hours
Before concluding this section, a useful step is to briefly examine if the calibrated
model produces plausible behavior over the life cycle for wages, earnings, and labor
hours compared to the US data. Figure 1.5 plots the mean log hours of employed
workers, which is computed using 10,000 simulated life cycle paths for individuals
drawn from the joint distribution of (Aj, hj0). As seen here, the average hours is close
to the chosen target of 0.40 and displays little trend over the life cycle. In the US
data, average hours rises to about age 25 and then remains fairly flat until about
age 55, after which point it starts declining until retirement (cf. Erosa, Fuster, and
Kambourov (2009), Figure 2). Although the model does not capture the rise in hours
before age 25, the flat hours profile during most of the working life is well captured
by the model. Hours also decline in the model, especially after age 50, although not
by as much as in the data. Some of the decline in the data is attributable to health
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Figure 1.6: Life Cycle Profiles of Wages and Earnings: Mean (Left), Variance (Right)
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shocks or partial early retirement, which are not modeled here.
The dashed lines around the mean profile in Figure 1.5 show the two standard
deviation bands of the hours distribution in the population, which reveal a small rise
in hours dispersion over the life cycle. More precisely, the variance of log hours goes
up by 1.6 log points, which is fairly small compared to the mean hours of 0.40. Again,
this is broadly consistent with the findings of Erosa, Fuster, and Kambourov (2009),
who document a fairly flat variance profile for hours with a rise only after the mid-
40s. Although the rise in the dispersion of hours found by these authors is somewhat
larger than what is generated by our model (judging from their Figures 9 and 10),
this discrepancy can be fixed here by increasing the Frisch labor supply elasticity, an
exercise we conduct in Section 1.5.3.
The left panel of Figure 1.6 plots the life cycle profile of average log wages and
earnings approximated by a cubic polynomial in age, as commonly done in the lit-
erature. The model reproduces the well-known hump shape in wages and earnings.
In particular, the mean log wage grows by 45% (as calibrated) and peaks around age
50 and then declines by about 20% until retirement age. Mean log earnings follows
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a similar pattern but declines by about 5% more than the mean wage as a result of
the fall in labor supply later in life, seen in Figure 1.5. Finally, the right panel plots
the variances of log wages and earnings, which both rise in a convex fashion up to
55 and then grow more slowly. The variance of earnings grows faster than that of
wages because hours dispersion rises over the life cycle. Guvenen (2009) constructs
the empirical counterpart for earnings from the PSID and finds this profile to rise
from about 0.20 to 0.73 from age 22 to 62. In the model, the variance rises from
about 0.15 to 0.75 from age 20 to 65, fairly consistent with this empirical evidence.
Overall, with the five empirical moments we targeted, the model appears to gen-
erate life cycle behavior—in terms of both first and second moments—that is broadly
consistent with the data, which is encouraging for the cross-country comparisons we
undertake next.
1.5 Cross-Sectional Results
In this section, we begin by presenting the implications of the calibrated model for
wage inequality differences across countries at a point in time. We then provide
decompositions that quantify the separate effects of progressivity, average income tax
rates, consumption taxes, and benefits institutions on these results. We then perform
sensitivity analyses with respect to key parameters.
1.5.1 The Cross Section in the 2000s
First, Figure 1.7 plots the log 90-10 wage differential for each country in the data
against the value implied by the model. The correlation between the simulated and
actual data is 0.86, suggesting that the model is able to capture the relative ranking
of these eight countries in terms of overall wage inequality observed in the data. Of
course, with eight data points a seemingly high correlation can be driven by a few
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Figure 1.7: Log 90-10 Wage Dispersion in Eight OECD Countries: Model versus Data
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outliers with no obvious pattern among the rest of the data points. As seen in the
figure, however, this is not the case: the countries line up nicely along the regression
line. Similarly, the left panel of Figure 1.8 plots the log 90-50 wage differential for
each country in the data against the predicted value by the model. The correlation
between the actual and simulated data is even higher—0.88—for the log 90-50 wage
differential. The correlation of the simulated and actual log 50-10 wage differential,
on the other hand, is somewhat lower at 0.63 (right panel of Figure 1.8). Thus, the
model does a better job in matching the relative ranking of countries for the upper
end wage inequality. This finding is consistent with the idea that progressive taxation
affects the human capital investment of high-ability individuals more than others and,
therefore, the mechanism is more relevant above the median of the wage distribution.
Although these figures and correlations reveal a clear qualitative relationship, they
do not allow us to quantify how important taxation is for cross-country differences
in inequality. For this, we turn to Table 1.7. The first two columns report the log
90-10 wage differential in the data for all countries, first in levels (second column)
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Figure 1.8: Wage Dispersion in the Model versus Data: Log 90-50 (left) and Log
50-10 (right) Differentials
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and then expressed as a deviation from the US, which is our benchmark country
(third column). For example, in Denmark the log 90-10 differential is 0.97, which is
60 log points lower than that in the US. The third and fourth columns display the
corresponding statistics implied by the calibrated model. Again, for Denmark, the
model generates a log 90-10 differential that is 38 log points below what is implied by
the model for the US. Therefore, the model explains 63% (= 38/60) of the difference
in the log 90-10 differential between the US and Denmark, reported in column (e).
Similar comparisons show that the model does quite well in explaining the level of
wage inequality in Germany (41 log points lower than the US inequality in the data
versus 29 log points lower in the model) but does poorly in explaining the UK (29 log
points difference in the data versus 7 log points in the model). The fraction explained
by the model ranges from 30% for France to 71% for Germany. Overall, the model
explains 49% of the actual gap in inequality between the US and the CEU in 2003.
To understand which part of the wage distribution is better captured by the model,
the next two columns display the same calculation performed in column (e), but now
separately for the log 90-50 (f) and 50-10 (g) differentials. For all countries in the
CEU, the model explains the upper tail inequality much better than the inequality
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at the lower end. For example, for Denmark, the model explains 93% of the log
90-50 differential while only generating 37% of the log 50-10 differential. In fact,
the model explains at least 63% of the upper tail inequality for all countries in the
CEU, averaging 76% across all countries, whereas it explains on average only 27%
of the log 50-10 differential. Among the CEU, Germany is the one best explained
by the model overall: a healthy 79% of the upper tail and 59% of the lower tail
inequality is generated by the model. The model does poorly in explaining the small
log 50-10 differential in France (12%). One reason could be the legal minimum wage
(not modeled here), which is equal to 62% of average earnings in France—the highest
among the CEU—and much higher than the 36% of average earnings in the U.S. If
these differences were modeled, it could be possible to better reconcile the model with
the very small lower tail wage inequality in France. Finally, a notable exception to
these generally strong findings is the UK, which is an important outlier: the model
explains almost none of the difference between the UK and US at the upper tail (1%
to be exact), whereas it explains 49% of the inequality at the lower end. As we shall
see later, we found UK to be an outlier along most dimensions this paper attempts
to explain and the least well understood economy when viewed through the lens of
this model.
Finally, we examine if the calibrated model is broadly consistent with the share
of wage inequality accounted for by the upper and lower tails in each region. When
the data for all countries in the CEU are aggregated, we find that 57% of the log
90-10 wage dispersion in this region is located above the median and 43% is below
the median (statistics not reported in the table to save space). This ratio is very well
matched by the model (56.5%), even though no moment from the CEU is used in the
calibration. Turning to the US, the upper tail inequality as a fraction of the total is
slightly lower than the CEU, at 53%. The model somewhat overstates the inequality
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Table 1.7: Measures of Wage Inequality: Benchmark Model versus Data
Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10
Data Model % explained % explain. % explain.
Level ∆ from US Level ∆ from US (d)/(b)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Denmark 0.97 0.60 1.20 0.38 63 93 37
Finland 0.89 0.67 1.26 0.33 49 77 27
France 1.08 0.49 1.44 0.14 30 74 12
Germany 1.15 0.41 1.29 0.29 71 79 59
Netherlands 1.06 0.50 1.35 0.23 46 63 30
Sweden 0.83 0.73 1.28 0.30 42 69 20
CEU 1.00 0.57 1.30 0.28 49% 76% 27%
UK 1.27 0.29 1.51 0.07 22 1 49
US 1.57 0.0 1.58 0.00 –
at the upper tail (59%) compared to the US data.
1.5.2 Decomposing the Effects of Different Policies
The baseline model incorporates several differences between the labor market policies
of the US and the CEU countries. Here, we quantify the separate roles played by each
of these components for the results presented in the previous section. We conduct
three decompositions. First, we assume that countries in the CEU have the same
benefits institutions as the US but differ in all other dimensions considered in the
baseline model. This experiment separates the role of the tax system for wage in-
equality from that of the benefits system. Second, we also set the consumption taxes
of each country equal to that in the US but each country retains its own income tax
schedule as in the baseline model. This experiment quantifies the explanatory power
of the model that is coming from the income tax system alone. Third, we go one step
further and assume that each country keeps the same progressivity of its income tax
schedule but is identical in all other ways to the US, including the average income
tax rate. This experiment isolates the role of progressivity alone. In each case, we
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adjust the lump-sum transfers to balance the government’s budget.26
Table 1.8 reports the results. First, in column 2, we assume that all countries
have the same benefits system as the US. In panel A, the correlation between the
data and model is only slightly lower than in the baseline case for the log 90-10 and
90-50 differentials and is, in fact, higher for the 50-10 differential. Turning to panel
B, the fraction of the US-CEU difference explained by the model goes down in all
cases. For example, for the overall inequality, the explained fraction goes down from
0.49 to 0.44. Therefore, (income and consumption) taxes together account for 90%
(= 44/49) of the model’s explanatory power for the overall inequality difference, and
the benefits system accounts for the remaining 10%. When we look separately at the
tails, we see that the benefits system is less important for inequality at the top (5%
of the model’s explanatory power) and more important at the bottom (18%). The
bottom line is that with tax differences alone, the model generates 72% of the wage
inequality differences above the median and 44% half of the difference in overall wage
inequality observed in the data between the US and the CEU.
In the next column, we also eliminate the differences in consumption taxes across
countries. The model-data correlations go further down but, again, somewhat mod-
estly. In panel B, the explanatory power of the model that is attributable to income
taxes alone is roughly 75% for all three measures of wage inequality. The difference
between columns 2 and 3 provides a useful measure of the role of consumption taxes:
these taxes account for about 14% (= 90%− 76%) of the model’s explanatory power
for overall wage inequality. Consumption taxes are more important for top-end in-
equality (20% of the model’s total explanatory power) and much less important for
26Adjusting the lump-sum transfers creates an income effect on individuals’ choices in addition to
the changes in policies considered in each experiment. An alternative would be to keep the lump-sum
amount fixed and not balance the budget in each case. We have conducted all three experiments
both ways and found only quantitatively minor differences (available upon request), so in the paper
we only report the case where the lump-sum amount is adjusted.
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Table 1.8: Decomposing the Effects of Different Policies
Benchmark All taxes Lab. Inc. Tax Progressivity
Diff. from Benchmark: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Progressivity — — — —
Average income taxes — — — set to US
Consumption tax — — set to US set to US
Benefits institutions — set to US set to US set to US
A. Correlation Between Data and Model
90-10 0.86 0.82 0.75 0.80
90-50 0.88 0.87 0.83 0.87
50-10 0.63 0.79 0.62 0.60
B. Fraction of US-CEU Difference Explained by Model
90-10 0.49 0.44 (90%)a 0.37 (76%) 0.33 (68%)
90-50 0.76 0.72 (95%) 0.57 (75%) 0.48 (63%)
50-10 0.27 0.22 (82%) 0.20 (74%) 0.20 (74%)
aThe numbers in parentheses express the fraction explained by the model in each column as a per-
centage of the benchmark case reported in column (1).
the lower-end inequality (8%).
Next, we investigate whether the power of income taxes comes from differences in
the average rates across countries or from differences in the progressivity structure. In
other words, if continental Europe differed from the US only in the progressivity of its
labor income tax system—but had the same average tax rate on labor income—how
much of the differences in wage inequality found in the baseline model would still
remain? To answer this question, we proceed as follows. First, we need to be careful
about how we adjust the average tax rate to the US level, because many plausible
modifications to the tax structure will simultaneously affect progressivity (as mea-
sured, for example, by the wedges). We show in Appendix A.3.2 how the average
income tax rate can be adjusted to any desired rate without affecting progressivity.
Then, using these hypothetical tax schedules, we solve each country’s problem assum-
ing that all countries have identical labor market policies (set to the US benchmark)
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and their tax schedules generate the same average tax rate as in the US when using
individuals’ choices made using the US income tax schedule. In column 4, the corre-
lation between the model and the data changes very little compared to the baseline
case reported in column 1, regardless of which part of the wage distribution we look
at. In panel B, we see that progressivity alone is responsible for 68% of the explana-
tory power of the model for the log 90-10 differential. Comparing this to the total
effect of taxes (calculated earlier as 75%), it becomes clear that progressivity is the
key component of the income tax system that is responsible for understanding wage
inequality differences.27
In summary, the benefits system and consumption taxes together are responsi-
ble for about a quarter of the explanatory power of the model for wage inequality.
The more important finding concerns the role of progressivity, which, for all prac-
tical purposes, is the key component of the income tax structure for understanding
wage inequality differences. Differences in the average income tax rate are the least
important among the four types of policy differences we examine in this paper.
1.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis and Discussion
We now conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to some key parameters of the
model. We begin with the Frisch labor supply elasticity and consider two opposite
cases: (i) the case with a high Frisch elasticity of 0.5 and (ii) the case without contin-
27A potential caveat to the preceding analysis is that we study wage inequality among all workers
(including females) whereas some of the model parameters were calibrated above using empirical
targets obtained from male wage data. This approach was necessitated by the fact that reliable
estimates of these moments for female workers are difficult to find in the literature (mainly due to
the difficulties involved with the extensive margin of female labor supply). To see if this matters, we
recalculate the main statistics reported in Table 1.7, but this time using data from the OECD on
male wage inequality alone: the model explains 45% of the difference between the US and the CEU in
the log 90-10 wage differential, 79% of the log 90-50 differential, and 23% of the log 50-10 differential.
These figures are quite comparable to those obtained in the baseline model for all workers (Table
1.7). Similarly, the model-data correlations using male data are 0.91 for the log 90-10, 0.86 for the
log 90-50, and 0.78 for the log 50-10 wage differentials, which are, again, quite close to those from
the baseline model (Figures 1.7 and 1.8).
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Table 1.9: Effect of Labor Supply Elasticity on Wage Inequality Differences
Frisch = 0.5 Discrete hours: n ∈ {0, 0.40}
Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10 Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Denmark 84 1.22 48 46 47 47
Finland 62 96 36 34 41 28
France 39 97 16 15 32 9
Germany 85 95 68 45 39 56
Netherlands 54 78 30 28 34 24
Sweden 53 92 24 25 32 20
CEU 62% 97% 33% 32% 38% 28%
UK 32 -10 86 25 0 56
uous hours choice: n ∈ {0, 0.40}. As a third exercise, we allow for the possibility that
some of the budget surplus is wasted (i.e., G > 0) rather than being rebated back to
households in full. In each case that follows, the model is recalibrated to match the
same five targets in Table 1.6. Finally, we discuss the implications of the model for
wage inequality among male workers, instead of all workers considered so far.
Effect of Labor Supply Elasticity
Frisch Elasticity = 0.5. We begin by setting ϕ = 3.0, which implies a Frisch
elasticity of 0.5. We then recalibrate the five parameters discussed in Section 1.4.1 to
match the same five moments reported in Table 1.6. Table 1.9 reports the counterpart
of the analysis we conducted for the benchmark model and reported in Table 1.7.
Comparing the two tables makes it clear that a higher Frisch elasticity improves the
model’s explanatory power across the board. Now the model can explain 62% of
the US-CEU difference in the log 90-10 wage differentials (compared to 49% in the
benchmark case) and a remarkable 97% of the upper tail inequality (from 76% before).
However, the improvement in the log 50-10 differential is very modest, going up to
33% from 27% in the benchmark case.
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Discrete Hours Choice: Full-Time Work versus Unemployment. To better
understand the role of continuous labor hours choice, we now examine another case
where workers can only choose between full-time employment at fixed hours (n = 0.40)
and unemployment. The parameters of the utility function are the same as in the
baseline case. The results are reported in the last three columns of Table 1.9. Without
the amplification provided by endogenous labor supply—and the resulting dispersion
in hours both within each country and across countries—the explanatory power of the
model falls and, in some cases, it falls significantly. For example, the model explains
32% of the difference in the log 90-10 differential, compared to 49% in the benchmark
case and 62% in the high Frisch case. For the upper-end inequality, the difference is
even larger: the model now explains 38%, half of the baseline value, and also much
lower than the 97% in the high Frisch case. The difference is much smaller at the
lower tail, however, where the explained fraction slightly rises to 28% from 27% in
the baseline, and is only a bit lower than 33% in the high Frisch case.
Overall, these findings underscore the importance of the interaction of endoge-
nous labor supply choice with progressive taxation for understanding wage inequality
differences across countries, especially above the median of the distribution.
Wasteful Government Expenditures versus Transfers
In the baseline model, the surplus was rebated back to households in a lump-sum
fashion, essentially assuming that government expenditures are perfect substitutes
for private consumption. To examine if our results are sensitive to this assumption,
we now assume that half of the government surplus is wasted: G = Tr, and each
component equals half of the budget surplus (i.e., tax revenues minus benefits pay-
ments). This assumption is probably extreme, but it is useful in illustrating whether
the results are sensitive to this scenario. From Table 1.10, we see that, qualitatively,
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Table 1.10: Effect of Wasteful Government Spending on Wage Inequality Results
G = Tr = 0.5× Gov’t Surplus
Log 90-10 Log 90-50 Log 50-10
(a) (b) (c)
Denmark 63 90 38
Finland 49 75 29
France 30 71 14
Germany 69 75 60
Netherlands 45 59 31
Sweden 42 67 23
CEU 49% 73% 29%
UK 21 0 49
the explanatory power of the model is lower for some countries for the log 90-10 and
90-50 differentials but higher for the 50-10 differential. Quantitatively, however, the
effect is minimal across the board. In fact, in some cases, no difference is visible
(because of rounding) compared to the benchmark case in Table 1.7.
1.5.4 Other Implications
Although the focus of this paper is strictly on second moments—wage and human
capital dispersion—the model studied in this paper also makes predictions for some
aggregate variables, and it is useful to discuss these for completeness, albeit very
briefly (Table 1.11). Notice that the first two columns report variables only as ratios.
This is because for GDP per worker, the levels are not informative (and not compa-
rable to the data counterpart); and for hours per worker, the model was calibrated to
match the US data exactly (n = 0.40), so, again, there is no information in levels.
The model does a good job of matching GDP per worker differences: in the data,
the CEU has a GDP per worker that is 23% lower than that of the US, which is nearly
matched by the model. The UK, on the other hand, is again an outlier (not shown
in the table). In the model, UK’s GDP per worker is only 1.4% lower, whereas it is
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Table 1.11: Aggregate Variables in the CEU and in the US: Model vs Data, 2001–5
GDP/ Worker Hours/Worker Unemp. Rate Educational
Attainment
CEU/US CEU/US CEU US CEU US
Data 0.769 0.813 7.4% 5.5% 27.8% 38.0%
Model 0.773 0.905 7.5% 5.7% 21.5% 37.9%
24% lower in the data. Turning to hours per worker, the CEU is 19% below the US in
the data. The model captures half of this difference and generates 9.5% lower hours
per worker for the CEU. Since we allow for unemployment and model the differences
in the benefits system, examining the implications of the model along this dimension
is also of interest. Somewhat surprisingly, the average unemployment rate in the
model is quite close to the data both for the US and the CEU. Again, the UK is an
outlier, where the model generates an unemployment rate of 9.3% compared to only
4.8% in the data. Finally, the model also does well in accounting for the educational
attainment rate28 for the US, but underestimates it for the CEU (21.5% compared
to 27.8% in the data). Of course, in our model, education is currently treated in
a simple manner—as an option for accumulating human capital full time with the
same production function used for on-the-job training—so these comparisons should
be taken with a grain of salt. A more thorough modeling of the differences in formal
education between the US and Europe is a difficult problem, but also a potentially
interesting and fruitful direction to extend the current model, which we intend to
undertake in future work.
28This is defined as the fraction of population aged 24–65 who have completed two or more years
of college education (following Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008)).
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1.6 Inequality Trends over Time: 1980–2003
In the one-factor model studied so far, the price of human capital, PH , is simply
a scaling factor and has no effect on any implications of the model (which is why
we normalized it to 1 earlier). In other words, the Ben-Porath framework does not
have a well-defined notion of returns to skill. This is an important shortcoming when
the goal is to study the changes in human capital behavior over time in response
to skill-biased technical change. Guvenen and Kuruscu (2009) proposed a tractable
way to extend the Ben-Porath model that allows for a notion of returns to skill and
overcomes this difficulty. We now describe the necessary modifications to the model
presented earlier.
1.6.1 Model 2: An Extended Framework
Suppose that individuals now have two factors of production: they begin life with an
endowment of “raw labor” (i.e., strength, health, etc.), and, as before, they are able
to accumulate human capital over the life cycle. Let lj denote the initial raw labor of
an individual of type j.29 Raw labor and human capital command separate prices in
the labor market, and each individual supplies both of these factors of production at
competitively determined wage rates, denoted by PL and PH , respectively. Individuals
begin their life with zero human capital and each period produce new human capital,
Qj, according to the following generalized Ben-Porath technology:
Qj = Aj
[
(θLl
j + θHh
j)ijnj
]α
. (1.17)
Notice that we now allow both factors of production to affect learning. The
motivation for this specification is that an individual’s physical capacity (health,
29The dependence of raw labor on j makes clear that raw labor can vary across individuals, albeit
in a way that is perfectly correlated with ability. We provide justification for this structure later on.
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strength, stamina, etc.) is also likely to affect her productivity in learning, in addition
to her ability and existing human capital stock. Furthermore, Guvenen and Kuruscu
(2009) show that this particular specification generates plausible implications for the
behavior of wages in the US since the 1970s, which is another reason for adopting this
formulation. Finally, both raw labor and human capital depreciate every period at
the same rate δ. With this new two-factor structure, the observed total wage income
of an individual is given by
yjs ≡ 
[
PLl
j + PHh
j
s
]
njs(1− ijs). (1.18)
Skill-Biased Technical Change. The two-factor structure just introduced breaks
the neutrality of the human capital investment with respect to a change in PH . In
particular, now a rise in PH increases investment, even when PL is fixed. Before
delving into the quantitative results, it is useful to step back and understand this
point more clearly. To this end, we make several assumptions that yield an analytical
expression for the optimality condition.30 In addition, we also assume PH/PL =
θH/θL, which essentially means that the relative price of human capital to raw labor
is the same as their relative productivity in the human capital function. Although this
assumption is not necessary for quantitative results, following Guvenen and Kuruscu
(2009) we make it in the rest of the paper because it substantially simplifies the
solution of the model. Under these assumptions, the first-order condition is
C ′j(Q
j
s) =θH{β
1− τ(ys+1)
1− τ(ys) ns+1 + β
21− τ(ys+2)
1− τ(ys) ns+2 + ...+ β
S−s1− τ(yS)
1− τ(ys)nS}
(1.19)
30We set χ ≡ 1, eliminate the benefits system (Ω ≡ 0 and Φ ≡ 0), and set  = 1. For simplicity
(although not necessary), we also set δ = 0.
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Table 1.12: Rise in Wage Inequality: Model versus Data, 1980–2003
Change in Log Wage Differentials
Log 90-10 = Log 90-50 + Log 50-10
CEU Data Level 0.070 0.063 0.007
% 91% 9%
Model Level 0.168 0.129 0.039
% 77% 23%
US Data Level 0.230 0.160 0.070
% 70% 30%
Model Level 0.232 0.184 0.048
% 79% 21%
Difference Data: Level 0.160 0.097 0.063
% 61% 39%
Model Level 0.065 0.056 0.009
% 87% 13%
% Explained 41% 58% 14%
Note: The model is calibrated to match the 23 log points rise in the log 90-10 differential
for the US from 1980 to 2003.
The key observation is that optimal investment, Qjs, now depends on the level of
θH , unlike in (1.4) and (1.6) presented in Section 1.2.1, where PH did not appear at all.
This is because, in our two-factor model, the marginal cost of investment depends on
both θH and θL (see equation (1.18)), whereas the marginal benefit is only proportional
to θH . As a result, a higher θH (for example, due to SBTC) increases the benefit more
than the cost (since θL does not rise), resulting in higher investment. This feature is
an important difference between this two-factor model and the standard Ben-Porath
framework.
1.6.2 Results: US versus CEU with Fixed Tax Schedules
The extended model has some new parameters that need to be calibrated. Except
those discussed here, all parameter values are kept at the values given in Table 1.5.
An important point to note is that for the cross-sectional analysis of the previous
section, the two-factor model would have precisely the same implications as the one-
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factor Ben-Porath model used earlier. This is because θH and θL are constant at a
point in time and their values can be normalized to generate exactly the same results
as in the previous section. Thus, with proper choices of θH , θL, and the distribution
of lj, we do not need to recalibrate any other parameter and can still obtain the same
results for year 2003 as before. This is the route that we follow in this section.31
For examining the change in inequality over time, we choose ∆ log (θH/θL) to
match the 23 log points increase in the log 90-10 wage differential in the US from
1980 to 2003. The required change in ∆ log (θH/θL) is 0.236. With this calibration,
wage inequality rises by 0.168 in CEU during the same time, compared to 0.070 rise
in the data (fourth column of Table 1.12). These results imply that differences in
labor market policies, even when they are fixed over time, can generate about 41%
(= (0.232−0.168)/(0.230−0.070)) of the widening in the inequality gap between the
US and the CEU during this time period.
Another dimension of the rise in wage inequality is seen in Table 1.2 and replicated
in the last two columns of Table 1.12. The substantial part of the rise in wage
inequality in the CEU has been at the top: the log 90-50 differential is responsible
for 91% of the total rise in the 90-10 differential, whereas only 9% of the rise took
place at the lower end. A similar outcome, somewhat less extreme, is observed in the
US where 70% of the rise in the log 90-10 differential is due to the 90-50 differential.
The model generates a similar picture: about 77% of the rise in the CEU and 79% in
the US is due to the 90-50 differential. An alternative way to express these figures is
that the model explains 58% of the increase in the inequality gap above the median
between the US and the CEU but only 14% of the rising gap below the median. As
31More specifically, the two-factor model eliminates initial heterogeneity in human capital but
instead introduces raw labor. We make the same assumptions for lj as we made earlier about hj0.
That is, we assume that lj is uniformly distributed and is perfectly correlated with Aj . We also
assume that θH = θL = 1 in 2003, which allows us to use the same mean value and coefficient of
variation for lj as for hj0 in Table 1.1.
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Figure 1.9: Progressivity Wedges at Different Income Levels: US vs. Germany, 1983
and 2003
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is clear by now, this is a recurring theme in this paper: the model explains cross-
country inequality facts at the upper tail quite well, but explains a smaller fraction
at the lower tail.
1.6.3 Results: US versus Germany with Changing Tax Sched-
ules
For the United States and Germany, we were able to construct the effective tax sched-
ules for 1983, which allows us to conduct a two-country comparison in the presence
of both SBTC and changing tax schedules. The procedure for constructing the 1983
tax schedules is described in Appendix A.3.3 and the resulting progressivity wedges
are shown in Figure 1.9. As seen in the figure, in 1983 the progressivity of the tax
structure in the US and Germany was similar in both countries up to about twice
the average earnings level. And above this point, the US actually had the more pro-
gressive system. Over time, the US has become much less progressive, whereas the
change in Germany has been more gradual, making the US tax schedules much flatter
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than that of Germany over time.
Using these schedules, we conduct two experiments.32 First, we consider the case
where there is no SBTC between 1983 and 2003 and the only change has been in the
tax schedules (including the consumption tax rates). No parameter is recalibrated
to match any target in 1983. The results are reported in the fourth column of Table
1.13 (denoted Experiment 1). In the US, the log 90-10 differential rises by 16.7 log
points compared to 23 log points in the data. Hence, the flattening of the tax schedule
alone explains a significant fraction (about 72%) of the rise in the US wage inequality
during this time. To our knowledge, this result is new to this paper. In contrast
to the US, wage inequality barely changes (by +1 log point) in Germany from 1983
to 2003. Thus, the dramatic fall in progressivity in the US and the small change in
Germany alone could explain an important part of the difference in the evolutions of
inequality between these two countries.
As a second experiment, in addition to changing tax schedules, we now also cal-
ibrate the change in the skill bias of technology such that we exactly match the log
90-10 wage differential in the US in 1983. The required change in log(θH/θL) is 7.5
log points, which is about a third of the value in the baseline model (23.6 log points).
Since the model is calibrated to exactly match the US wage inequality, we turn to
Germany: the log 90-10 differential rises by less than 7 log points compared to the 9
log points rise in the data. Thus, the model easily generates—in fact, it over-explains
by 16% (i.e., (0.23 − 0.068)/(0.23 − 0.09) = 1.16)—the growth of the inequality gap
between the US and Germany. For comparison, the baseline model (third column of
Table 1.13) with fixed tax schedules explained about 55% of the rise in the inequality
gap between the US and Germany.
32Because of computational burden, these experiments only provide steady state comparisons.
Although solving for the full transition path is beyond the scope of this paper, it could be important
for the quantitative results, so future work on this issue is certainly warranted.
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Table 1.13: US vs Germany: Log 90-10 Differential with Changing Tax Schedules
Data Model
Baseline Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Taxes Fixed Changing Changing
θH (SBTC) Calibrated to US Fixed Calibrated to US
US 0.23 0.232 0.167 0.230
Germany 0.09 0.154 0.010 0.068
% Explained 55% — 116%
Although these results are certainly encouraging, a caveat must be noted. First,
wage inequality in 1983 depends not only on the tax schedule in 1983 but also on
those that were in place several years prior, since the dispersion in human capital
across individuals results from investments made in previous years. Clearly, the same
comment applies to 2003. Although in our exercise we do not account for this fact, it
is not clear which way this biases the results. This is because the US tax system was
even more progressive before the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, whereas the
progressivity change in the years preceding 2003 (say, from 1990 to 2003) was more
modest. Therefore, if we were to use a time average of tax schedules in our exercise
(say, 1973 to 1983 and 1993 to 2003), we conjecture that the reduction in progressivity
over time could be larger than we assumed in the experiment just described (which
would attribute an even larger role to taxes).
1.7 Some Microeconomic Evidence on the Mecha-
nism
In this section, we provide some direct empirical evidence on the mechanism that is
at work in our model. In particular, we compare three key implications of the model
regarding human capital inequality to the data. First, we investigate whether, in the
data, higher wage dispersion in a given country is accompanied with a larger human
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Table 1.14: Evidence on the Human Capital Mechanism
Panel A: Cross-Country Correlation of
Wage Dispersion (Data) and Test Score Dispersion (Data)
Test Score Measure→ Quantitative Prose Document
Dispersion Measure↓
Log 90-10 0.88 0.91 0.89
Log 90-50 0.89 0.88 0.92
Log 50-10 0.77 0.78 0.76
Panel B: Cross-Country Correlation of Human Capital
Dispersion (Model) and Test Score Dispersion (Data)
Test Score Measure→ Quantitative Prose Document
Dispersion Measure↓
Log 90-10 0.88 0.81 0.80
Log 90-50 0.78 0.67 0.78
Log 50-10 0.88 0.80 0.77
capital dispersion, as robustly predicted by our model. Second, it seems useful to
go beyond wages and compare the human capital dispersion implied by the model to
that found in the data across countries. Third, and as discussed earlier, our model
predicts that countries with a more progressive tax system will have less dispersion
in human capital across individuals, which we test in the data.
To conduct this analysis, we need an empirical measure of human capital at the
individual-level for the countries in our sample. The data source we use is the Interna-
tional Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), which is a large-scale, international comparative
assessment designed to measure a range of skills linked to the economic characteristics
of the adult population within and across nations. The IALS differs from some other
well-known surveys by focusing on the adult population—which is more useful for
our purposes—instead of high-school students (e.g., the OECD’s Program for Inter-
national Student Assessment (PISA) study). We use data from the 1998 survey—the
latest available—which contains data from seven of the eight countries in our sam-
ple, the exception being France. The IALS survey is composed of three tests: (i)
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quantitative literacy (measuring arithmetic and analytical skills used in typical work
situations); (ii) prose literacy (the skills needed to understand and use information
from texts, including editorials, news stories, poems, etc.); and (iii) document liter-
acy (the skills required to locate and use information contained in various formats,
including maps, tables, graphs, job applications, payroll forms, transportation sched-
ules, etc.). As is evident from these descriptions, these tests aim to cover a broad set
of cognitive skills, which can reasonably be viewed as an empirical measure of human
capital. Not surprisingly, it has been widely used for this purpose in the literature
(see, e.g., Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van Ophem (2004); Nickell and Bell (1995); and
the references therein).
To address the first question raised above, panel A of Table 1.14 reports the cross-
country correlations between wage dispersion and human capital dispersion, where the
latter is measured using the three components of IALS test scores. Each correlation
is computed using the same measure of dispersion for both variables (log 90-10, 90-
50, and 50-10). The correlations are very strong everywhere in the table—regardless
of the test score used and part of the distribution we focus on. Furthermore, in
addition to the strong correlations, the test score dispersion varies significantly across
countries (not reported in table). For example, the country with—by far—the largest
human capital dispersion is the US, with a 90-10 percentile ratio of 2.26 (as measured
by the quantitative score), followed by the UK with 1.83. At the other end lie the
Scandinavian countries with a corresponding dispersion of 1.45. The other tests reveal
even larger gaps, with the US having the highest dispersion (2.58 for prose and 2.31 for
document literacy), followed by the UK (at 1.78 and 1.71, respectively), whereas the
Scandinavian countries average 1.43 and 1.40, respectively. Germany and Netherlands
are tucked in between these two extremes, often closer to the Scandinavian countries
than to the US and UK.
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Table 1.15: Cross-Correlation of Progressivity Wedge and Log 90-10 Test Score Dis-
persion
P (0.5,m)
m : 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Test Score Measure↓
Log 90-10 Quantitative –0.73 –0.74 –0.76 –0.78 –0.79
Log 90-10 Prose –0.72 –0.74 –0.75 –076 –0.77
Log 90-10 Document –0.66 –0.68 –0.69 –0.71 –0.73
Second, we examine how the implications of our model for within-country human
capital inequality compares to the data. Panel B of Table 1.14 reports the correlations
between the human capital dispersion in the model and those measured in the data
across countries. Using all three measures of test scores, the correlation is robust,
ranging from 0.67 to 0.88 and averaging 0.80. Third, and finally, we turn to the
relationship between progressivity and human capital inequality predicted by the
model. Table 1.15 displays the correlations of the log 90-10 dispersion of the three
test scores with the progressivity wedge at different income levels. The correlations
are negative, consistent with the model’s prediction, and fairly strong—ranging from
–0.66 to –0.79, with an average of –0.73.
In our view, these three empirical findings, when put together, provide strong
support to the human capital mechanism that is operational in our model.
1.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the effects of progressive labor income taxation on
wage inequality when a major source of wage dispersion is differential rates of human
capital accumulation. To understand the main mechanisms and their quantitative
importance, we have examined the inequality differences between the US and the
CEU, which differ significantly in their income tax structures as well as in other
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dimensions of their labor market institutions. A common theme that permeates all of
our findings is that the model is significantly better at explaining inequality differences
at the upper tail compared to the lower tail. Institutions, such as unionization,
minimum wage laws (as in the case of France, discussed earlier), and centralized
bargaining, are likely to be more important for the lower tail. However, since changes
in the upper tail have been so important during this time (as we have documented),
the mechanisms studied in this paper provide a promising direction for understanding
US-CEU differences in wage inequality.
We also found that the most important policy difference for wage inequality is
the progressivity of the income tax system, which is responsible for about two-thirds
of the model’s explanatory power. In addition, endogenous labor supply plays an
important amplification role for wage inequality when interacted with progressivity.
There is an active debate in the literature on the appropriate values of the labor
supply elasticity at the macro and micro levels. This paper also has implications for
this issue. In particular, if a micro-econometrician were to use the standard empirical
regression of labor hours on wages to recover the Frisch elasticity (of labor supply)
using simulated data from our model, she would obtain a value of 0.14 in the baseline
case when the theoretical value we set is 0.30 (and 0.26 when the theoretical value
is set to 0.50). At the same time, the labor supply elasticity relevant for human
capital accumulation is higher than the theoretical value because of the amplification
channel discussed earlier. We have also investigated the welfare differences across
countries resulting from labor market institutions. The calibrated model implies that
for highest-ability individuals, living in the US yields the highest utility, whereas for
the lowest-ability individuals, the UK is the best country. For brevity’s sake, we leave
out of the paper a more detailed discussion of these welfare experiments as well as
59
the micro elasticity regressions (results available upon request).33
We have also investigated if the differential rise in wage inequality between these
two regions could be explained by the channels explored here. Using fixed tax sched-
ules over time, the model explains about 40% of the rise in the inequality gap between
the US and the CEU and 60% of the upper tail inequality. In a two-country compar-
ison, we found that the model explains all of the rise in the inequality gap between
the US and Germany, when the actual changes in the tax schedules were also incor-
porated.
Finally, using IALS data, we have documented that countries with higher wage
inequality also have higher human capital inequality and that countries with more
progressive tax policies also have less dispersed human capital distributions. These
findings bring direct empirical evidence in support of the mechanism in this paper.
In this paper, we made several assumptions to make the quantitative exercise
computationally feasible.34 As noted earlier, an important direction to extend the
current framework would be by carefully modeling the differences between the US
and the CEU in the financing of their education systems as well as in the kinds of
skills taught in schools in both places. This is a difficult but interesting question that
is at the top of our future research agenda.
33The model studied here also has implications for how the tax and benefits systems affect the
life cycle profile of wages and it would be illuminating to examine how these implications compare
to the data from the US and the CEU. Such an analysis, however, requires panel data on wages
(to disentangle age effects from time or cohort effects), which is difficult to obtain on a comparable
basis for more than a few countries. One piece of evidence is available from a Swedish panel dataset,
studied by Domeij and Floden (2009). These authors find that the dispersion of wage earnings
growth rates over the life cycle (σ(bj) defined in Section 1.4.1) is much smaller in Sweden than in
the United States. Given the high progressivity of income taxes in Sweden compared to the US, this
outcome is exactly what is predicted by the present model. An interesting research avenue would
be to conduct a fuller investigation of the life cycle pattern of wages (and also perhaps hours) in a
broader set of countries.
34The numerical solution of the model requires care because the individuals’ dynamic problem has
several sources of non-convexities. As a result, solving for the equilibrium takes about 14 hours for
the US and UK, and as much as 30 hours for some countries like Denmark. This makes calibration
very time consuming, which prevented us from extending the model in other directions.
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Chapter 2
On the Persistence of Income
Shocks over the Life Cycle:
Evidence and Implications
This chapter is first presented in Karahan and Ozkan (2009) and is co-authered with
Fatih Karahan.
Abstract
How does the persistence of earnings change over the life cycle? Do workers at different
ages face the same variance of idiosyncratic shocks? This paper proposes a novel
specification for residual earnings that allows for a lifetime profile in the persistence
and variance of labor income shocks. We show that the statistical model is identified
and estimate it using PSID data. We strongly reject the hypothesis of a flat life-cycle
profile for persistence and variance of persistent shocks, but not for the variance of
transitory shocks. Shocks to earnings are only moderately persistent (around 0.75)
for young individuals. Persistence rises with age up to unity until midway in life.
On the other hand, the variance of persistent shocks exhibits a U-shaped profile over
the life cycle (with a minimum of 0.01 and a maximum of 0.045). Our estimate of
persistence, for most of the working life, is substantially lower than typical estimates
in the literature. We investigate the implications of these profiles for consumption-
savings behavior with a standard life-cycle model. The welfare cost of idiosyncratic
risk implied by the age-dependent income process is 32% lower compared to an AR(1)
process without age profiles. This is mostly due to a higher degree of consumption
insurance for young workers, for whom persistence is moderate. We conclude that
the welfare cost of idiosyncratic risk will be overstated if one does not account for the
age profiles in the persistence and variance of shocks.
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2.1 Introduction
How does the persistence of earnings change over the life cycle? Do workers at different
ages face the same variance of idiosyncratic shocks? Answers to these questions are
central to many economic decisions in the presence of incomplete financial markets.
Uninsured idiosyncratic risk affects the dynamics of wealth accumulation, consump-
tion inequality, and the effectiveness of self-insurance through asset accumulation.
Thus, income risk is an important object of study for quantitative macroeconomics.
Moreover, the age profile of persistence can be informative about the economic mech-
anisms underlying earnings risk. For these purposes, in this paper (co-authered with
Fatih Karahan) we estimate a novel specification for idiosyncratic earnings that allows
for a life-cycle profile in the persistence and variance of earnings shocks.
Two important determinants of labor income risk are the persistence and variance
of shocks. The persistence governs how long the effect of a shock lasts. For example,
in the case of an unexpected health problem, this represents the time to full recovery.
The variance, on the other hand, captures the magnitude by which shocks affect
earnings. The goal of this paper is to estimate the lifetime profiles of these two
components.
We are motivated by the observation that changes in earnings occur for differ-
ent reasons over the life span. For young workers, mobility because of a mismatch
or demand shocks to occupations might play an important role (Kambourov and
Manovskii (2008)). Midway through a career, settling down into senior positions as
well as bonuses, promotions or demotions may account for earnings dynamics. Older
people are more likely to develop health problems that reduce their productivity.
These changes differ in nature, and more specifically, in persistence and magnitude.
Thus, we suspect that variance and persistence of shocks are not constant throughout
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a lifetime.
In our analysis, we decompose residual earnings into an individual-specific fixed
effect, a persistent component and a transitory component. The fixed effect captures
permanent differences among individuals. The persistent component captures lasting
changes in earnings and it is modeled as an AR(1) process. The transitory component
encompasses both measurement error and temporary changes in earnings and is i.i.d.
The novel feature of our specification is that both the persistence parameter of the
AR(1) process and the variance of innovations to transitory and persistent compo-
nents are allowed to vary by age. Besides allowing for age profiles, we also account for
changes in variances over time. This paper, to our best knowledge, is the first study
that estimates a lifetime profile of earnings persistence and variance.35
We next turn to identification. Particularly, which features of the data tell us
how changes in earnings vary in persistence and variance over the lifetime? We show
that these profiles can be identified using the variance covariance structure of levels
of earnings. Intuitively, we identify the age profile of persistence by tracking the
covariance structure over lags for a given age. The variance of persistent shocks is
obtained by exploiting the variation in the covariance structure over age for a given
lag. Finally, the variance of transitory shocks is recovered from the variance structure.
The proof is rigorously discussed in Appendix B.1.
Using earnings data from the PSID, we first estimate a nonparametric specifica-
tion, i.e., without imposing any functional form on the lifetime profiles of persistence
and variance. Our results reveal that persistence is increasing at early stages in the
working life. Young agents face only moderately persistent shocks: 70 percent of a
shock received during the early years in the labor market dies out over the next 5
35Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) allow for an age profile in the variance of permanent and transitory
shocks. They don’t find evidence for a nontrivial profile.
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years. Shocks for workers midway through their careers are more enduring. If the
shock was received at age 40, 85 percent of it would still remain after 5 years. On
the other hand, we find a U-shaped profile for the variance of persistent shocks: A
shock of one standard deviation implies a 26% change in annual earnings for a 24
year old. The corresponding number for a 40 year old is only 12%. These are sizable
differences. As for the variance of transitory shocks, we find a slight increase early on
but a flat profile for the remaining working life.36
We then ask the question of whether these life-cycle profiles are statistically sig-
nificant. To tackle this question, we proceed in two ways. First, we estimate a
quadratic function for the age profiles and test whether the coefficients on the linear
and quadratic terms are zero. Then, in order to complement this approach, we also
estimate life-cycle profiles by partitioning the working life into 3 stages. Here, we as-
sume that persistence and variance are constant within a stage but might differ from
one to the other. Again, we test whether the profile of persistence and the variance
of persistent shocks are flat over the lifetime. Both of these tests strongly reject the
hypothesis of a flat profile for persistence and the variance of persistent shocks.
The estimates of persistence in the literature are close to unity.37 Our age-specific
estimate of persistence lies substantially below 1 for most of the lifetime. We argue
that the high persistence in the literature is driven by targeting the almost linear
increase in lifetime earnings inequality. Namely, estimation avoids lower levels of
persistence, which would imply a concave rise in inequality. The age-dependent in-
come process can capture the linear shape without high levels of persistence. This is
possible because of the inverse relationship between persistence and the variance of
36The 95% bootstrap confidence intervals point to a flat profile. In our specification, transitory
shocks also capture classical measurement error. Therefore, it is not surprising to find a flat profile
for transitory shocks.
37Estimates of specifications that account for the heterogeneity in income growth rates find lower
levels of persistence. In particular, Guvenen (2009) estimates persistence at around 0.82.
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labor income shocks that our estimates reveal. When persistence goes up with age,
the additional increase it induces in inequality is compensated by a decrease in the
variance.
We then investigate the economic implications and economic significance of the
age-dependent income process. In particular, we ask how much the presence of age
profiles matters for the insurability of labor income shocks and the welfare costs
of idiosyncratic risk. To address these issues, we study a standard life-cycle model
featuring incomplete financial markets and a social security system. We compare
the consumption-savings implications of the age-dependent income process with a
standard AR(1) process (with constant persistence and variance).
We start with an economy with natural borrowing constraints (NBC). We find that
both of the processes imply very similar consumption and asset profiles. However,
they differ significantly in the degree of consumption insurance against persistent
shocks. We measure the level of insurance as the fraction of shocks to earnings
that do not lead to consumption changes (Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)).
Around 44% of persistent shocks translate into consumption growth under the age-
dependent process compared to 60% under the standard AR(1) specification. Most of
this difference comes from young workers for whom the degree of insurance is as high
as 70% under the age-dependent process as opposed to 30% under the AR(1) process.
This is due to the level of persistence, which is particularly low for young workers
under the age-dependent process. It is well known that persistence is an important
determinant of insurance; transitory shocks are easily insured by borrowing (e.g.,
Kaplan and Violante (2008), Gourinchas and Parker (2002)). In the presence of
very persistent shocks, agents refrain from borrowing against the possibility of a long
sequence of low income states. Insurance against such shocks is, therefore, mostly
through assets. This is not possible for young agents, since they don’t have enough
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wealth. Persistence is fairly moderate for young workers under the age-dependent
income process, which explains the higher insurance coefficients early in careers.
Note that the low levels of persistence under the age-dependent process are com-
pensated by the larger variances of shocks. On the one hand, lower persistence implies
better insurability. On the other hand, larger variance implies more instability. In
order to evaluate this tradeoff quantitatively, we compare the welfare costs of idiosyn-
cratic risk implied by the age-dependent process with a standard AR(1) process. We
find sizable differences: An agent living in the AR(1) economy is willing to give up
around 14.85% of her consumption permanently in return for perfect insurance as
opposed to only 9.97% for an agent under the age-dependent income process.
As discussed above, the differences in welfare costs are mostly due to higher in-
surability. The fact that the age-dependent income process results in larger insurance
coefficients relies crucially on the extent of borrowing limits. In order to quantify
the effect of borrowing limits, we study an economy in which borrowing is ruled out
altogether (zero borrowing constraints (ZBC) economy). The degree of consumption
insurance goes down by a significant amount under the age-dependent specification,
especially for young workers, for whom insurance falls from around 70% to 26%. This
shows the importance of borrowing constraints for young workers.
The decrease in the degree of insurance does have welfare consequences: Welfare
costs increase compared to the NBC economy for both of the specifications. The
increase is larger for the age-dependent process, lowering the differences between
the two processes. However, welfare costs are still significantly lower under the age-
dependent income process (12.5% and 16.37%, respectively for the age-dependent and
the AR(1) processes).
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Related Literature Our contribution is twofold. First, we contribute to the lit-
erature that models idiosyncratic earnings risk. The estimates of statistical models
are used as an input in macroeconomic models with heterogeneous agents. Different
specifications will induce different economic decisions; therefore, one needs a good
measure of labor income risk. A partial list of such papers includes Lillard and Willis
(1978), Lillard and Weiss (1979), MaCurdy (1982), Abowd and Card (1989) and Baker
(1997), although none of the papers above have investigated the lifetime profiles of
persistence and variances. Our paper fills that void.
A notable exception is Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), which estimates a process
with a fully permanent component, an MA(q) component where q is estimated, and
a fully transitory component. Their focus is on conditional heteroskedasticity in
permanent and transitory shocks. Similar to our paper, they also allow for age profiles
in the variance of permanent and transitory shocks. However, unlike our paper, they
do not allow persistence to change over the life cycle. They find no evidence in favor
of changing variance over the lifecycle. In this paper, we argue that it is crucial to
allow persistence to change with age.
Another paper related to ours is Hause (1980). Using data on Swedish white
collar workers, he estimates a process that has an AR(1) component with time-specific
persistence and variance of shocks. Since his data set contains only workers born in
1943, it is not clear whether these profiles are age or time-specific. Our paper takes
advantage of the rich panel structure of the PSID and separates changes over time
from changes over the life cycle.
Recently, Guvenen (2009) argues for the existence of growth rate heterogeneity and
finds evidence against unit roots. The evidence he brings forward is twofold. First,
he points to the convexity in the variance profile of earnings. Second, he exploits the
increase in higher order covariances. He argues that these can be captured through
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growth rate heterogeneity but not by highly persistent shocks. The age-dependent
income process can inherently capture these features of the data without growth rate
heterogeneity. Alvarez, Browning, and Ejrnæs (2010) investigates the role of hetero-
geneity in income dynamics of individuals and find significant heterogeneity among
seemingly homogeneous individuals. Our paper can be thought as complementary to
theirs in that we focus on observed heterogeneity, that is, heterogeneity across age.
Another approach to infer the nature of earnings risk is to make use of economic
choices. Guvenen (2007), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and Guvenen and
Smith (2009) are papers that bring consumption data into the picture to make in-
ference about the nature of income risk. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2004) use
schooling decisions and decompose residual earnings into a component that is fore-
seen and acted upon (heterogeneity) and a component that is unanticipated (shocks).
Feigenbaum and Li (2008) also make this distinction and measure income uncertainty
as the variance of income forecasting errors at different ages. They find a U-shaped
uncertainty profile over the life cycle. Altonji, Smith, and Vidangos (2009) consider a
structural approach to estimate a joint model of earnings, employment, job changes,
wage rates, and work hours.
We also contribute to the literature on consumption insurance. Blundell, Pista-
ferri, and Preston (2008) develop and apply a methodology to measure the degree
of consumption insurance against permanent and transitory shocks. Kaplan and Vi-
olante (2008) argue that the lifetime profile of insurance coefficients in the data is
not consistent with a life-cycle model that features a standard AR(1) process, since
this implies that the insurance profile follows the profile of assets, which is roughly
increasing over the life cycle. However, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) find
a roughly flat insurance profile in the data. We show that under the age-dependent
income process proposed in this paper, the profile of insurance need not be increasing.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.2 we describe the
statistical model that we estimate, discuss its identification and present our results.
Section 2.3 presents the life-cycle model that is used to study the consumption-savings
implications of the age-dependent process and compares its welfare consequences to
a standard AR(1) process. Finally, Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section we describe the statistical model for earnings. We start with a simple
age-dependent income process and discuss its identification. We then introduce the
full-blown model, but the proof of identification is left to the appendix. Empirical
results are discussed at the end of this section.
2.2.1 An Age-Dependent Income Process
Let y˜ih be the residual component of earnings of individual i at age h, which is obtained
by running cross-sectional regressions of earnings on observables.38 The details of this
first-stage regression are presented later. Residual income is decomposed into a fixed
effect, an AR(1) component, and a transitory component. This representation is
simple, yet it captures the salient features of the data well. Therefore, it is widely
used in the literature.39 This paper extends the standard specification to allow for a
lifetime profile in the persistence parameter, the variance of persistent and transitory
38Some papers, such as Guvenen (2009), use potential experience as the explanatory variable
instead of age which is defined as age −max(schooling, 12) − 6. This is used as a proxy for actual
experience in order to avoid endogeneity issues. We use age since potential experience is collinear
with it. We carried out the same analysis with potential experience, and the results are similar (see
Appendix B.2.2).
39Some papers, including Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) and Hryshko (2008), allow for a fixed effect,
a permanent component (unit root), a fully transitory component and a persistent component that
is modeled either as an MA (q) or AR (1).
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shocks:
y˜ih = α
i + zih + ε
i
h (2.1)
zih = ρh−1z
i
h−1 + η
i
h
ηih ∼ iid(0, σ2η,h) εih ∼ iid(0, σ2ε,h)
Here, αi is an individual-specific fixed effect that captures the variation in initial
conditions such as innate ability. εih is a fully transitory component that encompasses
both measurement error and temporary changes in earnings such as bonuses and
overtime pay.40 zih is the persistent component of idiosyncratic income at age h that
captures lasting changes in earnings such as promotions and health status. Each
period the individual is hit by a persistent shock of size ηih. The magnitude of this
shock is governed by the variance σ2η,h and the extent to which it lasts is determined
by the persistence parameter ρ. The key innovation of our paper is to allow for an
age profile in the variance of shocks, σ2η,h and σ
2
ε,h, as well as in the durability of the
persistent shocks, ρh.
The age profiles capture the idea that changes in earnings occur for different
reasons throughout the life span. For example, young households experience high
mobility because of a mismatch or demand shocks to occupations. On the other hand,
middle-aged workers settle down into senior positions and experience promotions or
demotions that lead to changes in earnings. As for older people, the causes of earnings
instability are more likely to be health problems. These sources of earnings dynamics
differ in nature, and more specifically, in persistence and magnitude. Thus, we suspect
that the variance and the persistence of shocks are not flat throughout the lifetime.
Rather than imposing constant parameters throughout the lifetime, we let the data
40These changes are potentially correlated with future promotions. However, we follow the liter-
ature and assume that these shocks are i.i.d. in nature.
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speak for itself.
Having introduced the age-dependent income process, an immediate concern is
identification. Which features of the data tell us how changes in earnings vary in
variance and persistence over the lifetime? The identification discussion allows us to
connect the statistical model to the moments in the data and makes the estimation
procedure meaningful. Intuitively, we identify the profile of persistence by tracking
the covariance structure over lags for a given age. The variance of persistent shocks is
obtained by exploiting the variation in the covariance structure over ages for a given
lag. Finally, the variance of transitory shocks is recovered from the variance structure.
The next proposition establishes that the income process (2.1) is identified and
provides a formal proof:
Proposition 1: Specification (2.1) is identified in levels up to the normalization
that ρ1 = ρ2.
Proof: We use the variance-covariance structure in levels that is implied by speci-
fication (2.1) and outline a strategy to identify the parameters of the statistical model.
Below we present this variance-covariance structure.
var
(
y˜ih
)
= σ2α + var
(
zih
)
+ σ2ε,h h = 1, . . . , H (2.2)
cov
(
y˜ih, y˜
i
h+n
)
= σ2α +
(
h+n−1∏
j=h
ρj
)
var
(
zih
)
, (2.3)
h = 1, . . . , H − 1 n = 1, . . . , H − n
var
(
zih
)
= ρ2h−1var
(
zih−1
)
+ σ2η,h h = 1, . . . , H (2.4)
Let’s first assume that we know the variance of the fixed effect, σ2α, and show that
we can identify all the remaining parameters. Then we come back to argue that the
unused moment conditions are enough to pin down σ2α uniquely.
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Note that since we assume that σ2α is known, we can construct cov
(
y˜ih, y˜
i
h+n
)−σ2α.
(2.3) implies
[
cov
(
y˜ih, y˜
i
h+2
)− σ2α] / [cov (y˜ih, y˜ih+1)− σ2α] = ρh+1 for h = 1, . . . , H−2.
This pins down the whole profile of ρh for h = 2, 3, . . . , H − 1 except for ρH .41 Since
ρh is already pinned down for h > 1, cov
(
y˜ih, y˜
i
h+1
)−σ2α = ρhvar (zih) recovers var (zih)
for 1 < h < H. Note that it is not possible to identify ρ1 and var (z
i
1) separately. We
make the identifying assumption that ρ1 = ρ2. This then pins down var (z
i
1). Using
the information contained in (2.2), we recover σ2,h ∀h.
Note that all of the parameters recovered so far depend on σ2α. It remains to
be shown that the unused covariances uniquely pin this down. We now show that
cov (y˜i2, y˜
i
5)suffices to recover σ
2
α uniquely:
cov
(
y˜i2, y˜
i
5
)
= σ2α + ρ4ρ3ρ2var(z
i
2)
= σ2α + ρ4ρ3ρ2
[
cov (y˜i2, y˜
i
3)− σ2α
ρ2
]
= σ2α +
[
cov (y˜i3, y˜
i
5)− σ2α
cov (y˜i3, y˜
i
4)− σ2α
] [
cov (y˜i2, y˜
i
4)− σ2α
cov (y˜i2, y˜
i
3)− σ2α
] [
cov
(
y˜i2, y˜
i
3
)− σ2α]
⇒ cov (y˜
i
2, y˜
i
5)− σ2α
cov (y˜i2, y˜
i
4)− σ2α
=
cov (y˜i3, y˜
i
5)− σ2α
cov (y˜i3, y˜
i
4)− σ2α
⇒ σ2α =
cov (y˜i2, y˜
i
4) cov (y˜
i
3, y˜
i
5)− cov (y˜i2, y˜i5) cov (y˜i3, y˜i4)
cov (y˜i2, y˜
i
4) + cov (y˜
i
3, y˜
i
5)− cov (y˜i2, y˜i5)− cov (y˜i3, y˜i4)
Finally, we use (2.4) to identify σ2η,h ∀h.42 This completes the proof. Notice that
there are still unused moments meaning that the process is overidentified.
41Note that ρH does not enter the variance-covariance profile at all, so it is, in fact, not a parameter
of the model.
42The result in proposition 1 tells us that σ2ε,H and σ
2
η,H are unidentified. This is to be anticipated,
since distinguishing between persistent changes and transitory changes requires us to observe the
individual for several periods (at least one) after the change and see how long the change affects the
wage. Obviously, for the last age this is not possible.
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2.2.2 Full Model
In order to better account for earnings dynamics, we extend the basic specification
introduced in the previous section by incorporating time effects in variances.
Let yih,t denote the log of annual earnings of individual i of age h at time t.
To obtain the residual income y˜ih,t, we run cross-sectional first-stage regressions of
earnings on observables. More specifically,
yih,t = f
(
X ih,t; θt
)
+ y˜ih,t (2.5)
The first component in this specification, f is a function of age and schooling
and captures the life-cycle component of earnings that is common to everyone. X ih,t
is a vector of observables that includes a cubic polynomial in age and an education
dummy, indicating whether the individual has a college degree. The parameter θ is
indexed by t to allow the coefficients on age and schooling to change over time and
captures changes in returns to age and schooling that took place over time.
Figure 2.1 plots the evolution of residual inequality for the U.S. during our sample
period of 1967-1995. It is obvious that there is a significant change in residual inequal-
ity starting in the late 1970s. Ignoring the changes that took place over time might
bias our estimates of the age profile of shocks. In particular, changes that occur over
time can be misinterpreted as changes during the life cycle. The rich panel structure
of the PSID helps us to distinguish life-cycle effects from time effects: We observe
individuals with a given age at different points in time, and thus at a given year, we
observe individuals of different ages. This allows us to separate what is due to cal-
endar time from a life-cycle phenomenon. For this particular reason, it is important
to have a large number of cohorts in order to accurately separate these effects. This
observation will guide our sample selection process, as we will explain in 2.2.3.
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Figure 2.1: Residual Inequality over Time
Here we follow Gottschalk and Moffitt (1995), who argue that significant changes
took place in the variance of transitory shocks as well as persistent shocks and modify
(2.1) as:
y˜ih,t = αi + z
i
h,t + φtε
i
h (2.6)
zih,t = ρh−1,t−1z
i
h−1,t−1 + pitη
i
h
ηih ∼ N
(
0, σ2η,h
)
εih ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε,h
)
,
where φt and pit represent time loading factors for transitory and permanent shocks,
respectively.43
We leave the formal identification proof for the generalized version to Appendix
B.1, since it doesn’t provide any further insight. Here is a heuristic argument. The
loading factors on persistent shocks, pit, will be identified through the changes in the
43This assumes that changes over time have affected everyone at the same age in the same way.
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covariances over time. The difference in the covariances between age 1 and age 2 at
different points in time must have come from the change in the respective loading
factors. Once we have pinned down the profile of pit’s we then look at the variance
profile over time for a given age h. Changes in this variance can be due to a change
in the variance of the transitory component or the persistent component. Since we
have already identified the profile of pi, whatever remains unexplained will be picked
up by φ, the time profile of transitory shocks. Once we control for the time effects in
the variance and covariance structure, the identification of the parameters governing
the age profile follows from the previous result.
A related approach would be to control for cohort effects. It is reasonable to think
that different cohorts face different economic environments; thus the changes in the
residual variance structure may be due to the fact that there are different cohorts
at different points in time. It would be better to allow for cohort effects and time
effects in variances at the same time but this is not possible because age, time and
cohort are perfectly collinear. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2005) provide
some evidence that time effects are more pronounced than cohort effects.44
2.2.3 Data and Sample Selection
This section briefly describes the data and the variable definitions used in the empirical
analysis. We use the first 29 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
We estimate our model using both annual earnings and the average hourly wage of
44Another issue regarding our econometric analysis is measurement error. It has been widely
documented that earnings in the PSID contain substantial measurement error. In this paper, we
assume that transitory changes also capture the measurement error. The true size of transitory
shocks is not distinguishable from the measurement error once we assume fully transitory errors.
Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) decompose residual income into a completely permanent component,
a transitory component that is modeled as MA (q) and an i.i.d. component that they assume to be
measurement error. Bound and Krueger (1991) provide evidence in favor of somewhat persistent
measurement errors.
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male heads of households as the measure of labor income. Here, we present the
results for earnings data. Estimation results for wage data are reported in Appendix
B.2.1; the results are qualitatively the same. We include an individual in our baseline
sample if he satisfies the following criteria for 3 not necessarily consecutive years: (i)
the individual has reported positive labor earnings and hours, (ii) his age is between
24 and 60, (iii) he worked between 520 and 5110 hours during the calendar year, and
(iv) had an average hourly wage between $2 and $400 in 1993 dollars. We also exclude
people from the poverty sub-sample in 1968 (SEO). These criteria are fairly standard
in the literature and leave us with 4380 individuals and 53,864 observations. Sample
statistics are reported in Appendix B.4.
We exclude individuals younger than 24 to abstract from young part-time workers.
Adults older than 60 are also left out to avoid issues related to early retirement.
The early retirement of the elderly increases the variance of residual earnings by a
substantial amount, since some people quit their jobs for low-paying, less intensive
jobs. We did our analysis for a sample between ages 20 and 65; our results are
even stronger for this sample. Some of the changes in persistence and variance that
we observe for that sample the phenomenon known as might be driven by young
individuals who move from part-time to full-time employment or by older individuals
who are heterogeneous in retirement age. Therefore, in our baseline case, we present
the conservative results. We report the results for the larger sample in Appendix
B.2.2.
Another issue with our sample selection criteria is the minimum number of years.
Our choice is guided by the identification argument presented in 2.2.2. Recall that
we need to observe people of the same age at different points in time (and vice versa).
Requiring individuals to stay longer in the sample decreases the number of cohorts
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that we have in the data, since it gets rid of the early cohorts.45
2.2.4 Estimation Results
In this section, we present our estimation results. The emphasis is on the existence
of a nontrivial lifetime profile.
We employ an equally weighted minimum distance estimator. We minimize the
distance between the moments from the theoretical variance-covariance structure and
the corresponding moments in the data. In particular, we target all the variance and
covariance terms over age, cov
(
y˜ih, y˜
i
h+n
)
, and over time cov
(
y˜it, y˜
i
t+n
)
, but we use only
those moments to which at least 150 individuals contribute. To obtain the theoretical
counterpart of cov
(
y˜ih, y˜
i
h+n
)
, we average cov
(
y˜ih,t, y˜
i
h+n,t+n
)
over t. Similarly, we com-
pute the theoretical counterpart of cov
(
y˜it, y˜
i
t+n
)
by averaging cov
(
y˜ih,t, y˜
i
h+n,t+n
)
over
h. This leaves us with more than 1000 moments. Due to small sample considerations
explained in Altonji and Segal (1996), our minimum distance estimator employs the
identity matrix as the weighting matrix.
We start by estimating the lifetime profile of shocks and persistence nonparamet-
rically, i.e., without imposing any functional form on the lifetime profiles. Figure 2.2
shows the results for persistence. The point estimates are plotted with dots and the
95% bootstrap confidence interval is shown with dashed lines.
Figure 2.2 reveals an interesting fact: Early in life, shocks are moderately per-
sistent. Persistence starts around 0.70 for young individuals and increases with age
up to unity by the age of 45. The differences also appear to be economically large
(although a more precise evaluation needs to await the consumption model in Section
2.3). For example, more than 70% of a change in a 24-year-old’s earnings dies out in
45Of course, another source of concern is the sample size; if we were to require individuals to
remain in the sample longer, we would end up with fewer observations. This is important for us,
since we are increasing the number of parameters of the specification along the life-cycle dimension.
77
5 years. This number is only around 15% for a 40-year-old individual.
Figure 2.2: Persistence Profile
Figure 2.3: Variance Profile of Persistent Shocks
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The variance of persistent shocks (see Figure 2.3) follows the opposite pattern.
Early in life, shocks are larger compared to in the 40s. The variance starts around
0.05, decreases to around 0.01 by age 35 and remains roughly flat for 10 years. Shocks
toward the end of the life cycle are larger, which manifests itself in a variance of around
0.035. These differences again appear to be economically large; a one-standard-
deviation persistent shock implies a 26% change in earnings at age 24, whereas a
one standard deviation shock implies only a 12% rise for a 40 year old.
Figure 2.4: Variance Profile of Transitory Shocks
Figure 2.4 plots the variance of transitory shocks. Note that although there is a
slight increase early on, it is not statistically significant. This is not very surprising,
since the transitory component absorbs the classical measurement error, which we
would expect to be flat. In what follows, we take the variance of the transitory
component to be constant over the life cycle.
What features of the data give rise to this profile of persistence? In other words,
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we want to learn what moments in the data identify the increase in persistence early
in the lifecycle. For this, we refer to the identification argument presented in Section
2.2.1, where we argued that the ratio of 2-period ahead covariance to 1-period ahead
covariance, corrected for fixed effects, yields a consistent estimate for the persistence
parameter.46 The need to correct for the fixed effect arises because both of these
covariance terms contain the variance of the fixed effects. We now plot the empirical
counterpart of this ratio in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Identification of Persistence
In correcting for fixed effects, we use our baseline estimate (σ2α = 0.08), which is
in line with the estimates in the literature. The solid line plots the moving average of
the ratio over the lifetime. The shape of the ratio closely resembles our estimate of
persistence profile (shown in dots on the same figure): It increases from 0.78 to 0.94,
paralleling our estimation results in Figure 2.2. In general, the shape of this ratio
depends on the level of fixed effects. To check for the robustness of this, we plot the
46Recall that (2.3) implies
[
cov
(
y˜ih, y˜
i
h+2
)− σ2α] / [cov (y˜ih, y˜ih+1)− σ2α] = ρh+1 for h = 1, . . . ,H−
2.
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ratio for the case where there are no fixed effects (σ2α = 0), which is shown in dashed
lines. We see that the increase in persistence is robust to the variance of fixed effects,
though the steepness depends on it. Note that our estimation of an upward sloping
persistence profile is a result of targeting a fairly complicated variance-covariance
structure. The finding in Figure 2.5 confirms this increase over the lifetime from a
much simpler look at the data.
2.2.5 Comparison with the Literature
We now compare the age-dependent process with the benchmark specification, i.e.,
a specification consisting of a fixed effect, an AR(1) component where the persis-
tence and variance of shocks are constant throughout life, and an i.i.d. transitory
component with constant variance. In order for these cases to be comparable, we
estimate this model using our data. The dashed lines on Figures 2.2-2.4 show the
point estimates for persistence, and variance of persistent and transitory shocks. Our
estimate of persistence, 0.978, is in line with the estimates in the literature, which
range from 0.96-1.0. It is surprising to see that for most of the life cycle, persistence
in the age dependent process is significantly lower than the estimate of persistence
for the benchmark case. As the examples above have shown, these differences can be
economically significant. We will make this point clear in Section 2.3.
In what follows, we will argue that targeting the lifetime profile of inequality in
the data results in an upward bias in persistence if one does not allow for age-specific
persistence and variance. To do so, we compute the lifetime profile of inequality from
the data. To control for time effects in variances, we compute the variance of residuals
for each age-year bin, ̂var(y˜h,t). We then regress these on a full set of age and year
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dummies and report age dummies.47 The resulting profile is shown in Figure 2.6.48
This figure shows a steady rise in inequality of around 20 log points. The increase
is particularly steep after age 35. For the benchmark process, the corresponding
theoretical moments are given by
var(y˜h) = σ
2
α + σ
2
η
h−1∑
j=0
ρ2j + σ2z0ρ
2h + σ2 ,
where σ2z0 represents the initial variance of the persistent component. So long as ρ < 1,
residual inequality has a well-defined limit, say, var∗(y˜h). It can easily be shown that
var(y˜h) will converge to var
∗(y˜h) from below in a concave fashion.49 The degree of
concavity is more pronounced the farther away ρ is from unity. In the case of a unit
root, the variance profile will be linearly increasing, regardless of var∗(y˜h). Figure
2.6 obviously implies that the fit would be poor if ρ is far away from 1. Targeting
these moments results in an upward bias and drives ρ close to 1 because the statistical
model is misspecified.
At this point, it is worth stressing that the age-dependent income process does not
need to contain unit roots or very high levels of persistence to match the inequality
profile. Figure 2.6 also plots the smoothed inequality profile implied by our estimates.
The model captures the increase in lifetime inequality even if persistence for young
individuals is very low. The mechanism is due to the inverse relationship between
persistence and the variance of labor income shocks. When persistence goes up with
age, the additional increase it induces in inequality is compensated by a decrease in
47In order not to have too few individuals contributing to these variances, we include an individual
in an age-year bin if he is within 2 years of that age.
48Some papers choose to control for cohort effects rather than time effects when reporting lifetime
profile of inequality. We have decided to control for time effects for the sake of consistency, since
the estimation controls for time effects.
49Here we implicitly assume that var(y˜0) < var
∗(y˜h), which is necessary to have an increasing
lifetime profile.
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the variance and vice versa. In this manner, the model is able to replicate the increase
in the empirical variance profile with lower levels of persistence.
Figure 2.6: Lifetime Profile of Residual Inequality
Guvenen (2009) estimates a process that allows growth rates of earnings to differ
across individuals. He finds support for significant heterogeneity in income growth
rates and shows that ignoring this heterogeneity introduces an upward bias for the
estimate of persistence. This paper shows that even if one takes the alternative
view that agents are subject to similar income profiles, accounting for age-specific
persistence and variances reduces the estimates of persistence significantly.
The evidence he brings forward for growth rate heterogeneity is twofold: First, he
points to the convexity in the variance profile of earnings and argues that this feature
of the data indicates the presence of growth rate heterogeneity. Second, he exploits
the shape of higher order covariances, which features an increase in higher lags. This,
he argues, can be captured through growth rate heterogeneity but not by highly
persistent shocks. It is worthwhile to note that the age-dependent income process
can naturally capture these features of the data without growth rate heterogeneity.
As we mentioned in 2.1, Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) also allow for age effects
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while modeling conditional variances of transitory and persistent shocks, which are
found to be insignificant. Since their specification assumes fully permanent shocks,
i.e., persistence is constant at unity, it rules out the inverse relationship between
variance and persistence that is crucial in our results. A flat profile in persistence
suppresses the nontrivial lifetime profile in the variance of persistent shocks.
2.2.6 Significance Tests
We now turn to the question of statistical significance. Rather than making age-by-
age comparisons using our nonparametric estimates, we want to see whether there is
a significant pattern that is not flat. For this purpose, we proceed in two ways. First,
we conjecture a quadratic function for the age profiles of the persistence and variance
of persistent shocks and estimate its parameters from the data. This assumes that
life-cycle effects are smooth in age. Yet, time effects are modeled nonparametrically;
i.e., there are separate loading factors for each year. More specifically, we estimate
xh = γx,0 + γx,1h+ γx,2h
2 ,
where x is the variable of interest, such as ρ and σ2η. The quadratic polynomial is
flexible enough to capture the profiles shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. We then test the
hypothesis that the age pattern is flat. For each test, we compute the p-value as the
fraction of the bootstrap runs for which the null hypothesis is violated. The results
of the estimation and the test are presented in Table 2.1. The implied age profiles of
the persistence and variance of shocks are plotted in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. Note that
these line up well with the nonparametric estimates.50
The first row of Table 2.1 shows the results for persistence. The first three columns
50As explained before, we assume a constant profile of variance for transitory innovations.
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report point estimates along with bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. In the last
two columns, we investigate the statistical significance of these coefficients. Column
5 (Column 6) tests if the linear (quadratic) term is significantly positive (negative).
We find that in all bootstrap runs the linear (quadratic) term is positive (negative).
The same analysis for the variance of persistent shocks, reported in the second row,
shows that the linear and quadratic terms are significant at a 99% confidence level
as well. Thus, based on the polynomial estimation, we reject that these profiles are
constant over the lifecycle.
Table 2.1: Estimation and Test Results for Quadratic Specification
x γx,0 γx,1 γx,2 Test 1 Test 2
ρ
0.7638 0.0190 -0.0004 H0 : γρ,1 ≤ 0 H0 : γρ,2 ≥ 0
(0.0523) (0.0045) (0.0001) 0.0000 0.0000
σ2η
0.0525 -0.0041 0.0001 H0 : γσ2η ,1 ≥ 0 H0 : γσ2η ,2 ≤ 0
(0.0096) (0.0009) (0.0000) 0.0000 0.0000
σ2α
0.0833
(0.0234)
σ2
0.0702
(0.0233)
* The numbers in brackets are bootstrap standard errors.
** The last two columns report the P-values for the corresponding test.
In order to complete the picture, we choose a specification that is in between
the polynomial and the nonparametric specifications. We consider a model in which
working life is divided into 3 stages. This model restricts the persistence and variance
to be constant within an age interval but allows them to differ from one to the other.
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The bins correspond to ages 24-33, 34-52 and 53-60. More specifically, for x = ρ, σ2η :
xh =

δx,1 if h ∈ [24, 33]
δx,2 if h ∈ [34, 52]
δx,3 if h ∈ [53, 60]
These intervals give flexibility to the model in capturing arbitrary changes in param-
eters over the life cycle without disrupting the parsimonious structure. Furthermore,
we do not want to bias the results by imposing a misspecified functional form. Time
effects are still modeled nonparametrically. Figure 2.7 provides estimation results for
this case along with 95% confidence intervals. The results, once again, point to the
same profile over the lifecycle. The variance of persistent shocks follows a U-shape
and the persistence is hump shaped. Confidence intervals show that persistence in
the second age bin is significantly larger than in the first one. The difference in per-
sistence between the second and third bins is, however, not significant. As for the
variance, the second bin has a significantly lower variance than the other two bins. To
be more formal, we test the hypotheses H0 : ρ1 ≥ ρ2, H0 : ρ2 ≤ ρ3 , H0 : σ2η,1 ≤ σ2η,2
and H0 : σ
2
η,2 ≥ σ2η,3. The results are summarized in Table 2.2.
We find that the persistence in the first stage is statistically smaller than the second
stage. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the persistence in the last stage
is different than that in the second. For variance, the second bin is significantly lower
than the first and third.
Both the analysis of the polynomial and the age-bin specifications provides strong
evidence that these profiles are significant.
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Table 2.2: Estimation and Test Results for Age Bins
δx,1 δx,2 δx,3 Test 1 Test 2
ρ
0.8326 0.9648 0.9458 H0 : ρ1 ≥ ρ2 H0 : ρ2 ≤ ρ3
(0.0266) (0.0170) (0.0265) 0.0000 0.2800
σ2η
0.0295 0.0128 0.0273 H0 : σ
2
η,1 ≤ σ2η,2 H0 : σ2η,2 ≥ σ2η,3
(0.0075) (0.0039) (0.0071) 0.0000 0.0120
σ2α
0.0956
(0.0102)
σ2
0.0732
(0.0194)
* The numbers in brackets are standard errors.
** The last two columns report the p-values of the corresponding tests.
Figure 2.7: Results for Age Bins
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2.2.7 The Fit for Income Growth Rates
The previous sections have illustrated how the age-dependent process does a better
job in fitting the variance-covariance structure using log earnings (levels). This is
expected since the estimation targeted the moments in levels with a larger number
of parameters. How about the fit for the variance structure of income growth rates
(differences)? Is the fit for levels better at the expense of a worse fit for income
growth rates? It is well known in the literature that the estimates of canonical in-
come processes using levels are strikingly different than the estimates using income
growth rates, suggesting misspecification of the model (Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri, and
Violante (2010)). This section investigates this aspect of the age-dependent process.
The variance structure of growth rates (abstracting from time effects) is as follows:
var (∆yi,h) = (ρh−1 − 1)2 var (zi,h−1) + σ2η,h + σ2,h + σ2,h−1
The *-marked series in Figure 2.8 plots the variance profile of income growth rates in
the data. This reveals a U-shaped profile. In order to evaluate the performance of the
age-specific income process, we calculate and plot var (∆yi,h) using our estimates from
the polynomial specification (dashed line). Similarly, we plot the corresponding series
implied by a standard AR(1) process (solid line). This figure clearly replicates the
misspecification we discussed above: Both the age-dependent and the AR(1) processes
are far from matching the level of variances. However, it is worthwhile to note that
the age-dependent process can capture the U-shaped profile. This is facilitated by
the U-shape in the variance profile of persistent shocks, σ2η,h.
The age-dependent income process achieves a better fit for the moments in levels
without worsening the fit for the moment structure in differences. Although it cannot
match the magnitude of the variance of income growth rates in the data, it can
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replicate the age profile.
Further Remarks
A natural follow-up question is how to explain these profiles using economic theory.
Which economic forces give rise to these? To speculate about one mechanism, these
profiles could be due to differences in insurance opportunities against earnings shocks
between young and old workers. For example, in case of an adverse demand shock to
individual’s occupation, one might switch to a different one if she is young. For an
old worker, though, switching is costlier (e.g. because of occupation-specific human
capital). Therefore, shocks of the same nature can translate into innovations with
different persistence over the working life.
Figure 2.8: Variance Profile of Income Growth Rates
Another mechanism, again related to mobility, is learning about the match quality,
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first studied by Jovanovic (1979). In his setup, neither the worker nor the firm
know the productivity of the match before employment. After observing the output,
match productivity is revealed to both parties in a Bayesian fashion. This generates
endogenous movements in wages and job turnover. In Appendix B.3 we show that
a very stylized version of this model implies an increasing persistence profile and a
decreasing variance over the working life. Since this type of models are shown to
have empirical support (Flinn (1986)), we view this as an additional evidence for our
findings.
2.3 Consumption-Savings Implications
There is a large literature that rejects full insurance for the US economy (Cochrane
(1991), Mace (1991), Attanasio and Davis (1996)) making the nature of labor income
risk an important object to study. This paper so far has established the existence of
a nonflat lifetime profile in persistence and variance of shocks. We now investigate
its economic implications. In particular, we are interested in the insurability of labor
income shocks and the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk under different specifications
for earnings. To address these issues, we consider a standard life-cycle model that
features incomplete financial markets and a social security system and compare the
implications of the age-dependent income process with a standard AR(1) process.
There are several reasons to expect different consequences for welfare costs and con-
sumption insurance. First, as we have discussed above, the age-dependent income
process implies lower persistence but larger shocks for young agents. Kaplan and
Violante (2008) show that for reasonably calibrated versions of a Bewley model, the
insurability of shocks is decreasing in persistence. Therefore, one might expect a
higher level of insurance for young agents under the age-dependent income process
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than under the standard process. This will imply lower welfare costs of risk compared
to the benchmark case. On the other hand, shocks to earnings are larger for young
agents, which in turn results in larger welfare costs. Ultimately, whether welfare costs
are larger or smaller becomes a quantitative question.
We now describe the model that we use to study the question. The economy is
populated by a continuum of agents that have preferences over consumption that are
ordered according to
E
H∑
h=1
βhu
(
cih
)
(2.7)
where cih denotes the consumption of agent i at age h. They engage in labor market
activities for the first R years of their life and retire afterward. After retirement, they
live up to a maximum age of H.
Financial markets are incomplete in that agents can buy and sell only a risk-free
bond. Letting r denote the risk-free interest rate and aih denote the asset level of
individual i of age h, the budget constraint is given by
cih +
aih+1
1 + r
= aih + y
i
h , (2.8)
where yih is the labor earnings at age h. Agents are allowed to borrow up to an age-
dependent level, denoted by A¯h. We assume that everyone of the same age faces
the same borrowing limit and we experiment with two extreme cases: a natural
borrowing limit and a zero borrowing limit.51 It is important to investigate these two
cases for the question we have in mind, because the evaluation of the tradeoff between
persistence and variance of shocks depends crucially on the extent of the borrowing
limit. Namely, if borrowing limits are loose, the not-so-persistent but large shocks to
51The natural borrowing limit is the maximum amount that an agent can pay back with future
earnings for sure.
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young agents can be well insured by borrowing. On the other hand, in case of tight
borrowing limits, the magnitude of shocks matters more.
While in the labor market, agents’ earnings have two components. The deter-
ministic part is common to everyone and follows a quadratic polynomial in age. The
idiosyncratic component captures individual earnings risk and is modeled as discussed
in 2.2.1:
lnyih = γ0 + γ1h+ γ2h
2 + y˜ih (2.9)
y˜ih ∼ (2.1)
We consider the implications of two specifications for the income process: i) the
age-dependent income process and ii) an AR(1) process with constant persistence and
variance of shocks over the lifetime: ρh = ρ, σ
2
h = σ
2 ∀h.
There is a social security system that pays a pension after retirement.52 We model
the retirement salary as a function of the fixed effect and the persistent component of
income in the last period, ln yih = Φ(α
i, ziR). This function is modeled as in Guvenen,
Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009) and is set to mimic the properties of the US social security
system. Its details are discussed in 2.3.1.
Let Vh (a
i
h, α
i, zih, ε
i
h) denote the value function of an agent at age h ≤ R, with asset
holdings aih, fixed effect α
i, persistent component of labor income zih and transitory
component of income ih. The agent’s programming problem is as following:
V ih
(
aih, α
i, zih, ε
i
h
)
= max
aih+1,c
i
h
u
(
cih
)
+ βEVh+1
(
aih+1, α
i, zih+1, ε
i
h+1
)
s.t. (2.8) and (2.9)
aih+1 ≥ −A¯t+1
52Since this is a partial equilibrium framework, we do not model social security taxes and do not
consider the government’s budget.
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Upon retirement, the agent has a constant stream of income from social security
and faces no risk. His problem is given by:
V ih
(
aih, α
i, ziR
)
= max
aih+1,c
i
h
u
(
cih
)
+ βVh+1
(
aih+1, α
i, ziR
)
s.t. (2.8)
lnyih = Φ(α
i, ziR)
aih+1 ≥ − ¯Ah+1
2.3.1 Calibration
One period in our model corresponds to a calendar year. Agents enter the economy
at age 24, retire at 60 and are dead by age 84. We assume CRRA preferences and
set the parameter of relative risk aversion to 2.53 We take the risk-free interest rate
to be 3%.
As suggested by Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), among others, the crucial
part of our calibration is to pin down the discount factor β. We set this parameter to
match an aggregate wealth to income ratio of 3. This is important, since the amount
of wealth held by individuals affects the insurability and welfare costs of labor income
shocks. We define aggregate wealth as the sum of positive asset holdings. Aggregate
income is the sum of labor earnings (excluding retirement pension).
The deterministic component of earnings is estimated using the PSID data. It
has a hump-shaped profile where earnings grow by 60% during the first 25 years and
then decrease by 18% until the end of the working life. For the residual component of
earnings, we consider two specifications: the age-dependent and the AR(1) processes.
The first is calibrated according to the quadratic specification reported in Table 2.1.
53This is within the range of estimates in the literature (Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti
(2003)).
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The parameters of the latter come from our estimates in Figures 2.2-2.4.
In a realistic model of the retirement system, a pension would be a function of
lifetime average earnings, but this would introduce one more continuous state variable
to the problem of the household. We refrain from doing so, since this would complicate
the model without adding any further insight for our purposes. In our model, the
retirement pension is a function of predicted average lifetime earnings. We first regress
average lifetime earnings on last period’s earnings net of the transitory component
and use the coefficients to predict an individual’s average lifetime earnings, denoted
by yˆLT (α
i, ziR). Following Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009) we use the following
pension schedule:
Φ(αi, ziR) = a ∗ AE + b ∗ yˆLT (αi, ziR) ,
where AE is the average earnings in the population. The first term is the same
for everyone and captures the insurance aspect of the system. The second term is
proportional to yˆLT and governs the private returns to lifetime earnings. We set
a = 16.78%, and b = 35.46%.
We discretize all three components of earnings using 61, 11, and 11 grid points
for the persistent, transitory, and fixed effect components, respectively. The value
function and policy rules are solved using standard techniques on an exponentially
spaced grid for assets of size 100. The economy is simulated with 50, 000 individuals.54
2.3.2 Simulation Results
In this section, we report the differences in consumption behavior induced by the
age-dependent and the AR(1) processes. For every specification, we calibrate the
54The number of grids for the income process is sufficient, since simulated earnings are very
close to theoretical earnings. We find that increasing the grid for assets does not change Euler errors
significantly. Also, increasing the number of people we simulate does not change the model statistics.
We conclude that the current precision is sufficient.
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discounting factor, β, to match an aggregate wealth to income ratio of 3. We start by
showing the results for the economy with natural borrowing constraints (NBC). The
resulting discount factors for the age-dependent and AR(1) processes are 1/(1+0.041)
and 1/(1 + 0.042), respectively (see Table 2.3). Figure 2.9 shows mean asset and
consumption profiles. Note that the asset and consumption profiles are very similar
for both specifications.55 However, even though agents are more impatient in the
AR(1) economy, consumption growth of young individuals is steeper. This points to
the differences in precautionary motives (Carroll (1997)).
Figure 2.9: Mean Asset and Consumption Profiles for NBC
Figure 2.10 shows the inequality profiles of consumption implied by the two income
processes. Recall from Figure 2.6 that the initial level of earnings inequality is lower
for the AR(1) process, but that the increases over the lifetime are roughly equal.56
Thus, we focus on the increase in consumption inequality rather than levels: The
increase implied by the AR(1) process is 21 log points, whereas the age-dependent
55The model is able to generate a hump-shaped profile for consumption, as reported in Krueger
and Fernandez-Villaverde (2009), but the timing of the hump is later. This fit can be improved by
adding mortality risk or health shocks in older ages (Palumbo (1999)).
56The increase in the AR(1) process is only 0.01 higher.
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income process implies a rise of only 17 log points. This shows that the shocks in the
age-dependent process economy are more insurable.
Figure 2.10: Consumption Inequality for NBC
To make this point clearer, we provide a measure of insurance against persistent
shocks and investigate the differences between the two processes. Following Kaplan
and Violante (2008) and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), we compute the
degree of consumption insurance at age h as:
φh = 1− cov(∆c
i
h, η
i
h)
var(ηih)
,
where ηih is the persistent shock faced by worker i at age h. This measures the amount
of change in earnings that does not translate into consumption growth. Figure 2.11
plots φh over the life cycle for both processes. It is obvious that persistent shocks from
the age-dependent process are better insured throughout the lifetime. On average,
56% of persistent shocks are insured under the age-dependent process, whereas the
corresponding number for the AR(1) process is only 40%. Strikingly, most of this
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difference comes from younger adults. Recall that for them the level of persistence is
particularly low under the age-dependent process. It is well known in the literature
that persistence is an important determinant of insurance. Transitory shocks are
easily self-insured by using the risk-free bond (Kaplan and Violante (2008)). On
the other hand, in the presence of a very persistent component, agents abstain from
borrowing because of the possibility of a long series of bad income states. Insurance
against such shocks is, therefore, mostly through asset accumulation. This is not
possible for young agents since, on average, they are poor. Under the age-dependent
income process, persistence is fairly moderate for young workers, implying insurance
coefficients as large as 70%.
Figure 2.11: Insurance against Persistent Shocks
Another striking difference between the two processes is the profiles of insurance
coefficients. In the AR(1) process, the profile of insurance tracks the profile of assets.
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This is consistent with the previous explanation, since persistence is constant and high
throughout the working life and insurance mainly depends on the amount of assets.
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) approximate insurance coefficients against
permanent shocks in the data and find that this is roughly flat over the life cycle.57
Thus, the profile of insurance implied by an AR(1) process is not consistent with the
data (Kaplan and Violante (2008)). The left panel of Figure 2.11 shows, however,
that the age profile of insurance in a Bewley model need not track the profile of assets.
Note that the profile of assets under the age-dependent process is very similar to the
one under AR(1), but the insurance profiles are drastically different. This is solely
due to the profile of persistence. Young agents, as explained above, have access to
better insurance since shocks are not very persistent. Insurance decreases with age
in the early part of the working life, since persistence increases. After age 40, on the
other hand, agents have enough assets so that the change in persistence has virtually
no effect on the profile of insurance and thus insurance increases due to the increase
in assets.
2.3.3 Welfare Costs of Earnings Risk
We now turn to welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk under the two processes. Recall that
the low levels of persistence under the age-dependent process is compensated by the
larger variance of shocks (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). On the one hand, lower persistence
implies better insurability. On the other hand, larger variance implies more instability.
In order to evaluate this tradeoff quantitatively, we compute the fraction of lifetime
consumption that an individual would be willing to give up in order to live in an
57They develop an approximation to insurance coefficients in a life-cycle model assuming that
residual earnings consist of a completely permanent and a fully transitory component and that there
are no borrowing constraints.
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economy without earnings risk.58 The results are reported in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Welfare Costs under Different Income Processes
Natural Borrowing Limit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β wealth
income
Shocks+Fixed Shocks Insurance
Age-Dependent 1/(1 + 0.0410) 2.9994 15.73% 9.97% 0.56
AR(1) 1/(1 + 0.0420) 3.0001 16.71% 14.85% 0.40
Experiment 1 1/(1 + 0.0414) 2.9995 19.06% 13.51% 0.39
Experiment 2 1/(1 + 0.0418) 2.9994 19.08% 13.55% 0.41
Tight Borrowing Limit
Age-Dependent 1/(1 + 0.0561) 3.0009 18.84% 12.53% 0.39
AR(1) 1/(1 + 0.0562) 3.0008 18.51% 16.37% 0.31
Experiment 1 1/(1 + 0.0549) 3.0013 20.83% 14.72% 0.30
Experiment 2 1/(1 + 0.0558) 3.0009 21.01% 14.90% 0.31
Column 3 shows the welfare costs of not being able to insure against idiosyncratic
risk as well as fixed effects. The first two rows correspond to the age-dependent
58The formula for welfare costs, χ, is given by
χ = 1−
(
V
VComplete
)1/(1−γ)
,
where V is the expected lifetime utility in the economy for which welfare costs are calculated,
VComplete is the expected lifetime utility in the complete markets economy and γ is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion in the CRRA utility function (γ = 2).
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and AR(1) processes, respectively. The age-dependent income process delivers lower
welfare costs, even though the level of inequality at the end of the life cycle is lower
for the AR(1) process (see Figure 2.6). At this point it is not clear how much of these
differences is driven by shocks and how much is driven by permanent differences. In
order to properly account for the costs of shocks, we compute the welfare cost of
idiosyncratic shocks only.59 These are reported in Column 4. The differences between
welfare costs are now even larger: An agent living in the AR(1) world is willing to
give up 15% of her consumption every period in order to have perfect insurance. The
same number is only 10% for an agent in the age-dependent world. We conclude that
the effect of lower persistence dominates the effect of larger instability. These are
sizable differences.
There is a caveat in this analysis: The increase in earnings inequality over the
working life is slightly higher in the AR(1) process (0.1997 vs. 0.1863). Also, the
level of inequality at the beginning of life is lower for the AR(1) process. In order
to correct for these, we modify the parameters of the AR(1) process such that the
inequality at the beginning and the end of the lifetime is the same for both processes.
More specifically, we adjust the variance of the fixed effect in order to match the
inequality at the beginning of the lifecycle. To match the increase we do the following
two experiments: First, we keep the persistence the same but decrease the variance of
persistent shocks from 0.0143 to 0.0129. Second, we keep the variance the same but
decrease persistence from 0.978 to 0.9747. The last two rows in the top panel report
the results for these experiments, respectively.
Note that the results for both experiments are very close. Since we increased the
variance of fixed effects, the overall costs of inequality increased compared to the
59We follow Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and ask how much an agent with the average
fixed effect would be willing to give up in order to live in the economy with complete financial
markets.
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second row (from 16.7% to 19.1%). In addition, since the increase in inequality over
the lifetime is now lower, the welfare costs of shocks are lower, too. However, they are
still substantially larger than the welfare costs under the age-dependent specification.
The difference in welfare costs almost corresponds to 4% of lifetime consumption.
As explained above, the driving force for welfare differences is the insurability of
earnings shocks. The fact that the age-dependent income process results in larger
insurance coefficients relies crucially on the extent of borrowing limits. Young agents
would have little ability to insure even against moderately persistent shocks if they
cannot borrow freely. In other words, the evaluation of the tradeoff between durability
and magnitude might reverse. In order to quantify how much it matters, we take it to
the extreme and redo the same analysis for an economy where there is no borrowing
at all.60 The bottom panel of Table 2.3 presents the results.
The last column reveals that, as expected, insurance goes down by a significant
amount. The right panel of Figure 2.11 plots the lifetime profile of insurance coeffi-
cients for the ZBC economy. Note that the difference between the age-dependent and
AR(1) processes is significantly smaller compared to the NBC economy. The differ-
ence between the NBC and ZBC economies is substantial for young individuals, for
whom insurance falls from around 70% to 26%. The main mechanism of insurance for
young agents under the age-dependent process is borrowing. Since this is not allowed
in the ZBC economy, insurance goes down significantly.
The decrease in the degree of insurance will have welfare consequences. Column
4 on the bottom panel of Table 2.3 shows the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk for
the ZBC economy. As expected, welfare costs have increased compared to the NBC
economy for both of the specifications. Note that the increase is larger for the age-
60For the case with tight borrowing constraints, the complete markets economy in the welfare
calculations is the one with full insurance against income risk but with no borrowing.
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dependent process, and thus, the differences between the two processes are now lower.
However, it is still the case that welfare costs are lower for the age-dependent process.
These results hold also with the experiments explained above. We conclude that the
evaluation of welfare costs is substantially different for the two processes; however,
the margin depends on the amount of borrowing allowed.
2.4 Conclusion
In the presence of incomplete financial markets, the nature of labor income risk be-
comes an important determinant of individual decision making. In this paper, we
have proposed a novel specification for labor income risk that allows the persistence
and variance of shocks to change over the lifetime and estimated it using data from
the PSID. We have found evidence for a nonflat profile in the persistence and variance
of persistent shocks, but not in transitory shocks. Our results reveal that persistence
follows a hump shape over the working life: It starts at 0.75, increases up to unity
by age 40 and then slightly decreases to around 0.95. On the other hand, the vari-
ance of persistent shocks exhibits a U-shaped profile (with a minimum of 0.01 and a
maximum of 0.045).
We have investigated the implications of these profiles for consumption and sav-
ings behavior with a life-cycle model. We have found that under natural borrowing
constraints, the welfare costs of idiosyncratic risk implied by the age-dependent in-
come process is significantly lower compared to a standard AR(1) process. This is
mostly due to a higher degree of consumption insurance for young workers, for whom
persistence is low. Namely, the low level of persistence allows agents to insure them-
selves against persistent shocks by borrowing. This mechanism relies crucially on the
extent of borrowing limits. In order to quantify the effect of borrowing limits, we
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have studied an economy with no borrowing. The results are qualitatively the same,
although the difference between specifications in the ZBC economy is smaller. We
conclude that the welfare cost of idiosyncratic risk will be overstated if one does not
account for the age profiles in the persistence and variance of shocks.
Our findings have implications for the Credit CARD Act of 2009. One of the
provisions of this act restricts young individuals from obtaining credit cards. Accord-
ing to this paper, young agents face very large variances of income shocks that are
moderately persistent. This makes access to credit crucial for them.
The benefits of public insurance policies are commonly based on the gains from
redistribution, which can be proxied by the welfare costs of inequality. This paper
presented evidence that once the researcher accounts for the age-dependent nature of
labor income risk, welfare costs are much smaller.
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Chapter 3
Income Differences and Health
Care Expenditures over the Life
Cycle
Abstract
This paper studies differences in the lifetime profile of health care usage between low-
and high-income groups. Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS) I find that early in life the rich spend significantly more on health care,
whereas midway through life until very old age the medical spending of the poor
dramatically exceeds that of the rich. In addition, the distribution of the poor’s med-
ical expenditures has fatter left and right tails. To account for these facts, I develop
and estimate a life-cycle model of two distinct types of health capital: preventive and
physical. Physical health capital determines survival probabilities, whereas preventive
health capital governs the distribution of shocks to physical health capital, thereby
controlling the expected lifetime. Moreover, I incorporate important features of the
US health care system such as private health insurance, Medicaid, and Medicare. In
the model, optimal expected lifetime is longer for the rich which can only be achieved
by larger investment in preventive health capital. Therefore, as they age, their health
shocks grow milder compared to the poor, and in turn they incur lower curative medi-
cal expenditures. Public insurance in old age amplifies this mechanism by hampering
the incentives of the poor to invest in preventive health capital. I use the model to
examine a counterfactual economy with universal health insurance in which 75% of
the preventive medical spending is reimbursed on top of the existing coverage. My
results suggest that policies encouraging the use of health care by the poor early in
life have significant welfare gains, even when fully accounting for the increase in taxes
required to pay for them.
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3.1 Introduction
How do low- and high-income households differ in their lifetime profiles of medical
expenditures? Why do they differ? The answers to these questions are central to
designing and analyzing health care policies that target a reduction in the disparities
in access to health care and health outcomes among income groups.61 In this paper,
I present empirical facts on lifetime profile of health care usage by income groups
and study the differences among them using a life-cycle model of two distinct types
of health capital, physical and preventive, which allows households to endogenize the
distribution of health shocks, thereby controlling their expected lifetime.
Using data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) I document that
low- and high-income households differ significantly in age profile of medical expen-
ditures.62,63 The average medical spending of low-income households relative to high-
income ones exhibits a hump-shaped pattern over the lifetime and exceeds unity for
a significant part of the life span.64 Early in the life cycle, the rich spend more on
health care in absolute (dollar) terms. Midway through life until very old age, the
medical spending of the poor dramatically exceeds that of the rich.
In addition, the distribution of the poor’s medical expenditures is more widely
spread to the tails. A higher fraction of low-income individuals do not incur any
health care spending in a given year than high-income households. Specifically, among
the non-elderly, 24% of the poor have zero medical spending, versus 10% of the rich.
However, the average of the top 10% medical expenditures of the poor is substantially
61For example, low-income individuals in 1980 could expect to live about 25% fewer years than
high-income people (Deaton and Paxson (1999)).
62Please note that throughout the paper the definition of health care expenditure includes all
expenditures on health care goods and services except for over-the-counter drugs. Their source
of payment can be out-of-pocket expenditures, private insurance firms, the government (Medicaid,
Medicare, etc.) and others.
63Recently, Jung and Tran (2010b) also study the life-cycle profile of medical expenditures.
64The life span covers ages between 1 to 85 and older.
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larger than that of the rich. Furthermore, it is well known in the health economics
literature that low-income households consume less preventive care in absolute terms.
Last, the life expectancy of low-income households is dramatically lower than that of
high-income households.
I develop a life-cycle model of health capital that can account for these facts. In my
model there are two distinct types of health capital. First, “physical health capital”
determines endogenously the probability of surviving to the next period and depreci-
ates due to health shocks. Households can invest in physical health capital through
expenditures on curative medicine. Second, “preventive health capital” governs the
distribution of health shocks to physical health capital and depreciates at a constant
rate. Individuals can invest in preventive health capital against depreciation using
preventive medicine. For example, a flu shot is a preventive medicine that basically
affects the probability of one’s getting the influenza virus. On the other hand, getting
the flu is a physical health shock that affects an individual’s survival probability and
depreciates physical health capital if it is not cured.
In addition, I incorporate important features of the US health care system into my
model. Non-elderly individuals are offered private health insurance that covers medi-
cal expenditures of households up to a deductible and a co-payment. The premium of
the health insurance depends only on age and is determined endogenously by the zero
profit condition of the firm. Children of low-income families are covered by Medicaid
and all of the elderly are provided insurance through Medicare, both of which reim-
burse medical expenditures up to a deductible and a co-payment. Moreover, in the
case of severe health shocks, individuals are allowed to default. The government im-
poses the progressive US income tax schedule on households. The collected revenues
are used to finance (i) the Social Security system, (ii) medical expenditures due to
Medicaid and Medicare and default due to health shocks and (iii) other government
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expenditures. The residual budget surplus or deficit is distributed in a lump-sum
fashion to households.
The model described here allows households to endogenize the distribution of
health shocks through preventive health capital investment, thereby controlling their
expected lifetime. The major trade-off in the model is between the amount of con-
sumption per period and the length of expected lifetime. Optimal expected lifetime
is longer for the rich which can only be achieved by larger investment in preventive
health capital. Therefore, as the cohort grows older, low-income households draw
larger health shocks compared to high-income households and in turn they incur
higher curative medical expenditures. This explains the increase in medical expen-
ditures of the poor relative to the rich. The reason why medical spending of the
poor exceeds that of the rich midway through life until very old age is that public
insurance in old age (such as Medicare and the default option) largely subsidizes the
curative medical expenditures of the households. This also hampers the incentives of
low-income households to invest in preventive health capital.
I estimate my model using both micro (the MEPS) and macro data. I set some of
the parameter values outside of the model (e.g., income process, insurance coverage
schemes etc.). For the rest of the parameters (e.g., curative and preventive health
production technology parameters, distribution of health shocks, etc.) I use my model
to choose their values. The model is stylized enough to allow me to identify its key
parameters by the available data. The estimated model is able to successfully explain
the targeted features of the data in the estimation (e.g., differences in the lifetime
profiles of medical expenditures between the rich and the poor, mortality differential,
etc.) as well as other (non-targeted) salient dimensions.
I then use my model to analyze the macroeconomic and distributional effects of
expanding health insurance coverage, which is one of the main goals of the Patient
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Protection and Affordable Care (PPAC) Act of 2010.65 For this purpose, I contrast
the benchmark economy with a universal health care coverage economy in which all
individuals are covered by private health insurance until retirement and whose premia
are financed through an additional flat income tax on households.66 An immediate
implication of this policy change is that low-income households invest more in pre-
ventive and physical health capital, and in turn, they live longer by 1.25 years. Total
medical spending increases slightly, from 9.84% of total income to 9.92%. This is
due to a longer life span for low-income households. Moreover, I find that universal
health care coverage is welfare improving: An unborn individual is willing to give up
1.5% of her lifetime consumption in order to live with universal health care coverage
instead of the benchmark economy. Around one-third of the welfare gains are due
to the increase in the expected lifetime. The rest is coming from better insurance
opportunities against health shocks and redistribution in the economy.
In addition, under the PPAC Act of 2010 private insurance firms are required to
provide basic preventive care free of charge, such as checkups, mammograms, colono-
scopies, etc. However, patients are still required to cover co-payments for doctor visits
and not all preventive care is free. Thus, I study the effect of this policy change by
assuming that on top of the current private insurance scheme, firms pay 75% of the
preventive medicine expenditures of households. I examine this policy change in the
universal health care coverage economy discussed above.67 Under this new policy
households invest more in preventive health capital, which results in an increase in
life expectancy of all income groups except for the top income quintile. However,
65This act is known as ObamaCare in the popular media.
66According to Congressional Budget Office estimates, about 95% of the non-elderly population
is expected to have health insurance.
67This policy change in an economy without universal health care coverage would lead many of
the low-income households to drop out of the health insurance market due to the rise in health
insurance premia. But this is not what the PPAC Act of 2010 aims for.
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total medical spending does not increase because of the decrease in the magnitude
of health shocks. These results suggest that policies encouraging the use of health
care by the poor early in life have significant positive welfare gains, even when fully
accounting for the increase in taxes and insurance premia required to pay for them.
Related Literature There are several papers in the literature that allow for het-
erogeneity in income and health shocks among households (Palumbo (1999) and Jeske
and Kitao (2009)). In their model, health shocks are basically financial health ex-
penditure shocks. They implicitly assume that the amount of health expenditures
due to a health shock is the optimal amount in order to survive into the next period
(Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2008)).
Some notable exceptions endogenize the medical expenditure decisions of house-
holds over the life cycle (De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009), Jung and Tran (2010a),
Yogo (2007), Halliday, He, and Zhang (2009), Zhao (2009)). Recently, De Nardi,
French, and Jones (2009) study the consumption and savings behavior of the very
elderly who are subject to very large medical expenditure shocks. In their paper, out-
of-pocket medical expenditures rise quickly with both age and permanent income. In
one version of their model they allow households to choose medical spending optimally
against an idiosyncratic “medical needs” shock. Since they restrict their analysis to
the very elderly, they assume that medical expenditures do not affect survival proba-
bility. On the other hand, this paper models the survival probability as a function of
health capital and studies the medical expenditure decisions of households since their
birth.
In addition, Jung and Tran (2010a) develop a general equilibrium life-cycle model
of health capital which plays two roles: agents derive utility from being healthy and
health affects labor income. They use this model to study a counterfactual universal
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health insurance voucher policy. In their model, health shocks are exogenous and
survival probability is the same for everyone in a cohort. Thus, they do not study the
differences in life-cycle medical expenditure profiles between the rich and the poor.
My theoretical model sees health as a specific form of human capital. This concept
is first introduced by Grossman (1972). In his seminal paper, he develops a health
capital model in which health is a durable capital stock that produces an output
of healthy time. Grossman and Rand (1974) extend this model by distinguishing
preventive and curative medicine to theoretically study the trade-off between these
two. In addition, Cropper (1977) explicitly introduces uncertainty into Grossman
(1972) model by assuming sicknesses as exogenous random events.
This paper also contributes to a branch of the health economics literature that
investigates the dynamic inefficiencies in insurance markets (Finkelstein, McGarry,
and Sufi (2005), Fang and Gavazza (2007), Crocker and Moran (2003)). For exam-
ple, Fang and Gavazza (2007) study theoretically how the employment-based health
insurance system in the US leads to an inefficiently low level of health capital invest-
ment during working years. Using the MEPS and the HRS data they find that every
additional dollar of health expenditure during working years may lead to about 2.5
dollars of savings in retirement. This paper also studies the dynamic inefficiency in
health capital investment due to government-funded health insurance programs.
Furthermore, many researchers have studied several economic issues in decisions of
prevention of illnesses (see Kenkel (2000) for a careful overview). One of the findings
of this literature is that many preventive interventions add to medical costs not less
than they save, at the same time that they improve health outcomes (Russell (2007),
Russell (1986)). This is consistent with my empirical facts that the total life time
medical spending of the rich is not significantly lower than that of the poor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, I discuss the main
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data source and the empirical findings. Section 3.3 presents a stylized version of the
full model to show the main mechanism at work. Then I introduce other features of
the full model in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, I discuss the estimation of the model
and the model’s fit to the data. Then I perform counterfactual policy experiments
using the model in Section 3.6. Finally, I compare my findings to the literature in
Section 3.7 and I conclude in Section 3.8.
3.2 Empirical Facts
In this section, I present empirical facts on health care expenditures over the life cycle.
Particularly I document how medical spending differs by income groups over the life
cycle. First, I discuss the data source and the methodology I employ to construct the
income groups. Then in Section 3.2.2, I present the empirical findings.
3.2.1 Data and Methodology
I use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data that cover a period be-
tween 1996 and 2007. The MEPS surveys both families and individuals between
ages 1 to 90.68 It provides detailed information about usage and the cost of health
care. Its panel dimension is fairly short in that an individual is surveyed only for
two consecutive years. There are 359,826 observations in my sample after sample
selection.69
Medical expenditure is defined to include all health care services such as office
and hospital-based care, home health care, dental services, vision aids and prescribed
medicines but not over-the-counter drugs. Moreover, the source of payment for med-
ical expenditures can be households (out-of-pocket expenditures), federal or state
68Age data in the MEPS are capped with top code 90.
69The details of the sample selection are explained in Appendix C.1.1.
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government (Medicaid, Medicare), private insurance firms and other sources. But
private insurance premiums are not included. The expenditure data included in this
survey were derived from both households and the health care providers, which makes
the data set a more reliable source for medical expenditure data than any other source.
My measure of total income includes wage, business, unemployment benefits, div-
idends, interest, pension, Social Security income, etc. I construct total family income
by aggregating personal income over family members. Then I normalize total fam-
ily income by family-type-specific federal poverty thresholds which take into account
family composition (number of members and their ages).70 I use this normalized
family income to construct income groups (quintiles). I also group individuals into 9
age intervals, specifically, 0-14,15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 75-84, 85 and
older. While constructing the income groups in a particular age interval, I restrict my
sample to only those families that have a member within that particular age interval.
Thus, a family may have been grouped into different income quintiles in different age
bins, whereas an individual is assigned to only one income quintile.
3.2.2 Empirical Facts on Medical Expenditures
The first empirical fact is the age profile of health care expenditures by income
groups.71 The blue line with crosses and the red line with circles on the left panel of
Figure 3.1 show the age profiles of medical expenditures of bottom and top income
quintiles, respectively.72 For both income groups health care spending increases dra-
70I choose the federal poverty threshold as the household equivalence scale because it varies by
number of members in the family and their ages. I do the normalization by using another commonly
used scale, the square-root scale. The results are presented in Appendix C.1.2.
71I use only the cross sectional aspect of the data to construct these profiles. However, please note
that I use “age profile” and “lifetime profile” interchangeably throughout the paper.
72I do not control for year, gender, and race effects. These profiles are robust to controlling for
these observables. See Appendix C.1.2 for a version of this figure where year, gender and race effects
are controlled for. Unfortunately, I cannot control for cohort and age effects simultaneously, since
my sample covers only a 10-year time span, which does not allow me to observe different cohorts in
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matically over the life cycle. However, there are significant differences in the dynamics
of medical spending over the life cycle between income groups. To clarify this point,
I plot the ratio of average medical expenditures of the poor to the rich over the life
cycle. This is shown on the right panel of Figure 3.1 in the black solid line along with
95% bootstrap confidence intervals in the red dashed lines. As can be seen, the age
profile of medical expenditures of the poor relative to the rich exhibits a pronounced
hump-shape: Early on, the top income quintile group spends more on health care in
absolute (dollar) terms. Midway through life until very old age, the medical spending
of the bottom income quintile exceeds that of the top quintile. Between ages 50 to 70
health care expenditures of the poor are 25% higher than those of the rich in absolute
levels. This is particularly striking once income differences are taken into account.73
Finally, after age 80 high-income households consume health care services slightly
more than low-income ones.74
The second empirical fact shows the differences in the extensive and intensive
margins of health care spending between low- and high-income households. The
left panel of Figure 3.2 plots the fraction of households that have not incurred any
medical spending in a given year over the life cycle for the top and bottom income
quintiles. First note that a significantly higher fraction of low-income households do
not incur any medical expenditure compared to the high-income group. For example,
between ages 45 to 54, 20% of the poor do not incur any medical spending in a year,
an age bin. Cohort effects can change my empirical findings if they affect different income groups
differently. Recently Jung and Tran (2010b) construct life-cycle profiles of medical expenditures in
the MEPS by controlling time and cohort effects simultaneously. They use a semi-nonparametric
partial linear model. They do not find much difference in time and cohort effects between low- and
high-skill groups, which can be thought of as a proxy to income. This suggests that cohort effects
do not affect my empirical findings.
73The ratio of 80th percentile income to 20th percentile is around 4.
74Please note that the non-medical consumption of the low-income group relative to the high-
income would have decreased over the lifetime due to the increasing inequality in consumption and
the ratio would have never risen above 1.
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whereas this number is only 7% for the rich. However, this difference is smaller for
older households. Moreover, the right panel of the same figure shows the average
of the 10% medical expenditures by income groups. For most of the life span, the
right tail of the medical expenditure distribution is also fatter for the poor: The top
spenders of low-income households incur more extreme expenditures. For example,
between ages 45 to 54, the average of the top 10% medical expenditures of the poor is
almost one and a half times higher than that of the rich. Combining these two solid
observations, I conclude that the distribution of the poor’s medical expenditures is
more widely spread to the tails.75
Figure 3.1: Age Profile of Medical Expenditures
The third empirical fact regards preventive medicine usage by income groups. It is
well known in the health economics literature that high-income households consume
more preventive care (Newacheck, Hughes, and Stoddard (1996), Watson, Manski,
75For non-medical goods, the right tail of the expenditure distribution is fatter for high-income
households.
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and Macek (2001), Wilson and White (1977)). Using the MEPS data, I provide more
evidence in support of this argument. Table 3.1 reports how frequently households
use preventive care for a selected group of examples along with their standard errors
in parenthesis.76 In the MEPS, respondents are asked when was the last time they
used a particular preventive medicine. The respondents’ answers to these questions
are in terms of the number of years since their last usage. Thus, the smaller the
figures in Table 3.1, the more frequently preventive care is used. Note that high-
income households consume preventive health care services and goods substantially
more often than low-income households.
Figure 3.2: Extensive and Intensive Margins of Medical Expenditures
Last, another well-known empirical fact in the literature is that the life expectancy
of low-income households is dramatically lower than that of high-income ones (Deaton
and Paxson (1999), Attanasio and Emmerson (2003), De Nardi, French, and Jones
(2009)). At age 25, individuals from low-income families (with family income less than
76There are more examples of preventive care in Appendix C.1.3 that support the argument.
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$10,000 in 1980) expect to live almost 8 years shorter lives than those of high-income
individuals (with family income more than $25,000 in 1980) (Lin, Rogot, Johnson,
Sorlie, and Arias (2003)). Although this difference is smaller for older households,
there is still a significant mortality differential between income groups.
Table 3.1: Preventive Medicine Usage
Income Dentist Cholesterol Flu Shot Prostate Mammogram
Quintiles Test
Bottom Quintile 2.608 2.863 4.230 4.057 3.293
(0.00984) (0.0235) (0.0215) (0.0223) (0.0149)
Top Quintile 1.689 2.207 3.733 2.814 2.433
(0.00966) (0.0180) (0.0253) (0.0223) (0.0184)
Observations 254445 169552 176935 43337 72777
All of these empirical facts show substantial disparities in health care spending
and health outcomes between low- and high-income households.
3.3 Intuition in a Stylized Framework
In this section I introduce a simple version of the more general model studied in
Section 3.4, which features the distinction between physical and preventive health
capital. Then I use this model to illustrate the key mechanisms at work in the model
and how the model generates results consistent with the facts reported in Section
3.2.2. Then I discuss the other features of the full model in Section 3.4.
3.3.1 The Basic Model of Health Capital
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of a continuum of agents. The
cohort size of newborns is normalized to 1. The agents are subject to health shocks
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that affect their survival probability to the next period. They can live up to a maxi-
mum age of T.
Preferences and Endowment I assume standard preferences over consumption:
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ (3.1)
where c and σ denote consumption and the constant relative risk aversion coefficient,
respectively. For a positive value of life, σ < 1 needs to be assumed. With this form
of preferences, households value both consumption and a longer lifetime over which
consumption can be smoothed. Thus these preferences introduce a trade-off between
more consumption per period and a longer lifetime, which will play a key role in my
model.
Individuals are born as one of two ex-ante types: rich and poor, i ∈ {rich, poor}.
Each period they are endowed with constant income, wi, depending on their ex-ante
type.
Health Technology The model features two distinct types of health capital: phys-
ical health capital and preventive health capital. Physical health capital determines
the survival probability together with health shocks, whereas preventive health capital
affects the distribution of health shocks. For example, the influenza vaccine (flu shot)
is a preventive medicine (an investment in preventive health capital) that basically
affects the probability of one’s getting the influenza virus. On the other hand, get-
ting the influenza virus is a physical health shock that affects an individual’s survival
probability and depreciates physical health capital if it is not cured.77
77In a more broad definition preventive care includes all health care goods and services that
can mitigate future severe and costly health shocks. For example, relatively cheap recommended
diabetic services and effective management of diabetes can avoid end-stage renal disease, which is
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A newborn individual is born with 1 unit of physical health capital, i.e., h0 = 1.
Each period she is hit by a physical health shock, ωt. She can invest in physical
health capital according to a physical health production technology. Specifically,
QCt = A
c
tm
θct
C,t, where mC,t denotes the curative medicine, and A
c
t and θ
c
t denote the
productivity and the curvature of a physical health production technology at age t,
respectively. She can invest in physical health capital only up to fully recovering the
current health shock, i.e., mC,t ≤ (ωt/Act)1/θ
c
t :
ht+1 =

ht if A
c
tm
θct
C,t ≥ ωt
ht − ωt + Actmθ
c
t
C,t otherwise
(3.2)
Similarly a newborn individual is also endowed with 1 unit of preventive health
capital, i.e., x0 = 1. Each period her preventive health capital depreciates at a
constant rate of δx. She can invest in preventive health capital according to a preven-
tive health production technology, QPt = A
pmθ
p
P,t where mP,t denotes the preventive
medicine at age t, and Ap and θp denote the productivity and the curvature of a
preventive health production technology, respectively. In a period she can invest
in preventive health capital only up to fully recovering the current depreciation in
preventive health capital, i.e., mP,t ≤ (δxxt/Ap)1/θ
p
:
xt+1 =

xt if A
pmθ
p
P,t ≥ δxxt
xt(1− δx) + ApmθpP,t otherwise
(3.3)
The health shocks are assumed to be log-normally distributed with parameters µjt
, and σ2t where j denotes the type of the distribution. In any period, the agent draws
her health shock from one of the two types of distribution, which differ only in the
highly morbid and very costly.
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mean, µjt . Particularly, health shocks can be drawn from either the“good”distribution
with mean µGt (distribution of mild shocks) or the “bad” distribution with mean µ
B
t
(distribution of severe shocks). The probability that one draws the health shock from
the “good” distribution is a linear function of preventive health capital and is denoted
by pi(x) = x.
The probability of surviving to the next period is a linear function of current
physical health capital net of the health shock and is given by s(ht− ωt) = ht− ωt78.
Financial Market Structure Individuals receive a constant stream of income, wi,
depending on their ex-ante type (i ∈ {rich, poor}). They can accumulate assets, a,
at a constant interest rate r. They are not allowed to borrow.79 They allocate their
total resource between consumption c, curative medicine mc, preventive medicine mp,
and asset holdings for next period:
wi + (1 + r)at = ct +mC,t +mP,t + at+1 (3.4)
Individuals are allowed to default in the case of severe health shocks if their re-
sources are not enough to fully recover the shock (i.e.,
(
ω
Ap
)(1/θp)
> wi+(1+r)a−cmin).
Allowing them to have an option to default also captures the relatively free govern-
78I make an implicit assumption that current investment in physical health capital does not affect
the current survival probability but future ones. I need to make this assumption to identify physical
health production technology parameters, which I will discuss further in Section 3.5.1. A more
realistic way to model survival probability is to make it depend also on curative medical expenditures
as well as physical health capital and health shocks. With the current setup agents choose to recover
the health shocks fully for most of the life span. This is due to the fact that shocks are irreversible
in that if they are not cured in the current period, they cannot be cured in the future and they
affect survival probabilities in all future periods. Thus, allowing the survival probability to depend
on current curative medicine may not change the results significantly.
79The natural borrowing limit in this economy is zero borrowing. In order to check whether the
borrowing constraint plays an important role in my results, I have worked out a version of the model
where agents are endowed with heterogeneous initial wealth and receive the same small amount of
income stream. See Appendix C.2 for simulation results of this case. The results hold qualitatively
and I conclude that borrowing constraints do not play a crucial role in my results.
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ment programs such as Medicaid and Medicare or emergency room examinations. If
an individual chooses to default the shock is fully recovered and her consumption level
equals the consumption floor, cmin for one period. She spends her entire resource on
curative medicine and therefore she can neither buy preventive medicine nor save for
the next period. In future periods, she can accumulate asset and invest in preventive
health capital.
Let IDt be a binary variable and equal to 1 if the household chooses to de-
fault, zero otherwise. Then, the Bellman equation for a type-i household (where
i ∈ {rich, poor}) can be written as:
V it (ht, xt, at) = Eωt
 max
IDt ,at+1,
mC,t,mP,t,ct
u(ct) + βs(ht − ωt)V it+1(ht+1, xt+1, at+1)

s.t. (3.2) and (3.3)
IDt ∈ {0, 1}
(1− IDt )wi = (1− IDt )(−(1 + r)at + ct + at+1 +mC,t +mP,t)
IDt mC,t = I
D
t (ωt/A
c
t)
(1/θct )
IDt ct = I
D
t cmin, I
D
t at+1 = 0, I
D
t mP,t = 0
log(ωt) ∼

N(µGt , σ2t ) w/p pi(xt)
N(µBt , σ2t ) w/p 1− pi(xt)
3.3.2 Mechanism
Even the simplest version of the model is complicated enough not to allow me to
derive any analytical results. For this reason, to discuss the mechanism with key
ingredients, I simulate the model using the parameter values discussed in Section
3.5.1. The emphasis in this section is on the economic forces at work. Therefore, I
relegate the details of the parameter values to Section 3.5.1.
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The left panel of Figure 3.3 shows the lifetime profile of medical expenditures.
Dashed and solid lines plot preventive and curative medical expenditures, respec-
tively. And red circles and blue crosses represent high- and low-income households,
respectively. Moreover, the solid black line on the right panel shows the ratio of med-
ical spending of low-income households to high-income ones. Throughout the lifetime
rich households spend substantially more on preventive medical expenditures than do
poor households, whereas the curative medical spending of the poor exceeds that of
the rich until very old age.
The major trade-off in the model is between the amount of consumption per
period and the length of lifetime. Through the magnitude of the health shocks,
expected lifetime is mainly determined by the investment in preventive health capital.
The richer the household, the longer it can afford to live (since it can afford to
consume more). Thus, high-income households invest in preventive health capital
more than low-income households do. Therefore, as the cohort grows older, low-
income households draw larger health shocks compared to high-income households
and in turn incur higher curative medical expenditures. This explains the increase in
the medical expenditures of low-income households relative to those of high-income
until very old age. The option to default in the case of severe health shocks amplifies
this mechanism by hampering the incentives of low-income households to invest in
preventive health capital and allowing them to incur medical expenditures higher
than their resources. By means of this option to default, the medical spending of the
poor exceeds that of the rich midway through life until very old age.
As for the very elderly, the return on health capital investment is low for them,
since they face large health shocks and expect to live shorter lives. The return is
even lower for poor households, since the level of their preventive health capital is low
compared to that of rich which leads to shorter lives for the poor. This is the major
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reason for the sharp decrease in the ratio of medical spending of the poor to the rich
for the very elderly. In addition, selection effect also plays a role. Among the very
elderly the low-income households are mostly the lucky ones who have drawn smaller
shocks during their lives so they could accumulate relatively more assets; therefore
the difference between the rich and the poor is less significant for older households.
Moreover the lucky elderly poor could also invest in preventive health capital more,
thereby making the mean of health shocks relatively smaller for them.
Figure 3.3: Lifetime Profile of Medical Expenditures
The major ingredients of the model are two distinct types of health capital and the
option to default. To investigate their role in the mechanism, I first shut down both
the preventive health capital channel and the option to default. I assume that the
“good” and the “bad” health shock distributions have the same mean (i.e., µG = µB)
and restrict agents so that they are not able to default. The dashed red line on
the right panel in Figure 3.3 plots the ratio of medical expenditures of low- to high-
income households in the case of no preventive health capital. If there were only
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physical health capital, then medical expenditures of the poor relative to the rich
would exhibit a non-increasing profile over the life cycle. The left panel of Figure 3.4
shows the lifetime profile of medical expenditures. Early in life both low- and high-
income households optimally choose the corner solution, which is to fully recover the
health shocks.80 As an individual grows older, the health shocks get larger. Then both
the return on health capital investment decreases and the cost of fully recovering the
shocks increase. As a result, the poor invest in health capital less than the amount
needed to fully recover the shocks, whereas for the rich the corner solution is still
optimal for them until very old age.
Figure 3.4: Lifetime Profile of Medical Expenditures
Now I turn to the role of the option to default. For this purpose I restrict agents
so that they are not able to default but I allow for two distinct types of health
capital. The solid blue line with plus signs on the right panel of Figure 3.3 shows the
80This is why the ratio of medical expenditures is around 1 for the major part of the life cycle in
Figure 3.3.
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expenditures of the poor relative those of the rich for this case. As seen in the figure,
the concavity of the relative expenditure profile is more pronounced when agents are
allowed to default. Without the option to default, on average the health care spending
of low-income households would never exceed that of high-income households. The
right panel of Figure 3.4 plots the lifetime profile of curative and preventive medical
expenditures for low- and high-income households in the case of no default. If default
is not allowed the poor spend significantly more on preventive medicine over the life
cycle compared to the case with the option to default. Thus, I conclude that the
option to default amplifies the mechanism by hampering the incentives of the poor to
invest in preventive health capital and allowing them to incur medical expenditures
higher than their resources.
3.4 Full Model
The simple model of two distinct types of health capital looks promising to study
the differences in dynamics of medical expenditure between low- and high-income
households. But it falls short of being a model to be used for policy evaluation,
since it lacks major features of the labor market (i.e., idiosyncratic labor market risk,
etc.) and the U.S. health care system (i.e., availability of private health insurance,
Medicaid, Medicare, etc.), which can play an important role in the evaluation of
counterfactual health care policy.81 For this purpose we need a full-blown model that
takes into account these features.
In this section, I introduce a richer version of the basic framework presented in
Section 3.3.1. Namely, I extend the basic model by preserving its main structure.
Specifically, the accumulation process for the physical and preventive health capitals
81Indeed due to the lack of insurance, this model implies a very sharp decline in the ratio of
medical expenditures of low to high income for old households.
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(ht and xt, respectively) are the same as those given by Equations (3.2) and (3.3).
Moreover, households are still allowed to default in the case of “severe” health shocks.
First, I discuss the household’s life-cycle problem, specifically, the preferences and
the three different phases of life: childhood, working years, and retirement. Then
in Section 3.4.2, I introduce health insurance plans and a private health insurance
market. Last I discuss the government’s budget constraint in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Household’s Problem
Preferences
Households’ preferences over being alive, consumption, and physical health are or-
dered according to (a` la Hall and Jones (2007)):
u(c, h) = b+
c1−σ
1− σ + α
h1−γ
1− γ (3.5)
where b, c, and h denote the value of being alive, consumption, and physical health
capital, respectively. Although the general mechanism would work under homothetic
preferences (which is shown in the basic model in Section 3.3.1), there are a few
advantages to using this type of preferences: First, it allows me to incorporate the
value of life explicitly so that agents prefer to live longer not just because they prefer
to smooth their consumption over a longer period but also because an additional
year of life gives them the joy of being alive. Second, under these preferences the
marginal utility of consumption falls rapidly relative to the joy of being alive, which
implies larger differences in the valuation of life between low- and high-income agents
than under homothetic preferences. This feature of the preferences comes in handy
in the quantitative analysis. Last, these preferences allow me to a choose relative risk
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aversion coefficient, σ, greater than 1.
I also assume that households enjoy the quality of their lives, where α and γ rep-
resent quality-of-life parameters. There are situations where health and consumption
are complements (e.g., marginal utility of a fine meal is lower for diabetics) and other
situations where they are substitutes (e.g., marginal utility of hiring a maid is higher
for a sick person). Thus, I choose the intermediate case and assume that they are
separable (Hall and Jones (2007), Yogo (2007)).
Three Phases of the Life Cycle
Individuals live through three phases of the life cycle, each of which has unique fea-
tures. They are born into families of different income levels and stay with their
parents until age TCHILD. Then they join the labor force and earn an idiosyncratic
labor income until age TRET . Finally, they retire and receive a retirement pension
from the government proportional to their last period’s labor income. Throughout
their lifetime, they are subject to an endogenous death probability, and by the end of
age T , everyone dies with certainty. Now, I discuss the three phases of the life cycle
in detail.
Childhood Years: Individuals are born into families that are heterogeneous in
family income. Throughout childhood they receive a constant stream of income, wi,
from their parents. I do not model the parent-child interaction explicitly (which
would unnecessarily complicate the model further). Rather, I assume that, each
period, parents spend the same constant amount of money on behalf of and for the
enjoyment of their children.
Parents are offered a private health insurance contract for their children. If they
choose to buy insurance, they pay a premium of pPRVt and they receive reimburse-
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ment for their medical expenditures according to health insurance coverage function
χPRV (m) from the insurance firm, where m is total medical expenditures. If their
income is lower than some level of poverty threshold, they are eligible for Medicaid,
χMCD(m), which is a government-financed health insurance contract. The details of
the private and the Medicaid health insurance contracts will be discussed in Section
3.4.2. I assume that there is no cost of enrolling in Medicaid; thus, once they are
eligible, parents choose to enroll their children in this program.82
Parents are not allowed to accumulate assets for their children throughout this
phase. They can buy consumption, ct, curative medicine, mC,t, preventive medicine
mP,t and private health insurance with their income.
Working Years: After age TCHILD individuals join the labor force. They inelas-
tically supply labor hours in return for idiosyncratic labor income, wit, which follows
an AR(1) process. In addition, an individual’s physical health status in the current
period, ht − ωt, affects her labor productivity proportionally. Specifically, her labor
earnings at age t are wit(1− (1− (hit−ωit))ζ), where ζ determines the decrease in earn-
ings due to health status. Thus, workers experience a decrease in their earnings due
to physical health shocks. Moreover, the government taxes total income progressively
with average tax rate τ(.).
Individuals in their working years are also offered private health insurance. They
can buy insurance by paying an age-specific insurance premium, pPRVt . In the US
poverty alone does not necessarily qualify an adult for Medicaid.83 Thus I assume
that adults are not eligible for Medicaid. Since more than 85% of private insurance
82It is well known in the literature that although they are eligible, some people do not enroll in
Medicaid. I abstract from this feature in my model.
83Some of the eligibility groups for Medicaid are AFDC-eligible individuals (Aid to Families with
Dependent Children), pregnant women with income lower than threshold, children under age 19,
recipients of SSI, recipients of foster care. Thus, poverty alone does not necessarily qualify an
individual for Medicaid. As a result, I assume that adults are not eligible for Medicaid.
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is provided through employers (Mills (2000)), I assume that the health insurance
premium is tax deductible.
Financial markets are incomplete in that adults (workers and retirees) can only
accumulate a risk-free asset, at, at a interest rate r against idiosyncratic labor market
risk and idiosyncratic health risk, although they are not allowed to borrow.84
Retirement Years: Individuals retire at age TRET and as long as they are alive,
they receive constant pension payments from the government as a function of their
last period earnings, Φ(wiTRET ). They die by the end of age T with certainty.
All of the elderly are covered by Medicare, which is a government-financed health
insurance contract. Namely, they receive reimbursement for their medical expendi-
tures according to health insurance coverage function χMCR(m) from the government.
3.4.2 Health Insurance Plans
Individuals are offered different health insurance contracts during different phases of
their lifetime. During childhood and working years they are offered private health
insurance. If they are poor during childhood, they are covered by Medicaid. And all
of the elderly are covered by Medicare.
Individuals are not allowed to buy private health insurance after they observe the
health shock. They need to make their decision before the health shock is realized.
One way to interpret this condition is that private insurance firms can discriminate
against patients with pre-existing health conditions. Another way to interpret it is
that shocks are observable by the private insurance firm, and the price firms ask for
is higher than the individual is willing to pay due to operational costs.
All three types of insurance plans involve both deductibles and co-payments. The
84Since survival probability is endogenous, natural borrowing limit is zero borrowing limit.
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coverage function of a health insurance plan j ∈ {PRV, MCD, MCR} (private,
Medicaid, and Medicare plans, respectively) is as follows:
χj(m) =

0 m ≤ ιj
ςj(m− ι) m ≥ ιj
(3.6)
where m denotes total medical expenditures of the individual including curative med-
ical expenditures mC,t and preventive medical expenditures mP,t. Namely, an indi-
vidual who is covered by the health insurance plan j does not receive reimbursement
for her medical expenditures up to deductible ιj. And for every dollar she spends
above the level of the deductible ιj, she receives ςj fraction of each dollar spent as the
remainder of co-payment. These reimbursement schemes are determined exogenously.
Insurance premiums depend only on age so that everybody in age t pays the same
insurance premium pPRVt regardless of their physical health capital h
i
t, preventive
health capital xit, income w
i
t, and asset holdings a
i
t. The private health insurance
market consists of many small firms. Insurance premiums are determined competi-
tively through firms’ zero-profit condition. The firm’s revenue in the age t sub-market
is composed of insurance premia collected from customers. The costs of the firm in-
clude both the financial losses due to medical expenditures and operational costs
(overhead costs), which are proportional to financial losses, specifically ∆ fraction
of financial losses. Since there is free entry to every sub-market t, in equilibrium,
revenues pay out costs in each sub-market.
3.4.3 The Tax System and the Government Budget
The government imposes a progressive income tax, τ(.). The collected revenues are
used for three main purposes: (i) to finance the Social Security system, (ii) to finance
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the medical expenditures due to Medicaid, Medicare and default and (iii) finally,
to finance the government expenditure, G, that does not yield any direct utility to
consumers (because of either corruption or waste).85 The residual budget surplus or
deficit, Tr, is distributed in a lump-sum fashion to all households regardless of age.
3.4.4 Individual’s Dynamic Program
Let ID be an indicator that is equal to 1 if the agent chooses to default and 0 otherwise.
Similarly, Ijis an indicator that is equal to 1 if the agent is covered by type-j health
insurance and 0 otherwise, where j ∈ {private, Medicaid, Medicare}. The dynamic
program of a typical individual is given by:
Vt(ht, xt, at, wt) = Eωt
 max
IPRVt ,I
D
t ,at+1,
mC,t,mP,t,ct
u(ct, ht − ωt) + βs(ht − ωt)E [Vt+1(ht+1, xt+1, at+1, wt+1)]

s.t (3.2) and (3.3)
IMCRt =

1 if t ≤ TCHILD and wt ≤ w
0 otherwise
IMCDt =

1 if t > TRET
0 otherwise∑
j
Ijt ≤ 1
yt =

wt − pPRVt IPRVt t ≤ TCHILD
(1− τ(wt + rat − pPRVt IPRVt ))(wt + rat − pPRVt IPRVt ) t > TCHILD
(1− IDt )yt = (1− IDt )(−at + at+1 + ct +mC,t +mP,t −
∑
j
Ijt χ
j(mC,t +mP,t))
85Another way to think about government expenditures is that households enjoy government
spending separately from their utility from consumption and health.
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IDt mC,t = I
D
t (ωt/A
c
t)
(1/θct )
IDt ct = I
D
t cmin, I
D
t at+1 = 0, I
D
t mP,t = 0
at+1 = 0 ∀t ≤ TCHILD
wt =

w¯ t ≤ TCHILD
ρwt−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η) TCHILD < t ≤ TRET
Φ(wTRET ) t > TRET
log(ωt) ∼

N(µGt , σ2t ) w/p pi(xt)
N(µBt , σ2t ) w/p 1− pi(xt)
Definition 2. A stationary competitive equilibrium of this economy for given insur-
ance coverage schemes χj(), average tax rate function τ(), and risk-free interest rate
r is a set of decision rules,
{
IPRVt (z
′
t), I
D
t (zt), at+1(zt), mC,t(zt), mP,t(zt), ct(zt)
}T
t=1
;
value functions {Vt(z′t)}Tt=1, where z′t = (ht, xt, at, wt) and zt = (ht, xt, at, wt, ωt);
age-dependent prices for private health insurance plans
{
pPRVt
}TRET
t=1
and measures
{Λt(zt)}Tt=1,
{
Λ
′
t(z
′
t)
}T
t=1
such that:
1. Given insurance coverage schemes χj(), average tax rate function τ(), risk-
free interest rate r, and age-dependent prices for private health insurance plans{
pPRVt
}TRET
t=1
decision rules and the value function solve the individual’s problem.
2. The age-dependent private health insurance plan price satisfies firms’ zero-profit
condition:
ˆ
z′t
IPRVt (z
′
t)p
PRV
t dΛ
′
(z′t)− (1 + ∆)
ˆ
zt
m(zt)dΛ(zt) = 0 ∀t (3.7)
3. {Λt(zt)}Tt=1 ,
{
Λ
′
t(z
′
t)
}T
t=1
are generated by individuals’ optimal choices.
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4. The government budget balances as discussed in Section 3.4.3:
T∑
t=TCHILD+1
ˆ
zt
(w + rat − pPRVt IPRVt (z′t)− yt)dΛ(zt) = G+
T∑
t=1
ˆ
zt
TrdΛ(zt) +
∑
t
ˆ
zt
χMCD(mC,t(zt) +mP,t(zt))I
MCD
t (zt)dΛ(zt) + (3.8)∑
t
ˆ
zt
χMCR(mC,t(zt) +mP,t(zt))I
MCR
t (zt)dΛ(zt) +
∑
t
ˆ
zt
(mC,t(zt) + cmin − yt − at)IDt (zt)dΛ(zt) +
T∑
t=TRET+1
ˆ
zt
wt(zt)dΛ(zt)
The first term in the government’s budget is the total tax revenue from total in-
come collected from all adult agents. On the right-hand side, government finances
government expenditures, G, lump-sum transfers, Tr, Medicaid expenditures inte-
grated over eligible children, Medicare expenditures integrated over all elderly, cu-
rative medicine expenditures due to default, and last the pension payments, which
depend on a worker’s last period income.
3.5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I begin by discussing the parameter choices for the model. Then in
Section 3.5.2, I present simulation results and their counterparts in the data to evalu-
ate the model’s performance in fitting the data such as the lifetime profile of medical
expenditures by income, mortality differences, conditional survival probability over
the life cycle, etc.
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3.5.1 Estimation
My basic estimation strategy is to fix some parameters exogenously outside of the
model (e.g., labor income process, insurance coverage schemes, etc.) and to choose
the remaining parameters using the model and a set of moments from the MEPS (e.g.,
distribution of health shocks, physical and preventive health production technology
parameters, etc.).
Externally Calibrated Parameters
Table C.10 shows the parameters that are fixed exogenously together with their values.
Demographics The model period is one year. Households enter the labor market
at age 21 (TCHILD = 20). Moreover, workers retire at age 65 (TRET = 65 ) and die
with certainty at age 110 (T = 110).
CRRA coefficient De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009) estimate the constant rel-
ative risk aversion coefficient in a structural model with uncertain medical expen-
ditures. I follow them and set the constant relative risk aversion coefficient σ = 3,
which is higher than is usually assumed in the literature (σ = 2).86
Interest rate I assume that interest rate, r is determined exogneously by world
factors in an open-economy equilibrium and I set r = 2.5%.
Income Process I calibrate the common deterministic age profile for income using
the MEPS data.87 For the stochastic component of the income process, three param-
86I do a robustness check with σ = 2, and all the results hold qualitatively.
87I use the normalized family income to calibrate the deterministic component. There is little
change in average (normalized) family income throughout childhood. Thus, I assume that children
receive a constant (but idiosyncratic) stream of income. During adulthood, labor income increases
by 60% up to age 45 and then decreases by 25% by the age of retirement. This hump-shaped profile
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eters are required. These are the variance of individual-specific fixed effects, σ2α which
determine the cross-sectional variation in income among children and the variation
in initial conditions in the beginning of the labor market. The other two parameters
are the persistence, ρ, and the variance, σ2η, of persistent shocks. The MEPS has
a very short panel dimension that practically does not allow me to estimate these
parameters.88 Thus, I use the estimated values of these parameters from Storeslet-
ten, Telmer, and Yaron (2000), since they estimate an AR(1) income process using
household income data.89
Last, I estimate the decrease in labor earnings due to physical health status (ζ)
using the MEPS data. Using the (fairly short) panel dimension of the survey, I control
for the fixed effects and estimate the effect of health status on labor earnings.90
Social Security Benefits In a realistic model of the retirement system, a pension
would be a function of lifetime average earnings, but this would require me to in-
corporate average earnings as an additional continuous state variable to the problem
of the household.91 Instead, in my model the retirement pension is a function of
predicted average lifetime earnings. I first regress average lifetime earnings on last
period’s earnings and use the coefficients to predict an individual’s average lifetime
earnings, denoted by yˆLT (wTRET ) (Karahan and Ozkan (2009)). Following Guvenen,
Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2009) I use the following pension schedule:
is in line with other estimates in the literature. Income during retirement is determined by the
government pension function Φ().
88In the MEPS, respondents are surveyed for only two consecutive years.
89They also include a transitory component but due to computational issues, in my model and
calibration I abstract from transitory income shocks.
90Health status is measured by the subjective evaluation of the respondent. The details are
reported in Appendix C.1.4
91I refrain from doing so, since this would complicate the model without adding any further insight
for my purposes.
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Φ(yˆLT (wTRET )) = a× AE + b× yˆLT (wTRET )
where AE is the average earnings in the population. I set a = 16.8% and b = 35.46%.
Consumption Floor and Poverty Threshold Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
(1994) estimate the statutory consumption floor for a representative adult consid-
ering SSI benefits, housing subsidies and food stamps and find it to be $7000 (in
1984). However, De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009) recently estimate the effective
consumption floor in an uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenditures setting for the
elderly and find it to be much smaller ($2700 in 1998). Thus I follow an intermediate
path between these two papers and set the consumption floor to be $5000 per year.
Since the unit of interest in my model is an individual, I set the poverty threshold
to be equal to the federal poverty threshold for a single adult in 2006, which is equal
to $10488.
Insurance Coverage Schemes I use the MEPS data to estimate the insurance
coverage schemes, χj(m). In the MEPS, in addition to total medical expenditures,
variables that itemize expenditures according to the major source of payment cate-
gories are also available. Thus, I can identify how much of the total expenditure is
paid by the household itself, how much of it is paid by the private insurance firm, and
how much of it is paid through Medicaid or Medicare, etc. Then using this informa-
tion, I estimate equation 3.6 for private insurance holders and Medicare holders. The
details of the estimation is presented in Appendix C.1.5.
I assume that the Medicaid coverage scheme is the same as the private coverage
function. Because in the data Medicaid holders incur medical expenditures mostly in
the case of severe health shocks, I cannot identify the coverage function for small val-
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ues of medical expenditures. Moreover, in many states Medicaid is provided through
private insurance companies, which makes my assumption reasonable. If individuals
are younger than 6 years and their income is lower than 133% of the poverty thresh-
old, or if they are between 7-20 years and their income is lower than 100% of the
poverty threshold, then they are eligible for Medicaid.92
Estimated Parameters
My approach for estimating the remaining parameters is to use my model to match
moments in the data that are sufficient to identify all the parameters.
Now, I discuss further which moments help to pin down which parameters. I
informally argue that each of the parameters has a significant effect on a subset of
the moments and give some intuition for why this is the case. This approach should
be convincing, since it provides an understanding of how the moments are sufficient
to pin down the parameters (Kaplan (2010)).93
Preference Parameters The discount factor β is identified from the wealth to
income ratio in the economy. I choose β to match an aggregate wealth to income
ratio of 3.94 The value of being alive, b, is identified from average life expectancy in
the population (75 years), particularly, life expectancy of the poor.
To identify the remaining preference parameters, (α, γ), which determine the util-
ity from quality of health, I follow Hall and Jones (2007) and draw upon the literature
on quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). This literature compares the flow utility level
of a person with a particular disease with that of a person in perfect health and
estimates QALY weights by age (Cutler and Richardson (1997)). Then I use these
92Please see details in Health Care Financing Administration (2000).
93Note that I use “pin down” and “identify” interchangeably throughout this section.
94I define aggregate wealth as the sum of asset holdings and aggregate income as the sum of labor
earnings (excluding retirement pension).
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weights to estimate α and β:
u(c¯20, h¯20)
0.94
=
u(c¯65, h¯65)
0.73
=
u(c¯85, h¯85)
0.62
where c¯t and h¯t denote the average consumption and average physical health capital
net of health shocks at age t and 0.94, 0.73, 0.62 are the QALY weights at age 20, 65
and 85 respectively.
Distribution of Health Shocks I normalize the initial level of physical health
capital to 1. At each age t there are three parameters for the distribution of the log
of health shocks: Means of “good” and “bad” health shock distribution, (µGt , µ
B
t ), and
the common standard deviation of the distributions, σ2t . I assume that the difference
between means of the “good” and the “bad” distributions is constant for each age t,
i.e., µBt = µ
G
t + µ¯. So, there are two parameters in each t, (µ
G
t , σ
2
t ), and a common µ¯.
Recall that the survival probability is a function of both the current physical health
capital ht and the health shock ωt. Thus, the distribution of health shocks at age t
affects the conditional survival probability to t+1. First, I normalize the distribution
of health shocks such that the 99.9th percentile of the distribution equals 1 (which
is the worst shock, implying death with certainty). Then, the aggregate conditional
survival probability in each t can pin down the distribution of shocks along with
this normalization. Last, I use differences in the lifetime profile of medical expendi-
tures between low- and high-income households to identify the difference in means
of the distributions, µ¯, along with preventive health capital technology parameters,
(Ap, θp)95.
95Recall from Section 3.3.2 that if µ¯ = 0 then medical expenditures of the poor relative to the rich
exhibit a non-increasing profile over the life cycle.
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Physical Health Production Technology I use the distribution of medical ex-
penditures within 5-year age bins in the data to identify the productivity, Act , and
the elasticity, θct , parameters of the physical health production function. First, let’s
suppose that we can observe the curative medical expenditure distribution in the
data96 and households choose to fully cure the health shocks97. Then there is a one-
to-one relationship between the distribution of shocks and the distribution of curative
medical expenditures in the data through the physical health production function:
ωt = A
c
tm
θct
C,t
logωt = logA
c
t + θ
c
t logmC,t
logmC,t =
logωt − logAct
θct
Thus, the mean and variance of the distribution of medical expenditure shocks
identify the parameters (Act , θ
c
t ).
Preventive Health Production Technology I normalize the initial level of pre-
ventive health capital to 1. There are three parameters of preventive health produc-
tion technology: constant depreciation rate δx, productivity and curvature parameters
of preventive health production function, (Ap, θp) (notice that they do not depend on
age). The difference in means of the “good” and the “bad” distribution of health
shocks (µ¯) and depreciation in preventive health capital (δx) cannot be identified
jointly. Thus, I assume that δx = 7.5%.
96In order to identify the curative medical expenditure distribution in the data we need to identify
the preventive medical expenditure distribution, and vice-versa. I’ll discuss how we identify the
distribution of preventive medicine expenditures using my model in the next paragraph.
97Indeed model simulations imply that for reasonable parameter values households choose to fully
recover the health shocks throughout their lifetime except for very old age (older than 90). This is
due to the fact that shocks are irreversible in that if they are not cured in the current period, they
cannot be cured in the future and they decrease the survival probability in all future periods.
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The age profile of medical consumption of low income relative to high income
(see the right panel of Figure 3.1) identifies the preventive health production function
parameters (Ap, θp). Namely, as can be seen in Figure 3.3, the model generates
an increase in the ratio of medical expenditures of the poor to the rich through
the rise in differences in curative medical expenditures. Thus, preventive medical
expenditures should be small enough that the increase in differences in mC,t can
surpass the differences in mP,t. Moreover, early in life, medical expenditures of low-
income households are substantially lower than those of high-incomes ones. Thus,
there has to be enough differences in preventive medicine usage in the model between
low- and high-income groups to match the counterpart in the data.
3.5.2 Model’s Performance
In this section, I examine the fit of the model to the data. First I discuss the perfor-
mance of the model in fitting the targeted moments in the estimation. Then I present
an informal over-identification test of the model by showing the model’s performance
in fitting the moments that are not targeted in the estimation. The estimated pa-
rameter values for the model are shown in Tables C.11, C.13, and C.12.98
Fit of the Model to the Targeted Moments
The left panel of Figure 3.5 plots the average medical expenditures of households
(dashed red line), which are computed using 10000 simulated life-cycle paths for indi-
viduals starting with the same initial condition, and the data counterpart (solid blue
line). And the right panel shows the medical expenditures of low-income households
relative to high-income ones and its data counterpart. Average medical expenditures
98I estimate the model using the method of simulated moments. For each set of parameters the
code takes 1 hour to solve the model. Thus, at this point I am unable to report the standard errors
of the parameters.
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over the life cycle (along with the variances) and the increase in relative expenditures
of low- to high-income individuals are used as target moments in my estimation. The
model is able to account for the key medical expenditure profiles over the life cycle:
The dramatic increase in health care expenditures and the hump-shaped expenditures
of the poor relative to the rich.
Figure 3.5: Medical Expenditures over the Lifetime
Figure 3.6 shows the age profile of conditional survival probability implied by the
model and its data counterpart, which is used in the estimation. Except for very old
age, the model is able to endogenously generate an age profile of conditional survival
probability that is very close to the data. Next, I turn to mortality differences between
low- and high-income households. For this purpose I compute the life expectancies of
both income groups at ages 25, 45 and 65. The results are shown in Table 3.2 along
with their values in the data. Notice that the model is able to endogenously generate
a decreasing life expectancy differential between low- and high-income households,
albeit not as large a difference as that observed in the data. At age 25, there is
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almost 8 years difference in life expectancies of the rich and the poor, whereas the
model generates only 5 years.
Figure 3.6: Conditional Survival Probability
Table 3.2: Life Expectancy Differential
Low Income High Income
Life Expectancy Data Model Data Model
Age 25 45.0 48.5 52.9 53.8
Age 45 27.0 30.4 33.9 35.1
Age 65 13.8 15.1 17.1 18.1
An Informal Over-Identification Discussion
So far, I have presented the fit of the model in matching moments used in the estima-
tion. Now, I present an informal over-identification test of the model by showing the
model’s performance in fitting the moments that are not targeted in the estimation.
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In my estimation I target only the increase in the ratio of medical expenditures
of low to high income but not the decrease in the end of the life cycle (see the right
panel of Figure 3.5). The model can capture this decrease fairly well. First, the
return on health capital investment is lower for low-income households since they
expect to live shorter lives. This reduces medical spending of the poor relative to
the rich. Second, selection effect plays a role in the end of the life. As a cohort of
individuals grows older, it becomes increasingly composed of the rich; therefore the
difference between rich and poor decreases (Shorrocks (1975)). Moreover, the low-
income households that could survive until very old age are mostly the lucky ones
who are hit by relatively small shocks during their lives. Thus, they could invest more
in preventive health capital and therefore, the mean of health shocks they face are
relatively smaller.
In addition, I decompose the differences in the lifetime profile of medical expen-
ditures between the rich and the poor by investigating the bottom and the top of the
spending distribution separately. The left and the right panels of Figure 3.7 show
the average of the bottom 50th and the top 10th percent medical expenditures of the
poor relative to those of the rich, respectively.99 The model is capable of generating
differences between the rich and the poor for the top and the bottom of the expendi-
ture distribution. Namely, the average spending of the rich exceeds that of the poor
in the bottom of the distribution and this difference is smaller for older ages. On the
other hand, in the top of the expenditure distribution low-income households incur
more extreme expenditures for most of the life span and the ratio of the spending of
the poor to the rich follows a hump-shaped.
99In the data, the bottom 10th percentile of the medical expenditures is zero for both rich and
poor. Thus, I choose to investigate the bottom 50th percentile.
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Figure 3.7: Bottom and Top End of the Medical Expenditure Distribution
Table 3.3: Aggregate Statistics
Data Model
Private Insurance Coverage under age 65 73% 85
Medicaid Coverage under age 20 22% 23
Share of Medicaid and Medicare 29% 26
Table 3.3 shows three selected statistics in the data and their model counterparts.
First, the model results suggest that 85% of the population under age 65 is covered
by private insurance, whereas in the data this number is only 73%. This is due to
the lack of public insurance channels for individuals between ages 21 to 65 in the
model. Thus, the only option for adults is to buy private insurance, which leads to
higher ratios of private insurance coverage in the adult population. Second, the model
implies an 23% Medicaid coverage for children under age 20, whereas in the data this
number is 22%. Lastly, out of total medical expenditures the share of Medicaid and
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Medicare in the data is 29% and its model counterpart is 26%, which allows me to
conclude that the model is fairly successful in fitting the data.100
3.6 Policy Analysis
I now use the model to study counterfactual policy experiments.
3.6.1 Policy I: Universal Health Care Coverage
One of the main provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care (PPAC)
Act of 2010 is to expand health insurance coverage by expanding Medicaid eligibil-
ity, subsidizing low-income households to obtain private health insurance, providing
incentives for employers to provide health benefits, and imposing tax penalties for
individuals who do not obtain health insurance. These provisions are financed by
a variety of taxes, fees, and cost-saving measures. According to the Congressional
Budget Office estimates, about 95% of the non-elderly population is expected to have
health insurance.101
I use my model to evaluate the macroeconomic implications of expanding insurance
coverage to the whole population (universal health care coverage). I model the actual
policy reform by assuming that the government pays for the private health insurance
premia of all non-elderly individuals.102 The cost of this provision is offset by a
proportional income tax that keeps the government expenditures net of transfers the
same as before the policy change. In particular, the government budget constraint
100In the data total public spending constitutes 45% of all health care expenditures.
101The 5% of the non-elderly population who will lack health insurance will consist of low-income
households who are eligible for Medicaid, but do not enroll in it and young single adults who prefer
to pay a penalty instead of buying health insurance.
102Similarly, one can think of this policy as non-elderly individuals receive vouchers from govern-
ment to purchase private health insurance. The value of the voucher exactly equals to the health
insurance premium she would be paying for Jung and Tran (2010a).
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(equation 3.8) is satisfied by increasing tax rates (τ(.)) proportionally to income to
keep government expenditures (G) constant. This exercise should be viewed as a first
step to understanding the impact of the recent reform on the health care system.
Table 3.4 shows some selected aggregate statistics for the benchmark model (col-
umn labeled “Bench.”) and their steady-state values after the policy change (column
labeled “Policy I”). In order to finance the universal health care coverage policy, the
government imposes an additional 3.1% flat tax on income. Since the new policy
provides access to health insurance for low-income households, they invest in both
preventive and physical health capital more; therefore on average, they live longer by
1.25 years (see Table 3.5).
Table 3.4: Policy Analysis, Selected Statistics
Bench. Policy I Policy II
Average Tax Rate +0% +3.1% +4.06
Health Spending % of Income 9.84% 9.92% 9.92
Health Spending/Capita $4750 $4755 $4738
Medicare Expenditures 2.48% 2.495% 2.42%
Preventive Spending % of Total Spending 21.5% 21.7% 38.5
Welfare 0% 1.5% 2.5
The increase in preventive expenditures and curative expenditures due to a longer
life span exceeds the savings in curative expenditures due to milder health shocks. As
a result, aggregate health care expenditures increase slightly, from 9.84% of aggregate
income to 9.92%.103 However, due to a longer life span per capita health care expen-
ditures increase even less, only from $4750 to $4755. Similarly, due to the longer life
103The change in total income is negligible. This is because the slight increase in labor earnings due
to better health outcomes is offset by a decrease in asset income. Under the new policy households
accumulate less capital because of the distortion by better insurance opportunities against health
shocks and redistribution in the economy due to the income transfer from the rich to the poor. To
be more precise, total income decrease very slightly by 0.2%.
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span Medicare expenditures rise slightly, from 2.48% of aggregate income to 2.495%.
Furthermore, share of preventive care expenditures does not change significantly (it
rises only from 21.5% to 21.7%).
Including low-income households into insurance pool has ambiguous effects on
insurance premia. On the one hand, the poor spend less on preventive medicine
compared to the rich, in turn lower health insurance premia. On the other hand,
they are subject to larger health shocks, thereby rising insurance premia. As a result,
health insurance premia of individuals younger than 30 years old decrease by 2.5%.
However government pays 1.5% more for households older than 30 compared to the
benchmark case.
Table 3.5: Life Expectancy at Birth for Income Quintiles
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Benchmark 71.95 75.2 76.3 76.5 76.8
Policy I 73.2 75.3 76.3 76.5 76.8
Policy II 74.65 75.9 76.5 76.6 76.8
Note: Q1 through Q5 denote lifetime income quintiles from lowest to highest,
respectively.
In addition I compute the change in welfare of the society due to universal health
care coverage. On the one hand, it increases the welfare of the poor by providing
them health insurance at a relatively low cost. On the other hand, it reduces the
welfare of the rich due to higher tax rates. In order to evaluate the net effect of
universal health care coverage on social welfare quantitatively, I compute the fraction
of lifetime consumption that an unborn individual would be willing to give up in order
to live in an economy with universal health care coverage instead of the benchmark
economy. Namely, let (1− φ) be this fraction, then φ solves the following equation:
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E
T∑
t=1
βt−1s(hBt − ωt)u(cBt , hBt − ωt) = E
T∑
t=1
βt−1s(hPt − ωt)u(φcPt , hPt − ωt)
where {cBt , hBt }, {cPt , hPt } denote the optimal consumption and physical health capital
in the benchmark economy and in the economy with universal health care coverage.
Social welfare is improved under the new health care policy so that an unborn
individual would be willing to give up 1.5% of her lifetime consumption in order to
live with universal health care coverage instead of the benchmark economy. Around
one-third of the welfare gains are due to the increase in the expected lifetime of
the bottom first and second income quintile groups. The rest is coming from better
insurance opportunities against health shocks.
As expected, welfare gains are not evenly distributed and not even every new born
child is better off under the new policy. Welfare gains follow a hump-shaped pattern
over the parental income of newborn children (see Table 3.6). Children of median-
income households are gaining most from this policy; they are willing to give up 2.1%
of their lifetime consumption in order to live under this new policy . The welfare
of newborn babies of very rich families (top 2 percentile group) worsens since they
expect to cover most of the cost of universal health care coverage without gaining
much insurance (1 − φ = −0.88%). Surprisingly, children of low-income households’
welfare gains are very small (1 − φ = 0.6%). This is because that curative medicine
expenditures constitute the most part of their health care expenditures and the option
of default in case of a severe health shock is not too costly for them. Thus additional
insurance against health shocks from universal health coverage policy is not very
valuable to them.
Please note that in my model labor supply is inelastic; thus, higher tax rates do
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not lead to a distortion in labor supply, which would reduce the welfare gains. Thus
it is not surprising that this policy is welfare improving since it is redistributive in
nature that it transfers income from the rich to the poor in the economy. On the
other hand, this way of financing universal health care coverage is an assumption to
simplify the complicated changes in the law. In reality the tax burden on high-income
households will be small compared to this hypothetical exercise, since only a small
part of the population will need a subsidy to buy insurance. However, one should still
be careful in interpreting the welfare gains in this counterfactual policy experiment.
Table 3.6: Welfare Gains, 1− φ
Bottom 2% Median Top 2%
Policy I w.r.t Benchmark 0.6% 2.1% -0.88
Policy II w.r.t Benchmark 0.35% 3.13% -1.2
Policy II w.r.t Policy I -0.24% 1.105% -0.29
Note: This table shows the welfare gains in terms of percentage of lifetime
consumption for top 2%, median and bottom 2% income groups.
3.6.2 Policy II: Free Preventive Medicine
Under the PPAC Act of 2010 private insurance firms are required to provide basic
preventive care free of charge such as childhood immunizations and checkups, mam-
mograms, colonoscopies, cervical screenings, and treatment for high blood pressure.104
However, patients are still required to pay co-payments for doctor visits and not all
preventive care is free. Thus, I study the effect of this policy change by assuming
that on top of the current private insurance scheme, firms pay 75% of households’
104Some of the other free preventive care items are diabetes and cholesterol tests; counseling on
such topics as quitting smoking, losing weight, eating healthfully, treating depression, and reducing
alcohol use; routine vaccinations against diseases such as measles, polio, or meningitis; flu and
pneumonia shots; counseling, screening, and vaccines to ensure healthy pregnancies; regular well-
baby and well-child visits, from birth to age 21, etc.
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preventive medicine expenditures. I examine this policy change in a universal health
care coverage setting discussed in the previous section.105
The results of this policy change are reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 under the
column labeled “Policy II”. An immediate implication of the new policy is an increase
in insurance premia due to higher preventive medicine costs covered by firms. As
a result, the government raises flat taxes from 3.1% to 4.06% to finance the rise
in premia. Under this new policy, individuals spend more on preventive care which
results in an significant increase in share of preventive care expenditures from 21.7% of
total medical spending to 38.5%. This also leads to an improvement in life expectancy
for all income groups except for the top income quintile (see the bottom row of Table
3.5).106
Surprisingly, even though households spend more on preventive care, and they live
longer on average, aggregate medical spending does not change (remains the same at
9.92% of total income) compared to the universal health insurance coverage economy
(Policy I). This is due to the milder distribution of health shocks in the new economy
by means of larger investment in preventive health capital. As a result, total Medicare
spending decreases by 0.075% of total income, from 2.495% to 2.42% of total income
and per capita health care expenditures decrease slightly from $4755 to $4738 in the
new economy.
I also compute the welfare change for this counterfactual policy experiment: an
unborn individual would be willing to give up 2.5% of her lifetime consumption in
order to live under this new policy instead of the benchmark economy, which implies
105If I impose the “free preventive care” restriction on health insurance firms in the benchmark case
(in which the government does not provide private health insurance to all individuals), many of the
low-income households drop out of the health insurance market due to the rise in health insurance
premia. But this is not what the PPAC Act of 2010 aims for. Thus, I study this policy change in a
universal health care coverage setting.
106Top income quintile households have already reached maximum of preventive health capital
investment before the policy change.
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a 1% welfare gain compared to the universal health care coverage economy. In this
case most of the welfare gain is due to the increase in life expectancy (around 60% of
2.5% gain).
Again welfare gains are highest for new born children of median households. How-
ever, under the “free preventive medicine” policy not only new born children of top
2% households but also children of bottom 2% families are worse off compared to an
only universal health insurance coverage economy (see last row of Table 3.6). This
is because even under the “free preventive medicine” policy, the poor do not increase
spending on preventive health care to a level that the subsidy they get for their pre-
ventive medicine expenditures could offset the increase in taxes that are required to
pay for this policy.
Please also note that I am simply comparing two steady-state economies, before
and after the policy change. A more thorough analysis would be to compute tran-
sitional dynamics after the policy change which is computationally infeasible at this
point. However, one can speculate about the transition of the economy from old
steady state to the new one. After the policy change we should expect aggregate
medical costs to increase in the short term since elderly would not be affected by
the new policy but only the young who would react to this policy by increasing their
spending on preventive care without experiencing an immediate substantial decline
in curative medicine expenditures. Thus, from a political economy point of view, the
elderly would not support this policy change since this would only imply an increase
in tax rates for them.
These results suggest that policies encouraging the use of health care by the poor
early in life have significant positive welfare gains, even when fully accounting for the
increase in taxes and insurance premia required to pay for them.
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3.7 Comparison of Results to the Literature
In this section I compare the implications of the model introduced in Section 3.4 to
the findings of other studies in the literature.
First, the model presented in this paper points to avoidable health conditions due
to lower investment in preventive health capital for poor households. According to
Nolte and McKee (2007), the US health care system is particularly bad in prevention:
the US ranked worst among 19 peer countries in preventable deaths which can be
avoided with timely and effective care. Note that the US is the only country with-
out universal health coverage among rich countries and the lack of health insurance
is the most important factor for inadequate access to health care services (Docteur
and Oxley (2003)). In addition according to National Healthcare Disparities Report
(2003), in the US avoidable health problems are more prevalent among lower socioe-
conomic individuals.107 Low-income patients have higher rates of avoidable hospital
admissions (i.e., hospitalizations for health conditions that rarely need hospitalization
in the presence of early extensive primary care.). For example, poor households with
diabetes are less likely to receive recommended diabetic medicines in the early stages
of the disease which can prevent hospitalization for end-stage complications.
Second, the model implies a steeper growth in medical expenditures over the life
cycle for the US compared to other rich countries where there is relatively better
access to health care for the poor. Figure 3.8 shows the age profile of the average
medical expenditures relative to that of the 50-64 age group for nine rich OECD
countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, U.K., and
U.S.) (Hagist and Kotlikoff (2005)). In all countries medical expenditures increase
over the life cycle. However, in the U.S. the increase in health care spending is
107The full report can be find through http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhdr03/nhdr03.htm.
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dramatically more rapid. This is consistent with the prediction of the model.
Third, the model predicts a higher mortality differential between the rich and the
poor for the U.S. compared to other rich countries. Delavande and Rohwedder (2008)
estimate the socioeconomic mortality differential in the U.S and in ten European
countries using subjective survival probabilities.108 They find a significantly larger
mortality differential between the lowest and highest wealth tercile groups in the US
compared to European countries. The difference in probability of surviving to age 75
between the top and the bottom wealth tercile is 14%, whereas in European countries
it is only 8%.
Figure 3.8: Medical Expenditures over the Life Cycle in OECD Countries
Source: Hagist and Kotlikoff (2005) Table 2.
Recently, Kolstad and Kowalski (2010) investigate the impact of health care re-
form passed in the state of Massachusetts in April 2006 on hospital usage and pre-
ventive care. The key provision of this reform is an individual mandate to obtain
108The subjective expectation of survival has been shown to be predictive of the actual. For a more
detailed discussion of the methodology, see Delavande and Rohwedder (2008).
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health insurance, which is also key in the PPAC Act of 2010. Thus, their findings
from Massachusetts population can be used to examine the impact of expansion to
near-universal health insurance coverage for the country. They find evidence that
hospitalizations for preventable conditions were reduced. They also study the costs
at the hospital level and find that growth in health care spending did not increase
after the reform in Massachusetts relative to other states. These are in line with my
findings in Section 3.6.1.
3.8 Conclusion
One of the goals of the PPAC Act of 2010 is to reduce the disparities in health
outcomes between low- and high-income groups. Then the differences in the lifetime
profiles of medical expenditures between the rich and the poor become an important
determinant in designing and analyzing health care policies. This paper studies the
differences in lifetime profiles of health care usage among income groups.
Using data from the MEPS I document new empirical facts on health care ex-
penditure by income. First low- and high-income households differ significantly in
age profiles of medical expenditure. Particularly, the average medical spending of
low-income households relative to high-income households exhibits a hump-shaped
pattern over the lifetime and is above 1 for a significant part of the life span. Second,
a higher share of low income households do not incur any health care expenditure in a
given year than high income households. Yet their medical spending is more extreme.
I develop and estimate a life-cycle model of health capital that can account for
these facts. The main feature of my model is to distinguish between “physical health
capital”, which determines the probability of surviving to the next period, and “pre-
ventive health capital”, which affects the mean of shocks to physical health capital.
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Moreover, I carefully incorporate important features of the U.S. health care system
into my model such as private health insurance, Medicaid and Medicare.
I estimate my model using both micro (MEPS) and macro data. Then I use
my model to analyze the macroeconomic effects of a counterfactual universal health
coverage policy. For this purpose I simply assume that all individuals are covered by
private health insurance and this is financed through a flat income tax on households.
I find that in the new steady state, medical expenditures slightly increase, and the
life expectancy of the poor increases by 1.25 years.
In addition, the PPAC Act of 2010 forces private insurance firms to provide basic
preventive care free of charge. However, patients will still need to pay co-payments
for doctor visits and not all preventive care is free. Therefore, I study the effect of
this policy change by assuming that on top of the existing private insurance scheme,
firms pay 75% of households’ preventive medicine expenditures in an economy with
universal health care coverage. My results suggest that the life expectancy of all
individuals increases except for the top income quintile group. However, total medical
spending does not increase.
In this paper the emphasis is on the demand side of the health insurance market.
An interesting future work would be to extend the model discussed in this paper to a
more general case in which individuals are offered several types of private insurance
coverage schemes that differ in their co-payments and deductibles. Furthermore these
coverage schemes are determined endogenously along with their prices. It would be
interesting to study how would the recent health care reform affect the private health
insurance market in this setup.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Progressivity versus Other Labor Market In-
stitutions
Table A.1 reports the cross-correlations between different labor market institutions in
a country and the progressivity of its income tax structure. The progressivity mea-
sures we use are PW and PW* defined in the text. The labor market institutions
are union density, union coverage rate, and C&C (Centralization & Coordination)
score. All three definitions are explained in more detail later. All three variables are
measured in a way that higher numbers indicate more deviation from a frictionless
economy. The main finding is that both measures of progressivity are strongly pos-
itively correlated with all three labor market institutions. Therefore, countries that
have a more unionized labor force with stronger centralized bargaining are also those
that have a more progressive labor income tax system. To our knowledge, this finding
is new to this paper.
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Table A.1: Correlation between Different Labor Market Institutions
Union density Union coverage Centralization & Coordination PW
Union coverage 0.49 1
C&C 0.57 0.75 1
PW 0.88 0.75 0.78 1
PW* 0.81 0.85 0.69 0.93
Definition of Labor Market Institutions Union density is commonly measured
by the percentage of salaried workers who are union members. The results of collec-
tive bargaining agreements between unions and employers are often extended (through
mandatory and/or voluntary mechanisms) to non-union workers and firms. The total
fraction of workers covered through such extensions is termed union coverage. Cen-
tralization is a measure that indicates the level at which negotiations take place, such
as at firm or plant level (i.e., decentralized bargaining), industry level, and coun-
trywide level (centralized bargaining). In many countries, informal networks and
intensive contacts between social partners coordinate the behavior of trade unions
and employers’ associations. Examples are the leading role of a limited number of
key wage settlements in Germany, and the active role of powerful employer networks
in Japan. Therefore, what matters is not only the formal degree of centralization,
but also the degree of informal consensus seeking between bargaining partners. This
is generally called the level of coordination. The C&C score is an index that in-
creases with the level of centralization and coordination. (Definitions summarized
from Borghijs, Ederveen, and de Mooij (2003).)
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A.2 Key Derivations and Definitions
A.2.1 Derivation of the Optimal Investment Condition (Eq.
(1.6))
Here, we derive the optimal investment condition in the most general framework
studied in this paper (equation (1.6) in Section 1.2.1). The optimality conditions
presented earlier in the paper (equations (1.3), (1.4)) can all be obtained as special
cases of this formulation.
The problem of the agent is given by
V (h, a, s) = max
cs,ns,Qs
u((1 + r)as + ys(1− τ¯(ys))− as+1, 1− n)
+ V (hs+1, as+1, s+ 1)
s.t. ys = (θLl + θHhs)ns − C(Qs).
Note that total tax liability of the agent is given by yτ¯(y). The derivative of tax
liability with respect to y gives the marginal tax rate. Thus, τ(y) = τ¯(y) + yτ¯ ′(y).
Using this expression, we obtain the following FOCs for this problem
(ns) : (θLl + θHhs) (1− τ(ys))u1(cs, 1− ns) = u2(cs, 1− ns)
(as) : u1(cs, 1− ns) = βV2(hs+1, as+1, s+ 1)
(Qs) : C
′(QS) (1− τ(ys))u1(cs, 1− ns) = βV1(hs+1, as+1, s+ 1)
Envelope conditions are:
(as) : V2(hs, as, s) = (1 + r)u1(cs, 1− ns)
(hs) : V1(hs, as, s) = ns (1− τ(ys))u1(cs, 1− ns) + ns+1βV1(hs+1, as+1, s+ 1).
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Combining the envelope conditions with the FOCs yields
C ′(Qs) (1− τ(ys)) = θHns+1(1− τ(ys+1)) βu1(cs+1, 1− ns+1)
u1(cs, 1− ns)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
1+r
+
θHns+1(1− τ(ys+1)) β
2u1(cs+2, 1− ns+2)
u1(cs, 1− ns)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
(1+r)2
+ ....
Rearranging this expression delivers equation (1.6):
C ′j(Q
j
s) =θH{β
1− τ(ys+1)
1− τ(ys) ns+1 + β
21− τ(ys+2)
1− τ(ys) ns+2 + ...+ β
S−s1− τ(yS)
1− τ(ys)nS}.
A.2.2 Definition of y∗ Introduced in Section 1.3.1
Recall that y∗ was defined in Section 3.1 as “the income an individual would have
earned in a economy identical to the present model, except that unemployment in-
surance was set to zero. Mathematically, the definition is y∗ = h(1− i∗)n∗, where n∗
and i∗ are given by the solution to the following problem:
(c∗, n∗, i∗, a′∗(′)) = arg max
c,n,i,a′(′)
[
u(c, n) + β
∑
′
Π(′ | )V (′, a′(′), h′,m+ 1; s+ 1)
]
s.t.
(1− τ¯n(y))y + a+ Tr = (1 + τ¯c)c+
∑
′
q(′ | )a′(′)
y = [h(1− i)]n
h′ = (1− δ)h+ A(hin)α,
i ∈ [0, χ].
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A.3 Country-Specific Tax Schedules
A.3.1 Estimating Country-Specific Average Tax Schedules
Here we provide more details on the estimation of tax schedules described in Section
1.2.2. Define normalized income as y˜ ≡ y/AW. For each country, denote the top
marginal tax rate with τTOP and the top bracket y˜TOP . The values for these variables
are taken from the OECD tax database.109 As noted in the text, we already have
average tax rates for all income levels below 2 (i.e., two times AW ). For values above
this number, we have to consider separately the case where a country’s top marginal
tax rate bracket is lower and higher than 2. In the former case (y˜TOP < 2), since we
know the average tax rate at y˜ = 2, each additional dollar up to 2 is taxed at the rate
of τTOP . Therefore, for y˜ > 2
τ¯(y˜) = (τ¯(2)× 2 + τTOP × (y˜ − 2))/(y˜)
If instead y˜TOP > 2 (which is only the case for the US and France), we do not
know the marginal tax rate between y˜ = 2 and y˜TOP . Thus, we first set τ(2) =
(τ¯(2)× 2− τ¯(1.75)× 1.75)/0.25 and use linear interpolation between τ(2) and τTOP .
We have
τ(y˜) =
 τ(2) +
τTOP−τ(2)
yTOP−2 (y˜ − 2) if 2 < y˜ < y˜TOP
τTOP if y˜ > y˜TOP .
109From Table I.7, available for download at www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase.
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Table A.2: Tax Function Parameter Estimates
τ¯(y/AW ) = a0 + a1(y/AW ) + a2(y/AW )
φ
Country: a0 a1 a2 φ R
2
Denmark 1.4647 −.01747 −1.0107 −.15671 0.990
Finland 1.7837 −.01199 −1.4518 −.11063 0.999
France 0.5224 .00339 −.24249 −.41551 0.993
Germany 1.8018 −.01708 −1.3486 −.11833 0.992
Netherlands 3.1592 −.00790 −2.8274 −.03985 0.984
Sweden 9.1211 −.00762 −8.7763 −.01392 0.985
UK 0.5920 −.00390 −.32741 −.30907 0.989
US 1.2088 −.00942 −.94261 −.10259 0.993
Then the average tax rate function for y˜ > 2 is
τ¯(y˜) =
 (τ¯(2)× 2 + τ(y˜)× (y˜ − 2))/y˜ if 2 < y˜ < y˜TOP(τ¯(2)× 2 + (τ(2)+τTOP )
2
(y˜TOP − 2) + τTOP × (y˜ − y˜TOP ))/y˜ if y˜ > y˜TOP
We use this expression to compute τ for y˜ = 3, 4, ..., 8 (in addition to the original
average tax rate from OECD website). We then fit the functional form given in
equation (8) to these 13 data points as explained in the text. The resulting coefficients
are reported in Table A.2.
A.3.2 Deriving Tax Schedules with Different Progressivity
but Same Average Tax Rate
To change the average tax rates in Europe without changing progressivity, we apply
the following procedure. Let τi(y) be the marginal tax rate in country i for income
level y. We would like to obtain a new tax schedule τ ∗i (y) with the same progressivity
but with a different level. Thus, we need to have (for all y and y′)
1− τ ∗i (y′)
1− τ ∗i (y)
=
1− τi(y′)
1− τi(y) ⇒
1− τ ∗i (y′)
1− τi(y′) =
1− τ ∗i (y)
1− τi(y)
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Letting this ratio to be equal to a constant k, the new tax schedule τ ∗ is obtained
by the following expression:
1− τ ∗i (y) = k(1− τi(y)) for all y. (A.1)
Let the average tax rate be
τ¯i(y) = a0 + a1y + a2y
φ ⇒ τi(y) = a0 + 2a1y + a2(φ+ 1)yφ.
Plugging this last expression into (20) and solving for τ ∗(y), we get
τ ∗i (y) = 1− k + k
[
a0 + 2a1y + a2(φ+ 1)y
φ
]
.
Observing that yτ¯i(y) =
´ y
0
τi(x)dx, we can solve for the average tax rate τ¯
∗
i (y) as
τ¯i
∗(y) = 1− k + k[a0 + a1y + a2yφ] = 1− k + kτ¯i(y). (A.2)
The new schedule τ¯ ∗i (y) has the same progressivity as τ¯i(y) but can have any desired
average tax rate. We choose k so that the average labor income tax rate in country i
is equal to the average labor income tax rate in the US.
A.3.3 Constructing Tax Schedules for 1983
Here, we describe the formulas we use to calculate the average tax rate at different
income levels for Germany and the United States in 1983. This information is obtained
from the OECD (1986) (see pages 104–105 and 244–248 for the US and pages 74–75
and 149–154 for Germany. In all calculations for Germany, the monetary figures are
in Deutsche Mark (DM). Gross income is denoted by GM.
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Germany
Social Security Contributions In 1983, the social security system in Germany
had two brackets with their respective tax rates. Specifically, social security contri-
butions (SSC) were given by:
SSC = 0.1138× (min(GI, 64800) + 0.0588(min(GI, 48600)).
Allowances Each worker receives an allowance (tax exemption) of DM 1080 and
an allowance of DM 564 for work-related expenses. The OECD considers other mis-
cellaneous allowances in the amount of DM 1606. We treat this amount as fixed for
all levels of income. Finally, workers are able to deduct part of their social security
contributions determined by this formula:
SSC Allowance = max{6000− 0.18(GI), 0}
+ min(2340,max{SSC −max{6000− 0.18(GI), 0}})
+0.5×min(2340,max{SSC −max{6000− 0.18GI, 0} − 2340, 0}).
Total Tax Putting together the taxes and allowances just described gives the tax-
able income of a worker:
Taxable Income = GI-SSC Allow.-Basic Allow.-Work-related and other Allow.
Now, we can calculate the tax liability to the household. The first step is to round
the taxable income.
Rounded Taxable Income (RTI) = round(Taxable Income/54)× 54.
We calculate two variables Y and Z that will be used in the calculations that
follow. They are defined as Y = RTI−18000
10000
and Z = RTI−60000
10000
. To obtain the income
tax for a worker, we need to apply Germany’s tax schedule in 1983:
163
Income Tax=

zero if RTI ≤ 4212
0.22× RTI− 926 if 4213 < RTI ≤ 18035
(((3.05Y − 73.76)Y + 695)Y + 2200)× Y + 3034 if 18036 < RTI ≤ 60047
(((0.09Z − 5.45)Z + 88.13)Z + 5040)× Z + 20018 if 60048 < RTI ≤ 130031)
0.56× RTI− 14837 if RTI > 130032
Average Tax Rate =
Income Tax + SSC
Gross Income
.
The United States
Social Security Contribution In 1983, the employee social security contribution
in the US was given by
SSC Employee = 0.067× (min(Gross Income, 35700))
The employer’s social security contribution matches the employee’s contribution
of 6.7% on earnings up to $35700. Additionally, employers are required to pay an
unemployment tax of 6.2% of earnings up to $7000 and a nationwide average for
state-sponsored tax plan of 2.8% of earnings up to $7624.
SSC Employee = 0.067× (min(GI, 35700)) + 0.062× (min(GI, 7000))
+0.028× (min(GI, 7624))
Allowances The total combined allowances and exemptions amount to $2300 per
worker.
Taxable Income = Gross Income− Basic Allowance− Tax Bracket Allowance.
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Federal Income Tax Now, we can calculate the tax liability for the household. We
need to apply the US tax schedule in 1983. The first $2300 is not taxed, as discussed
earlier. The tax rate is 11% when taxable income is in range (2300, 3400); is 13% in
range (3400, 4400); is 15% in range (4400,8500); 17% in range (8500, 10800); is 19% in
range (10800,12900); is 21% in range (12900, 15000); is 24% in range (15000,18200);
is 28% in range (18200, 23500); is 32% in range (23500,28800); is 36% in range
(28800,34100); is 40% in range (34100,41500); is 45% in range (41500,55300); and
50% above $55,300.
State and Local Taxes For the purposes of calculating local and state taxes, the
OECD considers a worker that lives in Detroit, Michigan. Detroit allows an exemption
of $600, then a flat 3% tax is applied. Tax Detroit = 0.03(GI − 600). The formula
for Michigan’s state income tax is given by
Tax Michigan = 0.0635(GI− 1500)− 0.05 max(Tax Detroit-200, 0) + 27.5
Total Local Tax = Tax Michigan + Tax Detroit
Total Tax The total tax liability is equal to the income tax plus the social security
contribution and the local tax. Then, we have
Average Tax Rate =
Total Tax Liability
Gross Income
A.4 Pension and Unemployment Benefits Systems
Pension System The details of the pension benefits system for OECD countries
used in this paper are taken from the OECD publication entitled “Pensions at a
Glance: 2007.” The specific numbers used in this section are from Table I.2 and the
unnumbered table on page 35 of that document. Further details of these pension
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systems, including the number of years required to qualify for full benefits, and so on,
are described more fully on pages 26–35 of the same document. Let yj be the lifetime
average of net (after-tax) labor earnings of all individuals with ability level j; and
let y be the same variable averaged across all ability levels. Finally, recall that mR is
the total number of years a worker has been employed up to the retirement age, and
let m be the maximum number of years of work that an individual can accumulate
retirement credits in a given country. The net retirement earnings of individual with
ability j is given as
Ω(yj,mR) = min
(
1,
mR
m
)[
ay + byj
]
The first term approximates the credit accumulation process whereby individuals
qualify for full retirement benefits after working a certain number of years and only
qualify for partial pensions if they retire before that. We set m equal to 40 years for
all countries. Different countries differ mainly in the value of the coefficients a and
b. Broadly speaking, a determines the “insurance” component of retirement income,
because it is independent of the individual’s own lifetime earnings, whereas b captures
the private returns to one’s own lifetime earnings. In this sense, a retirement system
with a high ratio of a/b provides high insurance but low incentives for high earnings
and vice versa for a low ratio of a/b. Inspecting the coefficients in the table shows
that there is a very wide range of variation across countries. Finally, some countries
have a ceiling on pensionable income and entitlements, which is also reported in Table
A.3.
UI System The OECD provides data on UI benefits that would be paid to a
qualifying person at different points during the unemployment spell: (i) in the first
month after the worker becomes unemployed, and (ii) after 5 years of long-term
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Table A.3: Pension System Formulas
a b Ranges Ceiling for Pensionable
Income (as % of AW)
DEN 0.371 0.528 all —
FIN 0.011 0.695 all —
FRA 0.141 0.484 all 300%
GER -0.004 0.621 if yj ≤ 1.5y¯
0.927 if yj > 1.5y¯ 150%
NET 0.005 0.928 all —
SWE -0.021 0.735 all 367%
UK 0.257 0.154 if yj ≤ y¯ 115%
0.315 0.096 if y¯ < yj ≤ 1.5y¯
0.396 0.042 yj > 1.5y¯
US 0.168 0.355 all 290%
unemployment, which we will refer to as initial UI and final UI benefits, respectively.
An individual with gross earnings y, who has been employed for m years prior to
becoming unemployed will receive an initial UI of
Φ(y,m, s) = min
(
1,
m
mUI
) [
ay + byj
]
.
As before, mUI denotes the minimum number of years required to receive full UI
benefits, and partial benefits are received if m < mUI . We set mUI to 20 years for all
countries. UI benefits are assumed to decline (every year) linearly between the rates
provided by the OECD for initial and final UI levels. Some countries also have an
upper level of unemployment insurance denoted by UI in Table A.4.
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Table A.4: Unemployment Insurance Formulas
a b UI Ranges of Income
DEN 0.173 0.258 if y ≤ 0.75y¯
0.367 if y > 0.75y¯
FIN 0.285 0.100
FRA 0.010 0.392 2.24
GER 0.091 0.253 0.90
NET 0.205 0.246 if y ≤ 1.25y¯
0.513 if y > 1.25y¯
SWE 0.145 0.375 if y ≤ 0.75y¯
0.338 0.118 if 0.75y¯ < y ≤ y¯
0.456 if y > y¯
UK 0.301
US 0.045 0.420 if y ≤ y¯
0.465 if y > y¯
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Identification
Here, we provide the proof of identification for the full model (2.6). Again, we will
make use of the variance-covariance structure implied by this model. This structure
is given by:
var(y˜ih,t) = σ
2
α + var(z
i
h,t) + φ
2
tσ
2
,h (B.1)
cov(yih,t, y
i
h+n,t+n) = σ
2
α + ρhρh+1 · · · ρh+n−1var
(
zih,t
)
(B.2)
var(zih,t) = ρ
2
h−1var(z
i
h−1,t−1) + pi
2
t σ
2
η,h (B.3)
Proposition: The process in (2.6) is identified up to the normalizations that ρ1 = ρ2,
pi1 = φ1 = φH = 1 and σ
2
η,H = σ
2
η,H−1.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the one for the simpler specification. We start
by assuming that we know the variance of the fixed effect, σ2α, and show that we can
identify all the remaining parameters. Then we come back to argue that the unused
moment conditions are enough to pin down σ2α.
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Note that since we assume that σ2α is known, we can construct cov
(
y˜ih,t, y˜
i
h+n,t+n
)−
σ2α. (B.2) implies
[
cov
(
y˜ih,t, y˜
i
h+2,t+2
)− σ2α] / [cov (y˜ih,t, y˜ih+1,t+1)− σ2α] = ρh+1 for h =
1, . . . , H − 2. This pins down the whole profile of ρh for h = 2, 3, . . . , H − 1 except
for ρH .
110 Note also that by normalization ρ1 = ρ2.
Now, our goal is to recover the schedule of var
(
zih,t
)
. Once we recover these,
we can use (B.3) to identify the loading factors and variances of persistent shocks,
{pit}t=Tt=1 and
{
σ2η,h
}h=H−1
h=1
. Note that
cov
(
y˜ih,t, y˜
i
h+1,t+1
)− σ2α
ρh
= var
(
zih,t
)
(B.4)
Since ρh is pinned down for h ≥ 1, (B.4) recovers var
(
zih,t
)
for h = 1, . . . , H − 1, t =
1, . . . , T − 1. Please note that var(ziH,t) for t = 1, .., T and var(zih,T ) for h = 1, .., H
are not identified yet.
Note that all of the parameters recovered so far depend on σ2α. It remains to
be shown that the unused covariances uniquely pin this down. We now show that
cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
5,4
)
suffices to recover σ2α uniquely:
cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
5,4
)
= σ2α + ρ4ρ3ρ2var(z
i
2,1)
= σ2α + ρ4ρ3ρ2
[
cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
3,2
)− σ2α
ρ2
]
= σ2α +
[
cov
(
y˜i3,1, y˜
i
5,3
)− σ2α
cov
(
y˜i3,1, y˜
i
4,2
)− σ2α
][
cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
4,3
)− σ2α
cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
3,2
)− σ2α
] [
cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
3,2
)− σ2α]
⇒ cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
5,4
)− σ2α
cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
4,3
)− σ2α = cov
(
y˜i3,1, y˜
i
5,3
)− σ2α
cov
(
y˜i3,1, y˜
i
4,2
)− σ2α
110Note that ρH does not enter the variance-covariance profile at all, so it is, in fact, not a parameter
of the model.
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⇒ σ2α =
cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
4,3
)
cov
(
y˜i3,1, y˜
i
5,3
)− cov (y˜i2,1, y˜i5,4) cov (y˜i3,1, y˜i4,2)
cov
(
y˜i2,1, y˜
i
4,3
)
+ cov
(
y˜i3,1, y˜
i
5,3
)− cov (y˜i2,1, y˜i5,4)− cov (y˜i3,1, y˜i4,2)
Now, we are ready to identify the loading factors and variances of persistent shocks.
Since var(zi0,t) = 0, var
(
zi1,t
)
= pi2t σ
2
η,1. Using the normalization that pi1 = 1, we get
σ2η,1. Tracking var
(
zi1,t
)
along t identifies pit for t = 2, . . . , T−1. Consequently, tracing
(B.3) along the age dimension identifies σ2η,h for h = 2, . . . , H − 1. By assumption
σ2η,H = σ
2
η,H−1 which gives us var(z
i
H,1).
Now let’s identify σ2,1 using equation B.1 for h = 1 and t = 1. Then again using
equation B.1 for h = 1, t = T we can get var(zi1,T ). Equation B.3 for h = 1 and t = T
pins down piT . Now we have recovered the entire pit profile.
The unidentified parameters so far are the lifetime profile of transitory variances
and their respective loading factors over time. We will show that the information
contained in B.1 is sufficient to identify both of these parameters, thanks to our
identifying assumptions of φ1 = 1 and φT = 1. An immediate consequence of B.1 is
var(y˜ih,1)− σ2α − var(zih,1) = σ2,h for h = 1, . . . , H
identifying σ2,h over the life cycle (except for H − 1). Fixing h, tracking B.1 over t,
and using the fact that we already identified all the parameters except the profile of
loading factors on transitory variances, it is easy to see that φt can be recovered for
h = 2, . . . , H − 1.
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B.2 Robustness
B.2.1 Results with Wage Data
Recall that the paper presented results using earnings data. One concern with earn-
ings is that dynamics that are in reality due to changes in hours can be interpreted as
shocks. This requires us to check the robustness of our results using data on wages.
Wage in our data set is defined as the ratio of annual earnings to hours worked during
that year. Figures B.1-B.4 show the results for wage data.
Figure B.1: Persistence Profile
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Figure B.2: Variance Profile of Persistent Shocks
Figure B.3: Variance Profile of Transitory Shocks
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Figure B.4: Results for Wages with Age Bins
The following tables present point estimates as well as the results of significance
tests.
Table B.1: Estimation and Test Results for Quadratic Specification (Wage Data)
x γx,0 γx,1 γx,2 Test 1 Test 2
ρ
0.7862 0.0163 -0.0003 H0 : γρ,1 ≤ 0 H0 : γρ,2 ≥ 0
(0.0534) (0.0048) (0.0001) 0.0000 0.0000
σ2η
0.0495 -0.0033 0.0001 H0 : γσ2η ,1 ≥ 0 H0 : γσ2η ,2 ≤ 0
(0.0089) (0.0009) (0.0000) 0.0000 0.0000
σ2α
0.0695
(0.0236)
σ2
0.0528
(0.0179)
* The numbers in brackets are bootstrap standard errors.
** The last three columns report the P-values for the corresponding test.
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Table B.2: Estimation and Test Results for Age Bins (Wage Data)
δx,1 δx,2 δx,3 Test 1 Test 2
ρ
0.8774 0.9706 0.9558 H0 : ρ1 ≥ ρ2 H0 : ρ2 ≤ ρ3
(0.0266) (0.0170) (0.0265) 0.0040 0.3480
σ2η
0.0280 0.0133 0.0243 H0 : σ
2
η,1 ≤ σ2η,2 H0 : σ2η,2 ≥ σ2η,3
(0.0073) (0.0038) (0.0069) 0.0000 0.0480
σ2α
0.0699
(0.0102)
σ2
0.0522
(0.0171)
* The numbers in brackets are standard errors.
** The last three columns report the p-values of the corresponding tests.
B.2.2 Results with Potential Experience for Ages 20-64
Now, we check the robustness of our findings with respect to age criteria. Recall that
we required an individual to be between the ages of 24 and 60. In Figures B.5-B.8, we
present the results for the sample with individuals between 20 and 64. Recall, also,
that we used age as the variable that defines the life cycle. Here, we use potential
experience as an alternative.111
111This also means that we use potential experience instead of age in our first-stage regressions.
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Figure B.5: Persistence Profile
Figure B.6: Variance Profile of Persistent Shocks
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Figure B.7: Variance Profile of Transitory Shocks
Figure B.8: Results for Potential Experience with Age Bins
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The following tables present point estimates as well as the results of significance
tests.
Table B.3: Estimation and Test Results for Quadratic Specification: Potential Expe-
rience
x γx,0 γx,1 γx,2 Test 1 Test 2
ρ
0.6052 0.0289 -0.0005 H0 : γρ,1 ≤ 0 H0 : γρ,2 ≥ 0
(0.0505) (0.0030) (0.0001) 0.0000 0.0000
σ2η
0.0943 -0.0071 0.0001 H0 : γσ2η ,1 ≥ 0 H0 : γσ2η ,2 ≤ 0
(0.0117) (0.0009) (0.0000) 0.0000 0.0000
σ2α
0.0940
(0.0214)
σ2
0.0755
(0.0200)
* The numbers in brackets are bootstrap standard errors.
** The last three columns report the P-values for the corresponding test.
Table B.4: Estimation and Test Results for Age Bins: Potential Experience
δx,1 δx,2 δx,3 Test 1 Test 2
ρ
0.8184 0.9693 0.9218 H0 : ρ1 ≥ ρ2 H0 : ρ2 ≤ ρ3
(0.0359) (0.0170) (0.0278) 0.0000 0.0920
σ2η
0.0351 0.0129 0.0386 H0 : σ
2
η,1 ≤ σ2η,2 H0 : σ2η,2 ≥ σ2η,3
(0.0091) (0.0044) (0.0101) 0.0000 0.0000
σ2α
0.0983
(0.0133)
σ2
0.0996
(0.0221)
* The numbers in brackets are standard errors.
** The last three columns report the p-values of the corresponding tests.
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B.3 An Economic Rationale for the Age-Dependent
Specification
Through a series of econometric analyses, we have shown that persistence and variance
of innovations to earnings exhibit non-trivial age profiles. A natural follow-up question
would be which economic forces may give rise to these. In this section, we elaborate
on the economic rationale behind having an age-dependent income process.
To speculate about one mechanism, these profiles could be due to differences in
insurance opportunities against earnings shocks between young and old workers. For
example, in case of an adverse demand shock to an individual’s occupation, one might
switch to a different one if she is young. For an old worker, though, switching is costlier
(e.g. because of occupation-specific human capital). Therefore, shocks of the same
nature can translate into innovations with different persistence over the working life.
Another mechanism, again related to mobility, is learning about the match quality,
first studied by Jovanovic (1979). In his setup, neither the worker nor the firm
know the productivity of the match before employment. After observing the output,
match productivity is revealed to both parties in a Bayesian fashion. This generates
endogenous movements in wages and job turnover. Flinn (1986) presents evidence
from NLSY/66 in favor of this theory. We now study the wage dynamics implied by
a simple version of Jovanovic (1979).
B.3.1 A Model of Job Mobility
Our economy consists of a continuum of workers endowed with one unit of time per
period. Workers maximize the present value of their lifetime earnings and discount
future earnings at a constant interest rate of r. They are subject to death with
constant probability, δ. There is measure one of firms that have access to a constant
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returns to scale production technology. Labor is the only input to the production.
At the beginning of a period, unemployed workers meet with firms, form a match
and draw a productivity specific to the match, µˆ, from a normal distribution with
mean µ and variance σ2µ. The match-specific productivity is not known to the firm and
the worker. Employed workers with tenure t receive their compensation, wt, before
production takes place. Output of the match, yt, is the sum of the match-specific
productivity µˆ, and an i.i.d. shock, νt. The latter is normally distributed with mean
0 and variance σ2ν . After observing the output, beliefs are updated in a Bayesian
fashion. Because of normality assumptions, they are characterized by the mean and
the precision of the point estimate about µˆ. Let mˆt|t−1 denote the mean about µˆ in
period t conditional on all the information up to period t − 1 and let pt denote the
precision.112 The law of motion for these are governed by,
mˆt+1|t = mˆt|t−1
pt
pt + pν
+ yt
p
pt + pν
pt = pµ + (t− 1)pν (B.5)
yt = mˆt|t−1 + ωt︸ ︷︷ ︸
µˆ
+νt
where ωt ∼ N(0, 1/pt) represents the deviation of the belief from the true productivity
µˆ, pµ = 1/σ
2
µ, and pν = 1/σ
2
ν .
For simplicity, we assume that firms pay workers their expected productivity before
production takes place (i.e. wt = mˆt|t−1). After updating the beliefs, a worker decides
whether to break the match. If she decides to break the match, she has to pay a fixed
cost, C, which represents the direct and foregone earnings costs of changing a job.113
112Since the information set of the worker and the firm are the same, their beliefs are identical.
113We do not model unemployment in the sense that workers meet new firms and start working
immediately in the next period.
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The value function of the worker is
Wt
(
mˆt|t−1
)
= wt + βEmax
{
Wt+1
(
mˆt+1|t
)
,W1
(
mˆ1|0
)− C}
s.t. (B.5)
where mˆ1|0 = µ and β = δ1+r .
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B.3.2 Simulation Results
In order to evaluate this model, we simulate data from the model and estimate the
age-dependent income process. We should note that we do not calibrate the model
to match any targets in the data. Ours is an exercise of showing that the model has
the potential to generate age profiles and replicate our empirical findings.115 Figure
B.9 shows the results.
The top panel shows that persistence profile is increasing with age. The mechanism
behind this increase can be summarized as follows. First, let’s consider a worker who
stays in the same job. Her wage can be expressed as the sum of her previous wage and
a mean-zero innovation, implying random walk.116 On the other hand, job switchers
always get the unconditional mean of the match-specific component µ, implying 0
covariance between current and future wages. Therefore, persistence is lower for
them. The persistence of the overall sample is a combination of the persistence of
these two subsamples. Over the lifetime, the fraction of switchers is declining with
age due to a selection argument, implying a rising persistence profile. Furthermore,
114The initial beliefs are given by the unconditional mean of the distribution for match productivity,
thus they are the same for every quitter.
115To be more precise, we set µ = 2, σ2µ = 1, σ
2
ν = 4; β = 1/(1 + r) = 0.95, and C = 0. We
simulate 10000 individuals, run the first stage regressions to obtain the residuals and estimate the
nonparametric specification of the age-dependent process.
116Recall that wt = mˆt|t−1. Equation (B.5) implies that wt+1 = wt
pt
pt+p
+ yt
p
pt+p
=
wt
(
pt
pt+p
+ ppt+p
)
+ ppt+p (ωt + νt) = wt + ξt, where ξt ∼ N(0,
p
pt(pt+p)
).
181
the bottom panel of Figure B.9 shows a decreasing variance profile for persistent
shocks.117 This is because the variance of innovations to wages declines with tenure
for stayers.118
Figure B.9: Simulation Results for the Learning Model
This section presented a theoretical background for our empirical findings. We
have illustrated that a very stylized model of learning (a` la Jovanovic (1979)) implies
an increasing persistence profile and a decreasing variance over the working life. The
mechanism discussed here is known to have empirical relevance (see Flinn (1986)).
Therefore, we also view these results as complementary to our econometric analysis
in Section 2.2, providing independent evidence for the age profiles.
117Note that the variance of persistent shocks are very low. This is because we did not calibrate
the model to match the data.
118According to the previous footnote, the variance of ξt is decreasing, since pt is increasing in t.
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B.4 Data
We use the first 29 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We include
an individual in our baseline sample if he satisfies the following criteria for 3 not
necessarily consecutive years: (i) the individual has reported positive labor earnings
and hours, (ii) his age is between 24 and 60, (iii) he worked between 520 and 5110
hours during the calendar year, and (iv) had an average hourly real wage between a
minimum of $2 and a maximum of $400 in 1993. We also exclude people from the
poverty sub-sample in 1968 (SEO). These criteria are fairly standard in the literature
and leave us with 4380 individuals and 53,864 observations. Tables B.5 and B.6
present some summary statistics.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Data Appendix
C.1.1 Data Cleaning
I merge MEPS waves between 1996-2007, which provides 367,363 observations (after
dropping reporting units that did not complete the survey). First, I construct family
units as a group of individual who share the same dwelling unit id (duid), yearly
family id (famidyr) in the same year.119 I drop families whose reference person is
younger than 18 years (172 observations dropped) or the oldest member is younger
than 18 years (946 observations dropped). I construct family income as the sum of
family members’ total income. I drop families whose income is lower than 10% of the
poverty threshold (6449 observations are dropped). I convert income to 2006 dollars
using CPI and medical expenditures using MPI.
119The MEPS has its own family unit and provides family size for them. For 13755 individuals
family size of the MEPS is inconsistent with the number I found, although I kept these individuals
with my own definition of family unit.
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Table C.1: Number of Observations by Year
year | Freq. Percent Cum.
———– - ———– ———— ————
1996 | 21,771 6.05 6.05
1997 | 33,040 9.18 15.23
1998 | 23,111 6.42 21.66
1999 | 23,981 6.66 28.32
2000 | 24,517 6.81 35.13
2001 | 32,775 9.11 44.24
2002 | 38,074 10.58 54.82
2003 | 33,162 9.22 64.04
2004 | 33,322 9.26 73.3
2005 | 32,901 9.14 82.44
2006 | 33,074 9.19 91.64
2007 | 30,098 8.36 100
———– - ———– ———— ————
Total | 359,826 100
Table C.2: Number of Observations by Race
Race | Freq. Percent Cum.
———– - ———– ———— ————
White | 281,482 78.23 78.23
Black | 56,808 15.79 94.01
Indian/Alaskan | 3,769 1.05 95.06
Asian | 13,957 3.88 98.94
Other | 3,810 1.06 100
———– - ———– ———— ————
Total | 359,826 100
Table C.3: Number of Observations by Gender
Gender | Freq. Percent Cum.
———– - ———— ———— ———-
Female | 188,206 52.3 52.3
Male | 171,620 47.7 100
———– - ———— ———— ———-
Total | 359,826 100
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Table C.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Weight Mean Stdev Min Max
Real total income 359826 3.3342e+09 24767.18 31187.2 -102255 684888.4
Real total consumpt. 359826 3.3342e+09 3090.97 9916.78 0 1088773
Real total income 359826 20475.88 28304 -102255 684888.4
Real total consumpt. 359826 2880.324 9370 0 1088773
Real family income 359826 3.3297e+09 66855.3 52166 990.85 775036
Real Family Consumption 359826 3.3297e+09 7895.97 15787 0 1092902
C.1.2 Medical Expenditures
The measure of medical expenditures I use in my analysis is total medical expenditure
that can be financed by the household, and/or government, and/or private insurance
company, and/or other sources (hospital’s funds, or non-profit organizations). In
addition it includes office- and hospital-based care, home health care, dental services,
vision aids, and prescribed medicines, etc.
I first clean year, gender and race effects from the medical expenditures and control
for random effects. For this purpose since medical expenditures are very skewed to
the left with a fat right tail, I take the natural logarithm of them. But there are many
observations with zero medical expenditures (see Figure C.1). For zero-expenditure
observations I proceed in 2 different ways: First, I clean year, gender and race effects
omitting zero-expenditure observations (Model I). Second, I added $1 to the medical
expenditures and use the whole sample (Model II).120
120In this case the distribution of residuals is not Gaussian.
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Figure C.1: Fraction of Individuals with Zero Expenditures by Income Quintile
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Table C.5: Regression Results
(Model I) (Model II)
VARIABLES logtotexp logtotexp all
Male -0.346*** -0.928***
(0.00847) (0.0138)
White 0.240*** 0.321***
(0.0399) (0.0663)
Black -0.198*** -0.714***
(0.0413) (0.0686)
Indian/Alaskan 0.0190 -0.347***
(0.0608) (0.102)
Asian -0.292*** -0.680***
(0.0445) (0.0748)
yeardum1 -0.229*** -0.0773***
(0.0182) (0.0285)
yeardum2 -0.263*** -0.210***
(0.0168) (0.0265)
yeardum3 -0.249*** -0.240***
(0.0179) (0.0282)
yeardum4 -0.235*** -0.202***
(0.0176) (0.0275)
yeardum5 -0.156*** -0.174***
(0.0176) (0.0277)
yeardum6 -0.0213 0.0713***
(0.0162) (0.0255)
yeardum7 0.000443 0.0780***
(0.0157) (0.0248)
yeardum8 0.0174 0.118***
(0.0162) (0.0253)
yeardum9 0.00331 0.0276
(0.0162) (0.0254)
yeardum10 0.0486*** 0.0679***
(0.0157) (0.0246)
yeardum11 0.0567*** 0.0690***
(0.0140) (0.0217)
Constant 6.969*** 6.235***
(0.0410) (0.0679)
Observations 290,965 359,826
Number of myid 174,981 199,484
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure C.2: Age Profile of Medical Expenditures by Income (Model I)
Figure C.3: Age Profile of Medical Expenditures by Income (Model II)
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I also normalize family income with the square-root equivalence scale. Figure C.4
shows the age profile of medical expenditures for this case.
Figure C.4: Age Profile of Medical Expenditures by Income (Square-Root Scale)
C.1.3 Preventive Medicine Usage
In the MEPS respondents are asked how often they use a particular preventive
medicine. In particular, they are asked “Time since your last...” and their answers
are categorized into “within past year,”“within past two years,”... etc.121
Table C.6 shows the average durations between two consecutive usages of preven-
tive care by income group where Q1, Q2, .. Q5 denote the income quintiles from
lowest to highest, respectively.
121In the case of regular dentist checks the question is “How often do you get...” and the possible
answers are “twice a year,”“once a year,”“once in two years,” etc.
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C.1.4 Effect of Health Status on Income
The MEPS has a panel dimension for two consecutive years, which allows me to
identify the effect of health status on labor earnings. I impose more restrictions on
top of the sample I use for medical expenditure analysis. I restrict my sample to
those between ages 18 and 65 who work at least 10 hours per week. Moreover, my
sample excludes workers whose hourly wage is less than $2.75. I also control for year
(yeardum), highest educational degree (hidegdum), and race (racedum) dummies.
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Table C.7: Effect of Health Status on Income
VARIABLES logearn
health -0.111***
(0.00337)
yeardum1 -0.331***
(0.0106)
yeardum2 -0.285***
(0.0108)
yeardum3 -0.219***
(0.0106)
yeardum4 -0.163***
(0.0103)
yeardum5 -0.141***
(0.00958)
yeardum6 -0.115***
(0.00935)
yeardum7 -0.115***
(0.00971)
yeardum8 -0.0884***
(0.00958)
yeardum9 -0.0538***
(0.00918)
yeardum10 -0.0303***
(0.00816)
age 0.295***
(0.00761)
age2 -0.00578***
(0.000193)
age3 3.66e-05***
(1.57e-06)
male 0.201***
(0.00549)
hidegdum2 0.169***
(0.0151)
hidegdum3 0.390***
(0.00840)
hidegdum4 0.809***
(0.00996)
hidegdum5 0.967***
(0.0128)
hidegdum6 1.104***
(0.0196)
hidegdum7 0.564***
(0.0119)
racedum1 0.114***
(0.0319)
racedum2 -0.0103
(0.0325)
racedum3 -0.0474
(0.0428)
racedum4 0.0869**
(0.0342)
Constant 5.162***
(0.1000)
Observations 133,008
Number of myid 80,764
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In my sample the range of health status is between 1 to 5. So between best and
worst health status workers, earnings change around 40%.
C.1.5 Estimation of Insurance Coverage Functions
In the MEPS both the total amount of expenditures and out-of-pocket expenditures
are given. Moreover, in any given period information on whether the individual is
insured, if she is insured, the type of insurance (e.g., private, Medicaid, Medicare,
etc.) is provided. Using this information I estimate insurance coverage functions for
private insurance holders and Medicare holders.122 I assume the following functional
form for the insurance coverage, which features both a deductible and a co-payment:
χ(x) =

0 x ≤ ι
ς(x− ι) x ≥ ι
where ι and ς determine deductibles and co-payment rates.
For the estimation of the private insurance coverage function I exclude anyone
who is not covered by private insurance for the whole year, or who is covered by any
other type of insurance at any point in that particular year.123
Table C.8: Private Insurance Coverage
ς 0.955***
(0.000415)
ι 0.0237***
(0.000130)
Observations 139,300
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
122For Medicaid holders I assume that they are covered by private insurance.
123The amount of the deductible ι is in terms of average earnings, which is $30450.
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For the estimation of the Medicare coverage function I exclude anyone who is
not covered by Medicare for the whole year or who is covered by any other type of
insurance at any point in that particular year.
Table C.9: Medicare Coverage
ς 0.949***
(0.00175)
ι 0.0575***
(0.000941)
Observations 12,670
R-squared 1.000
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
C.2 The Basic Model with Initial Wealth
In this section I present the simulation results for the basic model introduced in
Section 3.3.1 with heterogeneity in initial wealth instead of heterogeneity in period
income. The purpose of this exercise is to show that the borrowing constraint does
not play a major role in medical expenditure profile of low-income households. The
model is the same as the original one except households differ in their initial holdings
of wealth at birth and receive a minimal constant stream of income per period (equal
to the consumption floor). In addition, households are not allowed to default since
their assets constitute the major portion of their lifetime wealth.
Then, the Bellman equation for a type-i household (where i ∈ {rich, poor}) can
be written as:
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V it (ht, xt, a
i
t) = Eωt max
IDt ,ct,mC,t,mP,tat+1
u(ct) + βs(ht − ωt)V it+1(ht+1, xt+1, ait+1)
w + (1 + r)ait = ct +mC,t +mP,t + a
i
t+1
ht+1 =

ht if A
c
tm
θct
C,t ≥ ωt
ht − ωt + Actmθ
c
t
C,t otherwise
xt+1 =

xt if A
pmθ
p
P,t ≥ δxxt
xt(1− δx) + ApmθpP,t otherwise
log(ωt) ∼

N(µGt , σ2t ) w/p pi(xt)
N(µBt , σ2t ) w/p 1− pi(xt)
where a0 ∈ {arich, apoor}and w = cmin.
Figure C.5 shows the simulation results for this economy. Please note that the
preventive medical expenditure behavior of low-income households is similar to the
case where households receive a heterogeneous income per period.
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Figure C.5: Lifetime Profile of Medical Expenditures
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C.3 Estimation Results
Table C.10: Fixed Parameters
Param Explanation Value
Demographics
T Life time 110 years
TCHILD Childhood 20 years
TRET Retirement Age 65
Income Process
σ2α Variance of Fixed effects 0.24
σ2η Variance of Shocks 0.02
ρ Persistence of Shocks 0.98
ζ Decrease in earnings due to health shocks 40%
Private Insurance Plan/Medicaid
ι Deductible 722$
ς Copayment 4.5%
Medicare
ι Deductible 1697$
ς Copayment 5%
Miscellaneous
r Interest rate 2.5%
σ CRRA coefficient 3
cmin Consumption Floor 5000$
w Poverty Threshold 10488$
Table C.11: Preference Parameters
Param Explanation Value
β Discounting Factor 0.98
b Value of being alive 6.75
α Quality of life parameter 0.20
γ Quality of life parameter 1.15
Table C.12: Preventive Health Capital Parameters
Param. Explanation Value
δx Preventive health depreciation 7.5%
Ap Preventive health function productivity 0.28
θC Preventive health function curvature 0.40
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Table C.13: Physical Health Parameters
Age Ac θc µ σ2 Age Ac θc µ σ2
1 0.15466 1.208109 -7.66545 1.703434 56 0.035172 0.869485 -5.86903 1.304228
2 0.15466 1.208109 -7.66545 1.703434 57 0.037824 0.850597 -5.74153 1.275895
3 0.15466 1.208109 -7.66545 1.703434 58 0.040687 0.831646 -5.61361 1.247469
4 0.15466 1.208109 -7.66545 1.703434 59 0.043669 0.813274 -5.4896 1.219912
5 0.15466 1.208109 -7.66545 1.703434 60 0.046839 0.795076 -5.36676 1.192614
6 0.225088 1.498756 -8.83517 1.96337 61 0.051328 0.803658 -5.24387 1.165304
7 0.225088 1.498756 -8.83517 1.96337 62 0.054971 0.785102 -5.12279 1.138398
8 0.225088 1.498756 -8.83517 1.96337 63 0.059163 0.765211 -4.993 1.109557
9 0.225088 1.498756 -8.83517 1.96337 64 0.063836 0.744638 -4.85877 1.079726
10 0.225088 1.498756 -8.83517 1.96337 65 0.06887 0.724096 -4.72473 1.04994
11 0.105945 1.372986 -8.83517 1.96337 66 0.070566 0.723387 -4.58989 1.019976
12 0.105945 1.372986 -8.83517 1.96337 67 0.075886 0.703553 -4.46405 0.99201
13 0.105945 1.372986 -8.83517 1.96337 68 0.080979 0.685828 -4.35158 0.967018
14 0.105945 1.372986 -8.83517 1.96337 69 0.085679 0.670435 -4.25391 0.945313
15 0.105945 1.372986 -8.83517 1.96337 70 0.090209 0.656379 -4.16473 0.925495
16 0.06723 1.363452 -8.83517 1.96337 71 0.085053 0.641626 -4.07111 0.904692
17 0.06723 1.363452 -8.83517 1.96337 72 0.090303 0.626031 -3.97217 0.882703
18 0.06723 1.363452 -8.83517 1.96337 73 0.095857 0.610493 -3.87358 0.860795
19 0.06723 1.363452 -8.83517 1.96337 74 0.101654 0.595205 -3.77657 0.839239
20 0.06723 1.363452 -8.83517 1.96337 75 0.107929 0.57961 -3.67762 0.817249
21 0.048962 1.340757 -9.05011 2.011136 76 0.109543 0.575596 -3.57445 0.794323
22 0.050157 1.330047 -8.97782 1.995071 77 0.117075 0.558288 -3.46697 0.770438
23 0.051328 1.31979 -8.90858 1.979684 78 0.125372 0.540467 -3.3563 0.745844
24 0.051518 1.318142 -8.89746 1.977212 79 0.134476 0.52222 -3.24299 0.720664
25 0.051224 1.320684 -8.91462 1.981027 80 0.13901 0.51359 -3.18939 0.708754
26 0.049118 1.313087 -8.92243 1.982762 81 0.144714 0.510161 -3.09923 0.688717
27 0.048987 1.314248 -8.93032 1.984515 82 0.153016 0.495438 -3.00978 0.668841
28 0.04949 1.309793 -8.90004 1.977788 83 0.161723 0.480831 -2.92105 0.649122
29 0.050613 1.300018 -8.83362 1.963028 84 0.170853 0.466338 -2.833 0.629556
30 0.052019 1.288079 -8.7525 1.944999 85 0.18042 0.451958 -2.74564 0.610143
31 0.03136 1.263582 -8.6429 1.920644 86 0.18157 0.413203 -2.65896 0.590881
32 0.032479 1.250788 -8.55539 1.901198 87 0.19187 0.399839 -2.57296 0.57177
33 0.033865 1.235537 -8.45107 1.878016 88 0.202667 0.386581 -2.48765 0.552811
34 0.035219 1.221228 -8.3532 1.856266 89 0.213976 0.37343 -2.40302 0.534005
35 0.036544 1.207752 -8.26102 1.835783 90 0.225815 0.360388 -2.31909 0.515354
36 0.030922 1.201206 -8.16219 1.813821 91 0.240758 0.368044 -2.23587 0.49686
37 0.032322 1.18591 -8.05826 1.790724 92 0.253748 0.354462 -2.15336 0.478524
38 0.033838 1.17007 -7.95063 1.766806 93 0.267315 0.341 -2.07157 0.460349
39 0.035604 1.152485 -7.83113 1.740252 94 0.281476 0.327657 -1.99052 0.442338
40 0.037395 1.135527 -7.71591 1.714646 95 0.296248 0.314438 -1.91021 0.424491
41 0.033983 1.117985 -7.59671 1.688157 96 0.302394 0.301342 -1.83065 0.406811
42 0.035874 1.100082 -7.47506 1.661124 97 0.318369 0.288371 -1.75185 0.389301
43 0.037776 1.083001 -7.35899 1.635331 98 0.33502 0.275527 -1.67382 0.371961
44 0.039635 1.06712 -7.25108 1.611352 99 0.352363 0.26281 -1.59657 0.354794
45 0.041563 1.051418 -7.14438 1.587641 100 0.372671 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
46 0.03328 1.048629 -7.03106 1.562457 101 0.363518 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
47 0.035193 1.031402 -6.91555 1.536789 102 0.363518 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
48 0.037154 1.014695 -6.80353 1.511895 103 0.363518 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
49 0.039081 0.999114 -6.69906 1.48868 104 0.363518 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
50 0.041253 0.982445 -6.5873 1.463843 105 0.363518 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
51 0.035327 0.978946 -6.47573 1.439051 106 0.35406 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
52 0.037538 0.961175 -6.35818 1.412928 107 0.35406 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
53 0.039907 0.943254 -6.23963 1.386584 108 0.35406 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
54 0.04249 0.924888 -6.11813 1.359585 109 0.35406 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
55 0.045278 0.906278 -5.99503 1.332228 110 0.35406 0.248692 -1.5108 0.335734
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